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The Department of Administrative Services files 
this brief in support of its Petition for Certiorari to set 
aside a Report and Order on Stipulation and Agreement dated 
December 31, 1981 (Report and Order) of the Utah Public 
Service Commission whereby the Commission approved a Stipula-
tion and Agreement among Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Wexpro 
Company, the Division of Public Utilities, and the Committee 
of Consumer Services. The Report and Order is in wholesale 
violation and disregard of this Court's decision and mandate 
in Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 595 P.2d 871 (1979). The Report and Order divests the 
Commission of jurisdiction over public utilities and public 
utility properties; allows an unregulated subsidiary of 
Mountain Fuel to sell natural gas produced from utility 
properties to Mountain Fuel at market price; allows Mountain 
Fuel to transfer its utility function of exploring for oil 
and gas to subsidiaries without any determination whether 
such a transfer is in the public interest; and allows 
Mountain Fuel shareholders to expropriate utility properties 
without an adequate determination that they are paying fair 
market value. By approving the Stipulation and Agreement, 
the Public Service Commission not only disregarded this 
Court's mandate, but knuckled under to Mountain Fuel and its 
shareholders, who presented the Commission with a fait 
accompli that it would not engage in a regulated exploration 
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and development program, and then launched what the Division 
characterized below as an extraordinary attack on this 
Court's decision in three separate legal forums. 
THE CASES ON REVIEW 
The Report and Order on Stipulation and Agreement 
which this brief seeks to reverse was entered with respect to 
the following cases. 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY FOR A GENERAL 
INCREASE IN RATES AND CHARGES INCIDENT TO 
NATURAL GAS SERVICE RENDERED WITHIN THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
CASE NO. 77-057-03 
(Count II) 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF MOUNTAIN 
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY FOR A GENERAL INCREASE IN 
RATES AND CHARGES INCIDENT TO NATURAL GAS 
SERVICE RENDERED WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
CASE NO. 79-057-03 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF MOUNTAIN 
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY FOR A GENERAL INCREASE IN 
RATES AND CHARGES INCIDENT TO NATURAL GAS 
SERVICE RENDERED WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
CASE NO. 80-057-01 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF MOUNTAIN 
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY FOR A GENERAL INCREASE IN 
RATES AND CHARGES INCIDENT TO NATURAL GAS 
SERVICE RENDERED WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
CASE NO. 81-057-01 
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE DIVISION 
OF PUBLIC UTILITIES TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSED 
TRANSFER OF CERTAIN WELLS, LEASES, LANDS AND 
2 
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RELATED FACILITIES AND INTERESTS OF MOUNTAIN 
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY TO WEXPRO COMPANY ON 
REMAND FROM THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
CASE NO. 76-057-14 
IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
TRANSFER OF CERrrAIN WELLS, LANDS, LEASES AND 
RELATED BUILDINGS AND INTERESTS OF MOUNTAIN 
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY AND/OR WEXPRO COMPANY TO 
CELSIUS ENERGY COMPANY OR ANY OTHER ENTITY OR 
PERSON. 
CASE NO. 81-057-04. 
The Report and Order is the final order of the 
Public Service Commission (Corrunission) in Case Nos. 76-057-14 
and 81-057-04. Case No. 76-057-14 is the case remanded to 
the Conunission by this Court's decision in Committee of 
Consumer Services, supra, commonly referred to as the "Wexpro 
case." Case No. 81-057-04 arose during proceedings before 
the Commission on remand in the Wexpro case when the Division 
of Public Utilities moved for a ternp<;>rary restraining order 
and preliminary injunction to enjoin Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company's attempt, without Commission sanction, to transfer 
oil and gas wells, leases and related property to a 
newly-created subsidiary, Celsius Energy Company (Celsius). 
Mountain Fuel created Celsius in response to this Court's 
decision in the Wexpro case. The Corrunission established 
Docket No. 81-057-04 to hear the Celsius matter. 
Case Nos. 77-057-03, 79-057-03, 80-057-01 and 
81-057-01 are general rate cases. The Report and Order 
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resolves contingencies in final orders previously entered in 
those cases, i.e., the rates set in those cases are to be 
adjusted by proceeds from oil and gas assets to the extent 
the Wexpro case determines those proceeds are available to 
reduce rates. 
The issues resolved in the Report and Order are all 
based on issues determined by this Court in the Wexpro case. 
PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS OF THE WEXPRO CASE 
AND THE POST-REMAND PROCEEDINGS 
The regulatory proceedings which culminated in 
the Report and Order were commenced by a Petition for Inves-
tigation filed by the Division of Public Utilities 
(Division) on December 17, 1976, and designated Case No. 
76-057-14. The Petition was occasioned by Mountain Fuel's 
announced intention to convey all of its claimed 
"non-utility" "oil" properties, including reserves, leases 
and related facilities, to a newly-formed, wholly- owned 
subsidiary, Wexpro, in exchange for all of the common stock 
of Wexpro at depreciated book value and to enter into a joint 
exploration arrangement with Wexpro to explore Mountain 
Fuel's wildcat acreage. The transfer was reflected in an 
Agreement of Purchase and Sale (P&S Agreement) and the 
exploration arrangement in a Joint Exploration Agreement 
(JEA). Both agreements were between Mountain Fuel and 
4 
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Wexpro. Committee of Consumer Services, supra. MFS 1 & 
2. 1 Mountain Fuel from the inception took the categorical 
position that the Commission had no jurisdiction over the 
transfer of properties from Mountain Fuel to Wexpro. Hear-
ing 12/29/76 at 24. 
The Petition for Investigation asked the Public 
Service Commission to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over 
these transactions and to determine after an evidentiary 
hearing whether they were in the public interest. Petition 
1 The following abbreviations are used for purposes of 
citation in this brief: With respect to the record made 
prior to remand of the Wexpro case, (1) "Ord." by date and 
without case number refers to orders in the Wexpro case; 
( 2) "Tr." refers to the transcript page number from the 
evidentiary hearings September 12 through October 28, 1977, 
(3) other transcript citations are given by page and date, 
(4) citations to exhibits are to the exhibit number used in 
that proceeding--Mountain Fuel exhibits are referred to as 
MFS- , Division exhibits are referred to as DIV- , and Salt 
Lake-County Exhibits are referred to as SLC-_; (5} pleadings 
or other papers are cited by the title and/or description, 
and (6) orders by case number and date only, refer to Corrunis-
sion orders in the cited case. 
With respect to the post-remand record, ( 1) R. __ refers to 
transcript page number and to the record citation to all 
other pleadings, papers and orders; (2) pleadings or other 
papers are cited by title and/or description, with a designa-
tion to the place in the record. For example, Petition for 
the Establishment of a Fund for Attorneys' and Expert Witness 
Fees for the Division of Public Utilities, R. 2506; (3) the 
Report and Order on Stipulation and Agreement R. 007, was 
only designated with a record number on every other page, and 
for that reason citations in this Memorandum to the Report 
and Order are given by original page and/or paragraph 
number. 
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for Investigation at 3. The issues raised by the Petition 
for Investigation included (1) "are the assets being trans-
ferred, in fact non-utility property, and have they always 
been non-utility property" and (2) "do the utility rate-
payers and the utility operations have any interest in the 
oil operations of Mountain Fuel Supply Co." Petition for 
Investigation,,, 6(a), 6(j). 
Without ever having held any evidentiary hearing, 
the Public Service Conunission on July 20, 1977, at the urging 
of Mountain Fuel, issued a Final Report and Order holding the 
Commission had no jurisdiction over the transaction transfer-
ring Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" "oil" properties to 
Wexpro. The Order terminated the case. Ord. 7/20/77 at 
4-5. 
While motions for rehearing were pending, on August 
23, 1977 the Commission heard a report from the parties con-
cerning a proposed settlement by Mountain Fuel which provided 
for the amendment of the P&S Agreement and the JEA. 
On August 29, 1977, the Commission entered its 
Order on the Petitions for Rehearing. The Commission af-
firmed its July 20 Order and denied the Petitions for Rehear-
ing, except that the Commission granted a rehearing for the 
purpose of having Mountain Fuel present the amendments to the 
P&S Agreement and the JEA that it had proposed at the August 
23 conference. Ord. 8/29/77. 
6 
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On September 12, 1977, the Commission commenced an 
evidentiary hearing under the scope of the Commission's Order 
of August 29, 1977. The evidentiary hearing on Mountain 
Fuel's proposed amendments to the Wexpro agreements continued 
for 18 days. 
On April ll, 1978, the Commission adopted verbatim 
an 80-page Order prepared by counsel for Mountain Fuel. 
Letter of transmittal by Mountain Fuel and Proposed Report 
and Order on Rehearing, 11/10/77. The Commission affirmed 
its position that it ha~ no jurisdiction over the properties 
held in Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" "oil" accounts, and 
rejected the Division's and Committee's positions that the 
ratepayers were entitled to have the net prof its from the oil 
operations applied to reduce rates. The Commission pass[ed] 
on every significant issue of fact and law" raised by the 
Mountain Fuel-Wexpro .transactions. Ord. 4/11/78 at ~ 100. 
This Court reversed the April 11, 1978 Order and 
remanded "for a hearing in accordance with the principles set 
forth in this opinion." Committee of Consumer Services, 
supra, at 873. This Court ordered, among other things, that 
a hearing must be held to determine whether the assets were 
utility assets pursuant to a three-pronged test. This Court 
also ordered that the proceeds from utility assets must 
reduce gas rates and that any transfer of utility assets 
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must be for fair market value. According to this Court's 
test, virtually all the assets transferred to Wexpro are, as 
a matter of law, utility assets. 
Mountain Fuel, Wexpro, Alex Oblad, Harold Burton 
and Carlyle Harmon filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
with the United States Supreme Court (Petition for 
Certiorari), submitted herewith as Appendix "A". Their 
petition states that this Court's opinion held that the 
"non-utility" oil properties transferred by Mountain Fuel to 
Wexpro "had always been and are utility assets, and that 
these properties and the oil revenues generated therefrom 
should be 'applied to reduce the cost of gas' to the Utah 
utility customer." Mountain Fuel Petition for Certiorari at 
13. The Petition for Certiorari stated that this Court's 
Order was reviewable in that "all that remains is an 
accounting proceeding." Petition for Certiorari at 17, n.7. 
Certiorari was denied on January 7, 1980. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company v. Utah Commission of Consumer Services, 444 
U.S. 1014 (1980). 
Thereafter, on remand before the Commission, Moun-
tain Fuel's shareholders launched what the Division charac-
terized below as an extraordinary attack on this Court's 
decision, including, in the Division's words, 
an attempt to make this hearing more than a 
ministerial proceeding by introducing con-
voluted evidence on the issues of shareholder 
contribution, shareholder risk, and their 
analysis of the "public interest." [This is] 
8 
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only an attempt to relitigate issues on which 
Mountain Fuel has already lost but an 
affront to [the Public Service] Co~nission in 
light of Mountain Fuel's statement to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Utah Department of Business Regulation, Division of 
Public Utilities' Hearing Brief on Remand (Division Brief on 
Remand), R. 2482, at 2491. 
On remand, no evidentiary hearing of any kind was 
ever held until after Mountain Fuel, Wexpro, the Division, 
and the Committee executed the Stipulation and Agreement. 
The evidentiary hearings held after the execution of the 
Agreement were limited to the issue whether or not the 
Stipulation and Agreement should be approved. 
The Commission issued its Report and Order approv-
ing the Stipulation and Agreement on December 31, 1981. 
SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF'S POSITION 
The plaintiff in suITu.nary claims: 
(a) The Report and Order on Stipulation and 
Agreement errs in divesting the Commission of its statutory 
jurisdiction. This Court held in the Wexpro case that the 
Commission has jurisdiction over Mountain Fuel's oil and gas 
operations and properties because the exploration and 
development of oil and gas is a utility business, and because 
the ratepayers bore the risk of exploration and development 
of oil and gas. This Court held that properties explored and 
developed with ratepayer funds are utility assets. This 
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Court also held that Wexpro is a public utility, and under 
this Court's decision Celsius, a newly created subsidiary 
which will own Mountain Fuel's wildcat acreage, is as a 
matter of law a public utility. The Commission, however, in 
approving the Stipulation and Agreement, divested itself of 
jurisdiction over utility assets. It also divested itself of 
jurisdiction over Celsius and Wexpro. 
Notwithstanding the Commission's statutory duty to 
regulate all of the business of every public utility, and 
therefore to regulate Mountain Fuel's oil and gas exploration 
and development business, the Commission divested itself of 
jurisdiction over sales of natural gas by Celsius to Mountain 
Fuel. And notwithstanding its statutory jurisdiction to hold 
hearings and make determinations pursuant thereto, the 
Commission approved a provision that arbitration is the sole 
remedy for parties claiming default under the Stipulation and 
Agreement. 
The statutes of this state, not the Stipulation and 
Agreement, must define the jurisdiction of the Commission, 
but the Commission acquiesced in a serious encroachment on 
its statutory power. 
(b) The Division, without legislative authority, 
gave up its power to challenge actions of Mountain Fuel, 
Wexpro or Celsius in violation of its duties to represent the 
public interest before the Commission. 
10 
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(c) The approval of the Stipulation and Agreement 
violates the mandate of this Court. While this Court 
remanded the case for a hearing in accordance with principles 
set forth in its opinion, the Commission failed to hold any 
such hearing. The only evidentiary hearing held by the 
Corni~ission was a hearing on approval of the Stipulation and 
Agreement. Nothing was done in accordance with the mandate. 
The Conunission was told to classify assets as utility or 
non-utility in accordance with a three-pronged test, but 
there was never a hearing on classification. The Commission 
was told that any transfer of utility assets must be for fair 
market value and in the public interest, but there was never 
a reasoned determination of fair market value, and in fact 
the Commission denied the Utah State Coalition of Senior 
Citizens' motion for a valuation of the assets. The 
Commission violated this Court's mandate that the ratepayers 
were entitled to have rates reduced by all oil prof its from 
properties explored and developed at ratepayer risk. While 
this Court expressly stated that if a subsidiary were to 
engage in oil and gas operations there must be a 
determination by the Commission of whether Mountain Fuel 
could divide its utility functions between itself and its 
subsidiary, the Commission in approving the Stipulation and 
Agreement allowed such a division without any such 
determination. All of those actions violated this Court's 
, , 
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mandate. 
An adminstrative agency has no power to ignore the 
mandate of this Court, whether or not a case is settled. In 
fact, an administrative agency has a duty not only to carry 
out the letter but to serve the purposes of this Court's 
mandate, and the Commission by approving the Stipulation and 
Agreement has frustrated virtually every purpose of this 
Court's mandate. 
(d) The Report and Order also violates the law of 
Utah. In direct contravention of the law, the Commission 
approved a sale of gas by Mountain Fuel's wholly-owned 
subsidiary, Celsius, to Mountain Fuel at market prices rather 
than cost of service. To add insult to injury, that gas will 
come from properties acquired and held in utility accounts. 
In contravention of the law, Wexpro is entitled under the 
Stipulation and Agreement to 46% of the net profits on oil 
from new wells drilled in gas reservoirs. In contravention 
of the law, the Stipulation and Agreement lead immediately to 
the end of Mountain Fuel's utility exploration and develop-
ment program. 
The Report and Order is the result of a compro-
mise--plain and simple. The shareholder interests were 
unwilling to live with this Court's decision that oil and gas 
exploration and development is a utility activity. The 
shareholder interests wanted an unregulated oil company and 
12 
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presented the Commission with a fait accompli that they would 
not operate a regulated exploration and development company. 
That fait accompli flouted this Court's decision. To promote 
their desire for an unregulated oil company, the shareholders 
launched a massive litigative attack on this Court's 
decision. The Stipulation and Agreement were a compromise of 
the Division's victory in the Wexpro case to avoid long and 
expensive litigation. The Commission, feeling itself "in a 
box", approved the Stipulation and Agreement. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Public Service Commission, in 
approving the Stipulation and Agreement, unlawfully divested 
itself of its statutory jurisdiction: 
(a) in relinquishing jurisdiction over assets 
which are as a matter of law utility assets; 
(b} in relinquishing jurisdiction over Wexpro 
and Celsius, which are as a matter of law public 
utilities; and 
(c) in relinquishing jurisdiction over sales 
of natural gas f rorn Celsius to Mountain Fuel. 
2. Whether the Public Service Commission, in 
approving the Stipulation and Agreement, unlawfully divested 
itself of its statutory jurisdiction to determine whether the 
public interest allows Mountain Fuel to divide its utility 
function between itself and a subsidiary. 
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3. Whether the Public Service Cornmiss ion, in 
approving the Stipulation and Agreement, unlawfully divested 
itself of its statutory raternaking jurisdiction in allowing 
an unregulated rate of return on production from utility 
assets. 
4. Whether the Division unlawfully divested itself 
of its statutory power to act as a party in litigation before 
the Public Service Commission. 
5. Whether the approval of the Stipulation and 
Agreement violates this Court's mandate in Committee of 
Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 595 P.2d 871 
(Utah 1979) 
(a) by failing to hold a hearing to classify 
assets; 
(b) by failing to hold any hearing to deter-
mine whether the transfer of assets was in the public 
interest and for fair market value; 
(c) by failing to determine whether it is in 
the public interest for Mountain Fuel to divide its 
utility function between itself and a subsidiary; 
(d) by failing to determine the benefits to 
which ratepayers are entitled by having oil prof its 
applied to reduce rates; and 
(e) by allowing Mountain Fuel to pay Celsius 
market prices for natural gas; 
14 
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6. Whether the Report and Order violates the law 
of Utah: 
(a} by allowing Mountain Fuel to purchase gas 
from a subsidiary at market prices; 
(b) Dy allowing Wexpro 46% of the net profits 
on oil obtained from gas reservoirs; 
(c) by allowing Mountain Fuel to divide its 
utility function between itself and its subsidiary 
without a determination whether such division is in the 
public interest; and 
(d) by depriving ratepayers of a reduction in 
rates from the net proceeds from all hydrocarbons 
obtained from utility properties. 
7. Whether the Report and Order is arbitrary and 
capricious and internally inconsistent in approving the 
Stipulation and Agreement despite the Commission's findings 
that: 
(a) cost of service gas is an important con-
sideration to the public interest; 
(b) there are potential conflicts of interest 
or sweetheart relationships between Mountain Fuel and 
its oil subsidiaries; 
(c) exploration and development of energy 
resources are appropriate utility activities; and 
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(d) non-utility activities should enhance 
rather than jeopardize utility operations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. This Court's Decision And Mandate In The Wexpro Case 
Rejected Mountain Fuel's Shareholders' Attempt To Create An 
Unregulated Oil Company Because Of The Inseparability Of 
Mountain Fuel's Oil Operations From Its Utility Exploration 
And Development Program And Because The Ratepayers Bore The 
Risk Of Mountain Fuel's Exploration For Oil And Gas. 
The regulatory issues in this case arise out of 
Mountain Fuel's exploration for oil and gas. Utility "oil" 
operations are by nature inseparable from natural gas opera-
tions. 595 P.2d at 874. Discovery of oil in a utility 
exploration and development program is not by design, but is 
incidental to the exploration for gas. What type of hydro-
carbons, if any, may be discovered is unknown prior to 
drilling. Until exploratory wells are drilled, it is not 
possible to determine whether the ultimate production, if 
any, will be oil or gas, or both. 595 P.2d at 879. 
Mountain Fuel, at least since 1947, engaged in an 
extensive exploration program for oil and gas. Case No. 2906 
(1947). Mountain Fuel met the risk of oil and gas explora-
tion in a unique manner. It maintained a utility account 
16 
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105 in which it held its unexplored or wildcat acreage. That 
acreage was deemed used and useful in the utility business 
and was included as a capital asset in rate base. 595 P.2d 
at 875. The Commission traditionally allowed funds for 
exploration and development to be charged to ratepayers as a 
just and reasonable expense as part of the utility function 
of Mountain Fuel. Therefore, Mountain Fuel was allowed to 
recover in rates costs for lease acquisition, lease main-
tenance (delayed rentals), non-productive well drilling (dry 
hole exploration), abandoned leases, and other authorized 
exploration expenses. 595 P.2d at 875. When exploration was 
successful, exploration costs were capitalized, MFS-8; when it 
was unsuccessful, they were expensed, DIV-1; Tr. 687-88, 
1026-27. Mountain Fuel expensed all of the cost of unsuc-
cessful exploration in utility accounts for cancelled leases, 
delayed rentals, other exploratory expenses and dry holes. 
Between 1960 and 1977, $44,981,000 was authorized 
by the Commission as a utility exploration expense, reflected 
in rates and charges for the sale of natural gas. 595 P.2d 
at 875. 
Mountain Fuel's stockholders, prior to 1972, did 
not stand any of the risk of exploring for "oil" and "gas." 
Case Nos. 2906 (1947), 4797 (1960) and 6369 (1972). Mountain 
Fuel's stockholders did not bear any cost of "oil" and "gas" 
exploration until exploration resulted in the discovery 
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of "oil" or "gas". Id. Mountain Fuel's stockholders' finan-
cial participation in "oil" and "gas" exploration prior to 
1972 was limited to capitalizing the cost of successful "oil" 
and "gas" wells. Only when "oil" and "gas" exploration was 
successful did the stockholders put up their money. If 
exploration was unsuccessful, the ratepayers put up the money 
and bore all of the risk. Case Nos. 2906 (1947), 4797 (1960) 
and 6369 (1972); DIV-1; MFS-8; Tr. 312-14, 687-89, 691, 701, 
2394. Successful "gas" wells were capitalized in Mountain 
Fuel's "utility" accounts and included in the ratepayers' 
"cost of service." Successful "oil" wells were transferred 
and capitalized in the "non-utility" "oil" accounts and all 
the income from production went to the stockholders. 
Under the uncontroverted facts, until 1972, all of 
the costs of exploration and development prior to the suc-
cessful discovery of "oil" or "gas" were charged to Mountain 
Fuel's "utility" accounts. Mountain Fuel was allowed to pass 
on every single cent it incurred in exploration and 
development expense in its gas rates to the ratepayers. 
Case Nos. 2906 (1947), 4797 (1960) and 6369 {1972); DIV-1; 
MFS-8; Tr. 312-14, 687-89, 691, 701, 2394. The ratepayers 
thus assumed all of the risk of "oil" and "gas" exploration 
and development during this period. 
18 
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The stockholders of Mountain Fuel, prior to 1972, 
did not pay for one single dry hole. Id.; R. 2711. 
In 1972, for the first time, the Commission 
required the Company's "oil operations" to pay $300,000 per 
year toward Mountain Fuel's exploration and development 
expense. Case No. 6369 (1972); Tr. 688. In 1974, the 
Commission ordered Mountain Fuel's "oil" "non-utility" 
accounts to pay 32.8 percent of Mountain Fuel's exploration 
and development expense ~ase No. 6668 (7/18/74). Finally, 
effective 1976, the Commission required the exploration and 
development expense of Mountain Fuel to be divided equally 
between its "utility" and "non-utility" accounts. Case No. 
7113 (12/1/75); Tr. 688-89. 
Between 1966 and 1976 the utility expense 
account (i.e., ratepayers) paid for 73.3 percent of dry hole 
exploration and the non-utility account (i.e., shareholders) 
paid 26.7 percent of this expense. The utility expense 
account paid 95 percent of the cancelled and delayed rentals 
on leases and the non-utility account paid 5 percent of this 
expense. Of the total exploration expenses for the ten-year 
period, $37,250,000 was paid from the utility account and 
$8,222,000 was paid by the non-utility account. 595 P.2d at 
875. 
It is true Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" "oil" 
operations did contribute from 1972 through 1976, under the 
1 () 
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orders of the Commission, approximately $8 million toward 
Mountain Fuel's combined exploration and development expense, 
DIV-1, but those funds came out of the enormous oil profits 
already obtained by the shareholders. The ratepayers in the 
same period contributed over $17 million. DIV-1. In 1972, 
Mountain Fuel's profit contribution from its "oil" operations 
was over $1.6 million; in 1973, $2.3 million; in 1974, $7.2 
million; in 1975, $14.4 million; and in 1976, $24 million. 
SLC-1 at 8. During this period of time, the profit from 
Mountain Fuel's "oil" operations held in its "non-utility" 
accounts for the sole benefit of Mountain Fuel's stockholders 
amounted to over $47 million. Id. 
In short, during this period, the $8 million con-
tribution that Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" "oil" accounts 
or its stockholders made toward Mountain Fuel's exploration 
risks was made out of the vast profits generated by Mountain 
Fuel's "non-utility" "oil" operations that had been developed 
at the risk of ratepayers. 
The total risk, therefore, of Mountain Fuel's ex-
ploration and the development of its "non-utility" "oil" pro-
perties transferred to Wexpro was in economic reality borne 
by Mountain Fuel's ratepayers. 
Therefore this Court stated: 
Thus, as early as 1957, the 
traditional principles of utility law were 
modified by the Commission, e.g., generally 
20 
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the investor supplies the risk capital and 
sustains the losses in a speculative venture; 
the ratepayer only pays a return on that 
portion of the investment which is 
found used and useful in rendering the utility 
service. Although the exploration and 
development costs which were reflected in the 
rates and charges were characterized as a just 
and reasonable expense of the utility by the 
Corrunission, these charges were, in effect, a 
capital contribution to a speculative venture 
for the purpose of developing oil and gas 
sources. 595 P.2d at 876 (emphasis 
added). 
On January 14, 1974, the Commission indeed 
found that the oil operations were so incidental to and 
inseparable from the production and sale of natural gas as to 
be a part of Mountain Fuel's utility operations. The Corrunis-
sion ordered on that date that the investments, revenues and 
expenses of the oil operations be included in the appropriate 
utility accounts for ratemaking purposes. While the Commis-
sion, in response to cries of financial ruin from Mountain 
Fuel, later rescinded the order rolling in revenues, this 
Court held that those findings "were not rejected." The 
January 14, 1974 Order caused Mountain Fuel to attempt to set 
up Wexpro as an unregulated oil company. Thus the essence of 
what was before this Court in Committee of Consumer Services 
was the shareholders' attempt to have an unregulated oil 
company explore properties acquired, held, and developed at 
the risk of the ratepayers of Utah. In this Court's words: 
These [January 14, 1974] findings, in 
regard to the inseparable nature of the oil 
f), 
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and gas operations, were the sword of Damocles 
Mountain Fuel sought to have beaten into a 
non-regulated oil derrick. 595 
P.2d at 874. 
This court rejected that attempt. See Part E, infra, at 
29-34. 
B. Prior To This Court's Decision In The Wexpro 
Case Mountain Fuel Used Its Own System Of Property 
Classification As A Test Of Jurisdiction And A Principle For 
Allocation Of Benefits. 
A central basis for this Court's decision that the 
April 11, 1978 Order was defective was that the Commission 
had allowed Mountain Fuel, in effect, to determine whether 
assets were jurisdictionalized or not depending on Mountain 
Fuel's own system of oil and gas classification. This Court 
stated: 
Mountain Fuel, .•• developed a system of 
classification based on custom or usage. This 
classification was never reduced to writing by 
either the utility or the Commission. If the 
exploration and development produced a 
successful well, it was classified as oil or 
gas based on the "value of production." This 
system involved measuring the product at the 
well head or field separator facility, and 
then comparing the field price of gas and oil. 
Whichever substance had greater value 
determined whether the site was a gas or an oil 
well. Thus, any disparity between gas and oil 
prices at the time of classification could 
play a decisive role in determining whether it 
was a gas or an oil well. If it were a gas 
well, the drilling costs were capitalized and 
the well was held in a utility account, and 
any incidental gas and oil sales were 
credited to a utility account. If it were an 
22 
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oil well, the drilling costs were capitalized 
and held in the non-utility account; any 
associated gas was credited at field price to 
the non-utility account. In addition, any 
acreage lo~ically related to the discovery was 
transferred and capitalized in the 
corresponding account. 595 P.2d at 876. 
The Commission in the April 11, 1978 Order 
based its jurisdictional determination on Mountain Fuel's 
classification of its assets. Id. at 877. This of course 
had the effect of nonjurisdictionalizing assets with 
substantial gas reserves and giving Mountain Fuel's 
shareholders a healthy unregulated return on oil production. 
This Court noted the extreme importance of this 
classification: 
The classification of this property is 
of utmost importance, since this property is 
being transferred to Wexpro at a depreciated 
book value of $33.l million. The claimed 
gross revenue from this property for 1976 was 
approximately $39 million. An expert from 
Mountain Fuel estimated the fair market value 
of the property at $150 million. If, in fact, 
after a hearing the property should be 
classified as a utility asset, the ratepayers 
by this transfer, would be deprived of 
benefits to which they are entitled. Id. at 
877. 
This Court agreed with the petitioners that 
there was no statutory or legal basis to determine the issue 
of the Commission's jurisdiction in this manner. 
The net effect of the Commission's 
initial determination was that their 
jurisdiction was based on Mountain Fuel's 
classification. This classification, in turn, 
was based on the value of production; and 
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whether the substance was deemed gas or oil 
was based upon the end use of the product. 
There is no statutory or legal basis to 
sustain such a classification. Id. 
c. The Wexpro Transactions Previously Rejected By 
This Court Involved An Attempt To Shield Mountain Fuel's 
"Oil" Operations From Regulation; To Deprive The Commission 
Of Jurisdiction Over Utility Assets; And To Appropriate All 
Benefits From Oil Operations To The Shareholders. 
The Wexpro transactions approved by the April 11, 
1978 Order and then rejected by this Court were reflected in 
four basic agreements between Mountain Fuel and Wexpro: {l) 
the original Agreement of Purchase and Sale (P&S Agreement) 
dated December 21, 1976, MFS-1; (2) the original Joint 
Exploration Agreement (JEA) of the same date, MFS-2; (3) the 
proposed Amended Agreement of Purchase and Sale (Amended P&S 
Agreement), MFS-4; and (4) the proposed Amended Joint 
Exploration Agreement (funended JEA), MFS-5. 
The P&S Agreement provided, effective January 1, 
1977, {l) for the transfer of all properties held by Mountain 
Fuel in its "non-utility" "oil" accounts to Wexpro at book 
value in exchange for all of Wexpro's common stock; (2) 
reserved all natural gas in the Dakota and Weber formations 
of the Brady Field after "blow down" to Mountain Fuel, and in 
effect transferred such reserves to Mountain Fuel's "utility" 
accounts; and (3) gave Mountain Fuel the first right of 
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refusal to purchase at market prices (a) all natural gas 
produced from the "non-utility" "oil" properties transferred 
by Mountain Fuel to Wexpro, and (b) all natural gas dis-
covered and developed by Wexpro in an eight-state area for a 
ten-year period. MFS-1. 
The JEA (1) granted Wexpro, effective January 1, 
1977, the right jointly to explore with Mountain Fuel the 2.9 
million wildcat acres of oil and gas leases held by Mountain 
Fuel in its "utility" accounts (105 accounts), SLC-1 at 12; 
Tr. 462-63, 588; (2) required Mountain Fuel and Wexpro to 
share the cost of exploration of Mountain Fuel's acreage on a 
equal basis with a joint annual co~nitrnent of $6,240,258.00; 
(3) provided for a division of ownership of hydrocarbons 
discovered under Mountain Fuel's "oil" and "gas" method of 
classification on a well-by-well basis, MFS-2; Tr. 72, 455, 
599; (4) provided that all "oil" wells and leases "logically 
related" to such wells would be transferred to Wexpro; (5) 
provided that on combination "oil" and "gas" wells that were 
classified as "gas" wells, Wexpro would have a right to 
purchase all "oil" at market prices from Mountain Fuel, and 
on all combination wells that were classified as "oil" wells, 
Mountain Fuel would have the right to purchase all "gas" from 
Wexpro at market prices; and (6) provided Mountain Fuel could 
farm out acreage under the JEA; but granted Wexpro the right 
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to all "oil" production pursuant to any farm-out arrange-
ment. 
The fundamental change provided by the proposed 
Amended P&S Agreement and the proposed Amended JEA was that 
all gas produced from the properties transferred to Wexpro 
and all gas discovered under the JEA would go to Mountain 
Fuel at "cost of service" prices. MFS-4 and 5; Tr. 68-69. 
The proposed Amended JEA also provided that incidental "oil" 
produced from a combination "gas" well would go to Wexpro at 
"cost of service" prices. The Amended P&S Agreement and 
Amended JEA, for the first time in Mountain Fuel's history, 
reduced Mountain Fuel's definition of "oil" and "gas" to 
writing. MFS-4 and 5; Tr. 286. 
Under the JEA, Wexpro was granted the right jointly 
to explore all of Mountain Fuel's oil and gas acreage. Tr. 
134, 462-63, 588, 1521; SLC-1 at 12. All of the 2.9 million 
acres were carried in Mountain Fuel's "utility" accounts. 
MFS-5; Tr. 2085, 462-63, 588, 691-92, 701. The initial costs 
of this acreage were included as costs of property held for 
future use and the ratepayers of Mountain Fuel paid a rate of 
return on those costs. Tr. 701. Virtually all of the 
exploration and development expense with regard to this 
acreage had been paid by Mountain Fuel's "utility" accounts 
and charged to the ratepayers. Tr. 691-92, 2083. 
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The right granted to Wexpro jointly to explore 
this wildcat acreage unquestionably was very valuable. 
During the hearings preceding this Court's decision, Mountain 
Fuel's vice-president for exploration, Mr. Cash, testified 
that the Rocky Moun ta in reg ion, the reg ion in which Moun ta in 
Fuel's wildcat acreage was located, was the hottest onshore 
area in the U.S. for oil and gas exploration, Tr. 439-441, 
444, and "the competition for acreage and for exploration and 
processing of acreage is extreme." Tr. 439-40. At the same 
hearings, Dr. Bass confirmed Mr. Cash's judgment. Tr. 886, 
892. Dr. Bass testified that Mountain Fuel's wildcat 
acreage was of great value, Tr. 892, and that the Amended 
JEA was fundamentally unfair because Wexpro had done nothing 
to earn the right to participate in its joint exploration. 
Tr • 8 8 5 , 9 4 2 • 
D. The April 11, 1978 Report And Order Allowed The 
Shareholders Their Unregulated Oil Company. 
On April 11, 1978, the Commission issued a Report 
and Order on Rehearing approving the ~nended P&S Agreement 
and the Amended JEA. The Commission resolved "every 
significant issue of fact and law in the proceeding." Ord. 
4/11/78 at ~ 100. 
The Commission ruled against the Division's 
contentions (1) that the Commission had jurisdiction over the 
oil and gas properties held in Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" 
., ..., 
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accounts; (2) that such properties were utility properties; 
and ( 3) that the proceeds from those properties should be 
rolled into or included in Mountain Fuel's utility accounts 
for raternaking purposes. 
The Report and Order on Rehearing covered the 
entire range of the controversy and adopted in total (and 
verbatim) the positions of Mountain Fuel and Wexpro. The 
Commission reaffirmed the non-utility status of the oil 
operations and its lack of jurisdiction over them. Id. at 
,, 11. The Commission held that it would not indulge in 
fund-tracing and that the origin of funds used for 
exploration was not relevant to the validity of the program. 
Id. at ,I 13. The Commission also held that cost-of-service 
gas was a sufficient return for inclusion of exploration 
expense in the rate base, and that the shareholders should be 
allowed an unregulated return from the oil-producing 
properties. Id. at ~l~I 16, 18, 26, 46. 
The Conunission in the Report and Order on Rehearing 
expressly rejected the theory proposed by the Division and 
other protestants that any gain from operations should be 
realized by those who bear the risk and therefore-gas rates 
should be reduced by oil profits. Id. at ,~ 30, 32 34, 35 ~ ' 
and 38. The Commission expressly rejected the notion that a 
utility bears a trust relationship toward its customers, 
citing Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. New York 
28 
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Telephone Co., 271 U.S. 23 ( 1925). Ord. 4/11/78 at ~[ 37. 
The Cormnission also expressly rejected the contention of the 
Committee that the transfer of properties to Wexpro should be 
for fair market value instead of depreciated book value. Id. 
at ,! ~[ 8 2 - 8 4 • 
The Commission approved a provision in the Amended 
Agreement of Purchase and Sale which allowed Wexpro to charge 
Mountain Fuel market price rather than cost of service for 
gas produced from acreage acquired by Wexpro other than 
transferred acreage and that which came to it under the JEA. 
Id. at, 104(2)(vii). 595 P.2d at 875. 
E. This Court's Decision And Mandate In The Wexpro Case 
Held That Properties Explored And Developed With Ratepayer 
Funds Are Utility Assets; Held That The Benefits From Such 
Properties Must Be Allocated According To The Principle "Gain 
Follows Risk," And Remanded The Case For A Hearing To 
Classify The Assets And Give The Ratepayers Their Due. 
Mountain Fuel itself explained to the Supreme Court 
of the United States this Court's decision in the Wexpro 
case. According to Mountain Fuel, this Court held that the 
"non-utility" oil properties transferred by Mountain Fuel to 
Wexpro had always been and are utility assets, and that these 
properties and the oil revenues generated therefrom should be 
applied to reduce the cost of gas to the Utah utility cus-
tomer. Mountain Fuel Petition for Certiorari at 13. 
'1 Cl 
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According to Mountain Fuel, this Court held that Mountain 
Fuel stood in a trust relationship when it sold natural gas 
to its utility customers, Mountain Fuel Petition for 
Certiorari at 14; that sales of gas by Wexpro to Mountain 
Fuel must be at cost-of-service prices for ratemaking 
purposes; and that Wexpro is itself a public utility. 
Mountain Fuel stated to the United States Supreme Court that 
this Court's decision leaves "no room for Mountain Fuel or 
Wexpro to conduct a non-utility business in oil and gas, 
subject[s] Wexpro to Utah regulation as a public utility, and 
require[s] Wexpro to sell gas to Mountain Fuel at cheap 
prices." Petition for Certiorari at 14. Mountain Fuel's 
characterization of the decision is correct. 
Specifically, this Court held that the order 
approving the Amended P&S Agreement and Amended JEA was 
predicated on two erroneous conclusions: the validity of 
Mountain Fuel's classification system for determining utility 
versus non-utility assets, and the conclusion that the 
Commission had no jurisdiction over the "non-utility" assets 
and the transfer of those assets to a non-utility corporate 
entity. This Court quoted with approval, as a key to the 
defect in the Co~nission's order, the dissent of Commissioner 
Rigtrup: 
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I would conclude that the exoloration 
acreage held by Mountain Fuel over the years 
was used or useful in its natural gas utility 
business, and should have always been 
classified as utility assets. The fact that 
revenues from ••oil" or other 1 iquid 
hydrocarbons have become very significant 
during the last few years does not change the 
basic character of those assets. However, it 
appears that the shareholders of Mountain Fuel 
have come to expect an unregulated return from 
oil properties, for which the risk capital was 
largely derived in rates charged its customers 
as ordered by the Commission •••• 595 P.2d 
at 873. 
This Court held that the provisions under the 
Amended P&S Agreement whereby Mountain Fuel would purchase at 
market price, rather than cost-of-service price, the gas 
discovered on properties acquired by Wexpro, violates the 
no-profits-to-affiliates rule. Id. at 875. 
This Court held that by the activities performed by 
Wexpro in joint activity with Mountain Fuel, particularly 
upon the properties transferred by the P&S Agreement, Wexpro 
itself becomes a public utility subject to the jurisdiction 
and regulation of the Corrunission. Wexpro is facilitating the 
production of natural gas and delivering natural gas to its 
parent, each of which constitutes Wexpro a public utility. 
Id. at 878. 
This Court held that the Amended JEA contained 
"certain infirmities", since it allowed Mountain Fuel's 
system of oil and gas classification to determine utility 
'l 1 
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versus non-utility properties and the allocation of benefits 
therefrom. Id. at 879. 
This Court reversed the Commission's Order 
approving the transact ions and remanded for a "hearing in 
accordance with the principles set forth" in its opinion. 
Id. at 873. 
The principles in accordance with which the hearing 
on remand was to be held were: 
1. Oil production facilities explored and 
developed by a public utility in the search for hydrocarbons 
with funds paid by ratepayers cannot be considered a separate 
non-utility operation, but are incidental to natural gas 
exploration and are a part of utility operations, and must be 
treated and regarded as such for ratemaking and accounting 
purposes. Id. at 879. 
2. "There is • posed the serious issue of 
whether it is in the public interest for Mountain Fuel to 
divide its utility function between it and a subsidiary." Id. 
at 878, n.8. 
3. When the expenses to develop utility properties 
are included in rate base, the ratepayers are entitled to 
share in the benefit by having the net proceeds on the oil 
and gas and other hydrocarbon substances sold by Mountain 
Fuel to others applied to reduce the cost of gas. Id. at 
876. 
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4. It is the duty of a public utility to operate 
in such a manner as to give the consumers the most favorable 
rate reasonably possible, which stems from the trust 
relationship the utility bears to its customers. Id. at 
874. 
5. Under the no-profits-to-affiliates rule, any 
amount paid as a prof it by a utility to any other company 
with which it is directly or indirectly in a control 
relationship cannot properly be included in the rate base. 
Id. 
This Court required a hearing: 
The order approving the amended purchase 
and sale agreement must be reversed, and there 
must be an evidentiary hearing. The 
Commission must reassess the transfer and 
determine whether the properties were utility 
assets. The following is the criteria by 
which the properties should be classified: 
(1) Was the property, while undeveloped, 
held in the utility capital account (Account 
#105), upon which a rate of return was paid by 
the ratepayers? 
(2) Were any funds from the utility 
exploration and development expense accounts 
(Accounts #795, #796, #797, and #798) applied 
to the development of the acreage? 
(3) Has any natural gas or natural gas 
liquids been produced from the acreage? 
If the answer to any of these is in the 
affirmative, the assets are utility property. 
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Any transfer of a utility asset should be for 
fair market value so an appropriate benefit 
therefrom will redound to the credit of the 
ratepayers. Furthermore, before approving the 
transfer of a utility asset, the Commission 
should determine whether the transaction is 
detrimental to the ratepayer, and whether it 
is in the public interest. 595 P.2d at 878. 
The record is uncontroverted that virtually 
every property transferred to Wexpro was, and is, under the 
tests, utility property. 
F. The Shareholder Interests, Unwilling To Live 
With This Court's Decision, Decided Not To Operate Within The 
Decision's Boundaries But Rather To Inform The Commission 
They Would Not Operate A Regulated Oil And Gas Exploration 
And Development Program; Presented The Commission With A 
Deregulated Oil Company As A Fait Accompli; And Attacked This 
Court's Decision In All Available Forums. 
1. The Fait Accompli. 
There was never an evidentiary hearing to classify 
assets, to reduce rates, or to determine whether the public 
interest could or would be served by Mountain Fuel's owner-
ship of an unregulated oil company. After this Court's 
decision and the denial of certiorari by the United States 
Supreme Court, Wexpro explored the properties conveyed to it 
under the P&S Agreement, and acted in all respects under the 
P&S Agreement, as if this Court had not rendered its deci-
sion. Stipulation ~ 1.14, R. 3548-49. The JEA was can-
34 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
celled, and further drilling on utility leases was done by 
Wexpro first under an informal agreement and subsequently 
under a stipulation filed in Case No. 81-057-04 and approved 
by the Commission. Mountain Fuel also discontinued all 
exploration and development activities on the properties 
subject to the JEA. Stipulation ,I 1.16, R. 3549. 
At the hearings on the Stipulation and Agreement, 
Mountain Fuel's officers and shareholders stated the position 
that: 
Under the conditions as they exist under 
the Supreme Court decision, and on the 
properties that are involved • • • the company 
is ••• not only unwilling, but probably 
unable to continue exploring in the utility. 
Testimony of Crawford, R. 1523. 
The general feeling was someone in Utah did 
something which was very bad for the investors 
in Mountain Fuel. 
Testimony of Harmon, R. 1265. 
There was no one in Washington who stood up 
and said "This is a horrendous decision that 
has been reached for free enterprise and for 
our national policy ••• " and I would say, 
well it wasn't the commissioners doing it. It 
was the Supreme Court of Utah that made that 
decision. 
Id. at 1265-66. 
[The company] felt the decision of the 
Supreme Court was improper and totally 
inconsistent with the practices that have been 
carried on by the company throughout its 
history. 
Testimony of Crawford, R. 1525. 
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Therefore, counsel for Mountain Fuel stated: 
We are fully aware of what the Supreme Court 
said about Wexpro and that is one of the 
reasons we want this initial transfer of the 
exploration program to go to Celsius. Wexpro 
as the operator may or may not be regulated. 
We'll just have to see what happens in the 
future on that, but we want the exploration 
part of the program as free of utility-type 
regulation as is possible to get it. That was 
probably as important as any other single 
element of anything we negotiated. R. 1651. 
The management of Mountain Fuel expressed to 
the Commission in writing that it "cannot and will not, as a 
regulated public utility in Utah, utilize retained earnings 
or other shareholder monies for an exploration program" under 
the circumstances facing the company. Objection of Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company to Division and Committee Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and for Preliminary Injunction, 
R. 2696 at 2701. Mountain Fuel informed the Commission that 
leases would be lost through expiration because it would not 
explore for hydrocarbons. Id. at 2700-01. 
Mountain Fuel also informed the Commission that, 
without seeking Commission approval, it was transferring 
wildcat acreage to Celsius and that Celsius was willing to 
commence drilling to prevent the lapsing of leases. Id. at 
2698, 2702-03. If the assets were not transferred to 
Celsius, Mountain Fuel stated, the leasehold interests would 
expire. Id. at 2703. "Unless the wells are drilled on the 
affected acreage by Celsius, under the jurisdiction of 
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FERC, they will not be drilled at all and all interests will 
be losers." Id. at 2704. Mountain Fuel took the position 
that no damage would be sustained by any party pursuant to 
this transfer, even though it acknowledged to the Commission 
that any gas purchased by the utility from Celsius would be 
at market price. Id. at 2703. 
At the hearing prior to the entry of the Stipula-
tion and Agreement, Mountain Fuel's counsel, rather than 
petition the Commission, simply told the Commission that 
Mountain Fuel was not going to continue with an exploration 
program on any properties transferred back to Mountain Fuel 
under the Supreme Court opinion. R. 30, 116, 1053-54. 
Mountain Fuel took the position that participation by the 
ratepayers in an exploration and development program with 
management was "impossible." R. 984. 
A Mountain Fuel shareholder testified that Mountain 
Fuel shareholders were not interested in a regulated 
exploration and development program. Testimony of Harmon, R. 
1211-12. 
Put simply, the utility interests made it crystal 
clear to the Commission that their exploration for hydro-
carbons would not be regulated by the Commission under any 
circumstances. 
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2. The Shareholder Interests' Litigative Attack On 
This Court's Decision. 
The shareholder interests "mounted an extraordinary 
attack on the determination of [this] Court" in three 
separate forums: before the Commission, before the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, and before 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), in an 
attempt to continue to litigate the Wexpro case, a case which 
it had already lost. Petition for the Establishment of a 
Fund for Attorneys' and Expert Witness Fees for the Division 
of Public Utilities, R. 2506 at 2507. 
(a) The FERC Applications. 
Mountain Fuel and Wexpro filed a Joint Application 
for Abandonment and Accounting Authorization and for Acquisi-
tion and Certificate and Sales Authorization by Celsius 
Energy Company, In the Matter of Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, Wexpro Company, Celsius Energy Company, before the 
FERC. R. 2506. 
Mountain Fuel and Mountain Fuel Resources filed a 
Joint Application for the Issuance of Authorizations, 
pursuant to Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, for (1) the 
Abandonment of Certain Interstate Transmission Facilities, 
Gas Purchase Agreements, Sales, and Service by Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company, and (2) the Acquisition, Operation and 
Continuation of such by Mountain Fuel Resources, Inc., In the 
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Matter of Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Mountain Fuel 
Resources, Inc., before the FERC. R. 2506-7. 
Mountain Fuel attempted to obtain FERC approval of 
a transfer of the exploratory leaseholds held in its 105 
account--its wildcat acreage--to Celsius, even though this 
Court had required that any transfer of utility assets should 
be determined by the Commission after a hearing on 
whether the transfer is for fair market value and in the 
public interest. The property sought to be transferred to 
Celsius was, as a matter of law, utility property under the 
tests announced by this Court. Mountain Fuel did not inform 
the Commission or the Division of the FERC applications. 
Rather, staff of the Division in attendance at a meeting 
between Mountain Fuel and FERC gained knowledge that 
agreements were being prepared to transfer utility leaseholds 
to Celsius. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for 
Preliminary Injunction, R. 2622-26. The Division moved for a 
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in 
Case No. 76-057-14, to restrain the transfer of 105 account 
leaseholds to Celsius. Id. The Commission denied the 
Division's motion in 76-057-14, but established the 81-057-04 
docket, and entered the motion for temporary restraining 
order in the new docket. R. 2794-95. The Division took the 
position that Mountain Fuel's applications before FERC were 
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an attempt by Mountain Fuel to avoid 
continued cost of service pricing for its 
oroduced gas [and] an attempt to avoid giving 
the Company's ratepayers proper credit for 
their contribution to the Company's producing 
oil properties, as required by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Motion of Utah State Division of Public Utilities and 
Utah State Committee of Consumer Services to Dismiss Applica-
tions, R. 2709 at 2710. As the Division informed FERC, by 
the applications 
Mountain Fuel now invites [FERC] to 
relitigate these issues, in hopes of setting 
aside the result of the Utah Supreme Court's 
opinion and the policy embodied in the Utah 
Commission's 1974 Report and Order. Id. at 
2716. 
In short, the FERC application and Mountain 
Fuel's failure to apply to the Commission for permission to 
transfer properties to Celsius were attempts to divest the 
Commission of jurisdiction over the properties and to obtain 
market prices on the gas developed from those properties. 
(b) Mountain Fuel Supply Company, et al. v. 
Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., Civil No. 
C-80-0710-J, In The United States District Court For The 
District Of Utah, Central Division. 
In this action, Mountain Fuel and the shareholder 
interests sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 
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various provisions of the federal constitution and federal 
statutes, claiming that regulation of Mountain Fuel's 
non-utility properties would violate its constitutional 
rights, all of which issues had been previously litigated and 
foreclosed. 
(c) Mountain Fuel's Opposition to the Fund 
for Attorneys' and Expert Witness Fees. 
The effect of the actions in federal district 
court, FERC and before the Public Service Commission, and the 
use by Mountain Fuel and Wexpro of four major law firms and 
in-house legal counsel, spread the issues in the Wexpro case 
across multiple forums and stretched the Division 
representation thin. See, Reply of the Division of Public 
Utilities and Committee of Consumer Services to Mountain Fuel 
and Wexpro Objection to Motion for Continuance, R. 2858-60; 
see also, Motion for Continuance of Hearing and Time for 
Filing of Prefiled Testimony, R. 2836 at 2837-38. 
Mountain Fuels's litigation strategy led the Divi-
sion to petition the Commission to establish a fund for 
attorneys' and expert witness fees, as necessary so that the 
Commission could exercise its power and jurisdiction and to 
secure compliance with Utah statutes because of the attack on 
this Court's determination. The Division noted that, even 
I "1 
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should the federal court and FERC actions be dismissed sum-
marily, the three-front war launched by Mountain Fuel would 
involve an enormous amount of expense, and noted the irony 
that Mountain Fuel was incurring enormous fees and costs and 
charging them off to ratepayers, while the ratepayer 
interests were in severe danger of being unrepresented. 
Petition for the Establishment of a Fund for Attorneys' and 
Expert Witness Fees for the Division of Public Utilities. R. 
2506-09. 
Mountain Fuel not only opposed the fund for 
attorneys' fees, but based on purported Commission contacts 
with legislators concerning appropriations for the Wexpro 
litigation, moved to disqualify the Commission from adjudi-
cating the Motion. 
G. The Positions Taken By The Shareholder 
Interests Before The Commission On Remand Contradicted Their 
Positions Before The United States Supreme Court. 
On remand, in a complete turn about from the 
positions taken before the United States Supreme Court as to 
the meaning of this Court's decision, the shareholder 
interests took some extraordinary positions before the 
Commission. The Utility Shareholders Association of Utah 
(Shareholders Association), an organization funded by the 
utilities of this state, R. 4345, noted that this Court's 
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decision "is viewed by the petitioner as adversely affecting 
vested interests of shareholders acquired in reliance upon 
past Commission actions," Application to Intervene, R. 2129 
at 2133. It in effect urged the Commission to ignore this 
Court 1 s opinion. It urged the Commission to "give 
recognition to the long standing separation of the utility 
and non-utility functions of the Company upon which the 
shareholders have relied." Id. at 2132. 
The Shareholders Association expressly asked the 
Corrunission to ignore the Court's decision that gain follows 
risk and to reaffirm in effect the findings and conclusions 
in the April 11, 1978 Report and Order rejected by this 
Court. The Shareholders Association asked the Commission to 
recognize 
that customers pay for service, not for the 
property used to render it, so as to avoid an 
unconstitutional taking of the shareholders' 
property rights. 
Id. at 2135. The Shareholders Association further 
ignored this Court's express determination that its decision 
did nothing unconstitutional, by asking the Commission to 
"recognize its responsibilities to the Company's existing 
investors not to confiscate properties squarely acquired by 
non-utility operations by their own funds." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
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Mountain Fuel also attempted to litigate the issue 
whether the Corrunission's enforcement of this Court's mandate 
would involve an unconstitutional taking of property from 
Mountain Fuel and its shareholders, Objection to Order on 
Prehearing Conference, R. 2194-95, and Wexpro took the same 
position. Id. at 2196-97. Mountain Fuel, attempting to 
convince the Commission that a number of "comments" by this 
Court are dicta, seemingly flip-flopped the hierarchy between 
this Court and the Commission: 
All of the functions of regulating a 
public utility are vested by statute in this 
Conunission--not the Court. 
We are not urging the Corrnnission to 
undertake to overrule the Utah Supreme Court 
on any issue, but we do urge the Commission 
to assert its primary authority to make the 
judgment decisions and to in effect regulate 
where the issue has not been foreclosed by the 
Court. 
Memorandum of Mountain Fuel Supply Company in Support of 
Objection to Prehearing Order, R. 2237 at 2245-46. 
Notwithstanding Mountain Fuel's statement to the 
United States Supreme Court that "nothing remained to be done 
except the implementation of the judgment by the Utah 
utilities corrunission," Mountain Fuel Petition for Certiorari, 
at 17, n.7, and that "the federal questions have been 
resolved with finality, the regulation and taking are certain 
and all that remains is an accounting proceeding," Id. at 
17-18, n.7, Mountain Fuel informed the Corrunission on remand 
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that there were many issues to be decided. Memorandum of 
Mountain Fuel, supra. 
The Shareholders Association urged the Commission 
to "exercise the discretion and latitude implicit in the 
opinion of the Supreme Court." Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Prehearing Conference, 
R. 2330 at 2338, and itself went on to reargue all of the 
issues already foreclosed by this Court's decision. The 
Shareholders Association went so far as to tell the 
Commission: 
While it is important to consider the 
advice and philosophies set forth in the 
Supreme Court's opinion on whether any 
transferred assets should be transferred at 
fair market value, the Commission must 
recognize that it is only after a full hearing 
as mandated by the Supreme Court that any such 
determination of what is in _the public 
interest can in fact be made. Id. at 
2337-38. 
In short, the Commission was urged by the 
shareholder interests to ignore this Court's opinion, and to 
"sustain [the Commission's rulings] that the beneficial 
interest in those assets that have traditionally been 
classified as non-utility assets must continue to be 
unregulated property." Id. at 2343. 
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H. The Agreement And Stipulation Violate This Court's 
Decision And Mandate. 
1. The Agreement 
(a) The Property Transferred to Wexpro and 
Celsius. 
The Agreement, R. 3575, effect~ates the retention 
by Wexpro of Mountain Fuel's oil and gas properties 
transferred to Wexpro under the Amended P&S Agreement. The 
Agreement expressly supersedes and terminates the P&S 
Agreement and recognizes that the properties subject to the 
Agreement which were transferred from Mountain Fuel to Wexpro 
under the P&S Agreement "have been held, operated and owned 
by Wexpro since the effective date of [The P&S] Agreement," 
and will be and remain the sole and exclusive property of 
Wexpro. Agreement, ,1,1 VII-2, VII-3. Mountain Fuel's and the 
Commission's total disregard of this Court's reversal of the 
April 11, 1978 order approving the P&S Agreement is thus 
perpetuated. 
The Agreement also provides for the transfer to 
Celsius of all Mountain Fuel's wildcat acreage held in 
utility account 105, formerly the subject of the JEA. 
The Agreement thus went beyond transferring the 
properties the shareholders obtained under the Amended P&S 
Agreement and Amended JEA rejected by this Court. For not 
only does this Agreement perpetuate the infirmities of the 
P&S Agreement, but it goes on to transfer with few exceptions 
virtually all of the utility's oil and gas properties to 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, Wexpro and Celsius. 
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First, properties already deemed by the Agreement 
to be in Wexpro's possession pursuant to the P&S Agreement 
are under the Agreement to remain Wexpro's sole and exclusive 
property and all oil, natural gas liquids and natural gas 
produced from such properties are the property of and to be 
sold or otherwise disposed of by Wexpro. Agreement 
., II-1 to II-3.2 
Second, Mountain Fuel transfers to Wexpro all 
101 and 105 account leaseholds and operating rights held by 
Mountain Fuel and accounted for in its utility gas plant 
(101) account as of July 31, 1981, subject to a retention by 
Mountain Fuel of the ownership of oil, natural gas liquids 
and other minerals produced from "productive gas reservoirs" 
underlying those leaseholds. Agreement ,I III. Productive 
gas reservoirs are reservoirs classified as such under Moun-
tain Fuel's rejected system of classification. These account 
101 properties transferred to Wexpro are defined by the 
Agreement itself as "gas plant owned and used by a utility 
entity in its natural gas operations." Agreement, , I-30. 
Thus, except for hydrocarbons from productive gas reservoirs, 
Mountain Fuel gives up its ownership of all hydrocarbons, 
2wexpro's properties in ,! II of the Agreement are 
referred to as "productive oil reservoirs" and "prior Wexpro 
wells." These designations are based on Mountain Fuel's 
classification system previously rejected by this Court. 
I -, 
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including gas, from gas plant used in Mountain Fuel's naturaJ 
gas operations. While "prior company wells" and hydrocarbon~ 
produced from "productive gas reservoirs" remain the propert~ 
of Mountain Fuel, everything else goes to Wexpro; and to add 
insult to injury, 46% of the net profits from any oil from 
commercial wells completed after July 31, 1981 in productive 
gas reservoirs is to be shared by Wexpro, according to a 
formula to be described below. Agreement tt III-3, III-9. 
Third, Mountain Fuel transfers to Celsius all its 
valuable wildcat acreage. Agreement, t IV. Even under the 
Amended JEA, found infirm by this Court, Mountain Fuel 
continued to hold the wildcat acreage as gas plant used and 
useful in its utility 105 account. The Agreement, however, 
transfers all this wildcat acreage to Celsius. This valuable 
wildcat acreage is now transferred from utility accounts to 
an independent hydrocarbon exploration subsidiary free of 
Commission regulation. 
All of the properties transferred above would by 
the very definitions in the Agreement be utility properties 
under the three tests enunciated by this Court. Yet no 
hearing was held to classify them and no attempt was made, 
despite a motion by the Coalition of Senior Citizens, to 
determine their fair market value. 
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Fourth, the Agreement transfers to Wexpro or 
Celsius certain properties acquired by Wexpro after the P&S 
Agreement was executed from sources the Agreement states are 
independent from Mountain Fuel. Agreement ~ v. In the 
initial stage of the post-remand proceedings, a dispute arose 
as to whether these "after-acquired properties" would be 
classified as utility or non-utility, with the Division 
taking the position that they were utility assets. Utah 
Department of Business Regulation, Division of Public 
Utilities' Hearing Brief on Remand, R. 2482 at 2487-88. Yet, 
the Agreement transfers those properties to Wexpro without 
any decision on classification. 
Fifth, the Agreement transfers "non-utility" 
properties said by the Agreement never to have been in 
utility accounts. 
(b) Allocation Of Benefits From The 
Transferred Properties. 
The allocation of benefits from the transferred 
properties depends on the type of property transferred. 
For example, the Agreement treats differently the 
consideration given to the utility for productive oil 
reservoirs and oil wells (P&S acreage) than it does the 
consideration given the utility for the wildcat acreage. 
Again, these different types of properties are defined by the 
same classification system which this Court rejected as a 
I r. 
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principle of jurisdiction or allocation. 595 P.2d at 
877-79.3 
(1) "Productive Oil Reservoirs" And 
"Prior Wexpro Wells" 
With respect to what the Agreement calls "produc-
tive oil reservoirs" and "prior Wexpro wells," all oil, 
natural gas liquids and natural gas produced therefrom are to 
be the property of Wexpro. Agreement • II-3. The proceeds 
from the sale of oil and natural gas liquids are subject to a 
"54-46" formula. Agreement, ,, II-4. 
This "54-46" formula subjects the proceeds to the 
following provisions: First, the proceeds are used to pay 
Wexpro's costs and expenses of holding and operating prior 
Wexpro wells and productive oil reservoirs. Agreement ,I II-4. 
Second, after deduction of expenses and royalties, Wexpro is 
then allowed to receive from the proceeds a return sufficient 
to provide a return on Wexpro's investment allocated to oil 
and natural gas liquids production. Agreement ,I II-4(e). 
The "base rate of return" is, for the first year of operation 
16%, subject to certain adjustments. Agreement , I-44. 
3 Whether a reservoir is "oil" or "gas" is determined 
in the Agreement by whether a well drilled in a reservoir was 
held at the time of the Agreement by Mountain Fuel or Wexpro, 
which is in turn determined by whether or not the P&S 
Agreement had transferred that well based on Mountain Fuel's 
classifiction system. 
so 
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For example, if development oil drilling is done into a 
productive oil reservoir, the investment of Wexpro includes 
the investment in any commercial well and the base rate of 
return is set at R+5%, i.e., at least 21%. Agreement 
~! I I-8 ( b) • 
Out of any remaining Wexpro oil and natural gas 
liquids, Mountain Fuel receives 54% of the net revenues to be 
placed in an account used to reduce natural gas rates, and 
Wexpro receives 46%. Agreement ' II-4. 
Natural gas produced by Wexpro from oil wells or 
productive oil reservoirs is to be sold to the utility at 
cost of service. That cost of service price includes the 
base rate of return plus certain adjustments, Agreement 
~ I-44 and Exhibit "A", and the rate of return will be 
unregulated by the Commission. 
(2) "Productive Gas Reservoirs" and 
"Prior Company Wells" 
While Mountain Fuel retains the ownership of oil, 
natural gas liquids, natural gas and other minerals produced 
from productive gas reservoirs underlying any leaseholds in 
the 101 account, Agreement III-2(a), Wexpro under the 
Agreement owns all the operating rights and will be the 
operator of all facilities related to such leaseholds. 
Agreement ~! III-2(b). Proceeds from the sale of oil and 
natural gas from Mountain Fuel's gas wells and productive gas 
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reservoirs, as defined by Mountain Fuel, are accounted for as 
utility revenues, Agreement ,! III-3, with one critical 
exception--i.e., any oil from commercial wells drilled after 
July 31, 1981 in productive gas reservoirs will be sold by 
Wexpro and Wexpro will receive revenues under the "54-46" 
formula. Agreement irir III-3, III-9. Moreover, in 
calculating Wexpro's proceeds on this "new oil" under the 
"54-46" formula, the rate of return applied to Wexpro's 
investment in development gas wells from which such oil is 
produced entitles Wexpro to a "5% risk premium," Agreement 
t III-9(c), or a rate of return of 21% in the first year, in 
addition to its 46% of net revenues from "new oil". 
Wexpro, as operator, will bill Mountain Fuel an 
"operator service fee" in producing Mountain Fuel's 
hydrocarbons from gas wells and productive gas reservoirs. 
Agreement , III-5. The Agreement does not provide that the 
utility may bargain with third parties to obtain an operator, 
but locks the utility into using Wexpro as the operator. 
Billing will be on a cost-of-service basis, including a 
return on investment for post-July 1981 facilities at the 
base rate of return with an additional 8% rate of return (24% 
in the first year) on investment in commercial development 
wells. Agreement ,! III'7'5( c). The rate of return to be 
included in the service operator fee is set by the Agreement, 
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Agreement ,I III-5{ c) and Exhibit "E", and will be unregulated 
by the Commission. 
Wexpro is required by the Agreement to spend or 
invest at least $40 million for development drilling in 
productive gas reservoirs. Agreement ,I III-8{c). If 
development gas wells become corrunercial, they will be 
capitalized as Wexpro investment. Wexpro is expected under 
the Agreement to exercise prudent judgment "as if it were 
owner of the productive gas reservoirs in determining the 
desirability and necessity of development gas drill-
ing •••• " Agreement ,I III-8(a). While Wexpro is committed 
to invest at least $40 million in development gas drilling, 
it receives two major benefits for this investment: first, 
it obtains its service operator fee with its rate of return 
on investment in commercial development wells in productive 
gas reservoirs; second, it receives 46% of the net profits 
from "new oil" from productive gas reservoirs after deducting 
its costs and expenses on drilling wells, and a healthy rate 
of return on investment. 
(3) Exploratory Properties 
All the leaseholds and operating rights with re-
spect to the 1.4 million acres of wildcat acreage are trans-
ferred to Celsius4 under the Agreement. All such acreage 
4The Stipulation provides that Celsius rather than 
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and unexplored formations underlying 101 account lease-
holds transferred by the Agreement are to be explored by 
Celsius. Mountain Fuel retains a 7% overriding royalty 
interest on all natural gas, oil and natural gas liquids pro-
duced from these "exploratory properties."5 The 7% over-
riding royalty continues until expiration or surrender of 
the leases to which the overriding royalty is applicable. 
Agreement ,! IV. The Agreement leaves open the possibility 
that Celsius could trade leases so as to avoid the overriding 
royalty and there is no safeguard established to prevent 
reciprocal dealing which could avoid the 7% royalty. 
Mountain Fuel has a 30-day call on any gas produced 
from these exploratory properties, but at market prices 
rather than cost-of-service prices. 
The wildcat acreage is the same class of acreage tc 
which the Amended JEA applied. Under the Amended JEA, 
Mountain Fuel would have obtained the gas produced from the 
properties transferred to Wexpro and all gas discovered unde! 
(4 cont'd) 
Wexpro may receive properties under the Agreement, 
Stipulation§ 17.4. In fact, the wildcat acreage was all 
transferred to Celsius. Testimony of Crawford, R. 1516. 
5Exploratory properties are defined as "Formations 
underlying Account 101/105 leaseholds or transferred lease-
holds into which exploratory drilling is conducted •••• " 
Agreement, ,! I-29. 
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the JEA at cost of service. MFS-4, 5; Tr. 68-69. Yet under 
the Agreement Mountain Fuel's 30-day call on gas from 
exploratory property is at market price. Moreover, any 
agency which disallows any portion of the market price in 
rates does so at the risk of the utility's gas supply--the 
Agreement provides that if any regulatory agency with 
ratemaking jurisdiction over Mountain Fuel disallows in rates 
any portion of the market price paid to Wexpro, the price 
will be reduced to equal the amount that Mountain Fuel is 
allowed to re~over, but Wexpro may then elect to be released 
of its obligation to sell further gas subject to that price 
reduction. Agreement ,I IV-6 ( c). 
(4) "After-Acquired" Properties 
With respect to the after-acquired properties, 
Wexpro grants Mountain Fuel a 2.5% overriding royalty 
interest on all production. Agreement ' V-3. It also grants 
Mountain Fuel a 30-day call at market prices on the same 
terms as the call on gas from exploratory properties. 
(5) $250,000 Per Year Credit 
Wexpro agrees to pay Mountain Fuel $250,000 per 
year for twelve consecutive years to be credited to its 
utility account. Agreement ,I VIII-16. 
(6) $21,000,000 Reduction In Rates. 
The Stipulation provides a temporary reduction in 
the company's cost of service reflected in a reduction of 
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retail distribution rates in the pre-tax sum of $21 million, 
90% of which reduction applies to Utah customers. 
Stipulation ' 3.3.10. 
2. The Stipulation 
(a} The Stipulation Divests The Commission Of 
Its Jurisdiction And Divests The Division Of Its 
Statutory Powers. 
The Stipulation, R. 3544, was executed by the 
Division, the Conunittee, Mountain Fuel and Wexpro to resolve 
all issues in all the above-captioned cases except the rate 
design issue in Case No. 81-057-01. Mountain Fuel and Wexpro 
also entered into a similar stipulation with the staff of the 
Wyoming Public Servtce Commission. The Stipulation in part 
calls for the parties to enter into the Agreement and be 
bound by it. Stipulation ,r 5. 
The parties stipulate at paragraph 2.4 that Wexpro' 
and Celsius will be independent hydrocarbon exploration and 
development companies not subject to state public utility 
regulation and which legally own and operate Mountain Fuel's 
oil and gas properties. Thus, the Stipulation, in direct 
contravention of this Court's opinion, divests the Commission 
of jurisdiction over Wexpro and Celsius. 
The parties stipulate at paragraph 5.2 that the 
Division and Committee will not challenge any action taken by 
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Mountain Fuel, Wexpro or Celsius other than through arbitra-
tion procedures set forth in the Stipulation. 
The Stipulation provides that in the event any 
party claims default under the Stipulation or the Agreement, 
arbitration will be the sole remedy. Stipulation ' 9. The 
decision of the arbitrators will b~ binding upon the parties 
except with respect to matters covered by Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-31-16 and 78-31-17, and other claims of improprieties 
or irregularities in the arbitration proceedings. Any form 
of rescission is specifically excluded as a remedy in 
arbitration. The Division and Committee agree to make no 
claim that Mountain Fuel or its customers have any right in 
any property owned by Wexpro or Celsius except as provided in 
the Stipulation and Agreement. Stipulation ,I 11.1 
The Division and Committee further agree not to 
claim that any of Wexpro's or Celsius' properties are subject 
to the public utility regulation of any state and agree to 
cooperate to obtain legal rulings or statutes so providing. 
Stipulation ~ 11.2 
The Stipulation provides that no party will assert 
any claim to any reimbursement for any cost previously paid 
by it to them. No party will claim any entitlement to any 
revenues previously received by others as a result of any 
aspect of the exploration and development program, the 
ownership or classification of the properties, or rates 
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previously in effect, except as expressly provided in the 
Stipulation and Agreement. Stipulation ,! 13. 
The Stipulation provides that no benefit or burden 
created in the company, and ultimately its retail distribu-
tion customers, by the Stipulation or the Agreement" will be 
used in any way as a basis for future rate relief to the 
company except under exigent circumstances as otherwise 
directed by the agency having jurisdiction." Stipulation 
~ 7.6. 
The Stipulation strips the Commission of 
jurisdiction over the natural gas sold by Celsius to Mountain 
Fuel at market prices and nonjurisdictionalizes the 101 and 
105 leaseholds. It strips the Commission of jurisdiction to 
regulate the rate of return on capital in the cost of service 
for gas from productive oil reservoirs, and in the operator 
service fee on gas from productive gas wells. The 
arbitration provision strips the Commission of its statutory 
jurisdiction and powers. 
The Division divests itself of its statutory powers 
in agreeing not to challenge actions of Mountain Fuel, Wexpro 
or Celsius other than through arbitration, in agreeing to 
make no claim to any right in property transferred to Wexpro 
or Celsius, and in agreeing not to file with any regulatory 
body for modification of the Agreement. 
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(b) The Stipulation Flies In The Face Of The 
Division's Successful Position Before The United States 
Supreme Court. 
The Stipulation states: 
By reason of the Company's decision 
not to conduct exploration activities as a 
utility, in order to exploit the Properties 
adequately, Wexpro must own the fee title or 
be the lessee of record and must be the 
operator of all the Properties. Stipulation 
~I 1. 2 2. 
The Division also stipulates that all issues are resolved 
in Case No. 76-057-14 "in a manner consistent with the public 
interest and in accordance with the holding of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Committee of Consumer Services." 
Stipulation • 13.1. The Stipulation also provides that this 
Court's decision was limited to jurisdictional grounds. 
Stipulation ' 13. 
The Division and Committee in the Stipulation con-
tradict the position they took before the United States 
Supreme Court, a position which was successful. That 
position was that this Court's decision with regard to the 
oil and gas properties held in Mountain Fuel's "non-utility" 
accounts was (1) such properties were utility properties and 
(2) such properties should be included in Mountain Fuel's 
utility accounts for ratemaking purposes. Brief of the 
Division and Committee in Opposition to Mountain Fuel's 
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Petition for Certiorari (Brief in Opposition), attached 
hereto as Appendix "B", at 14. The Division and 
Committee also stated to the United States Supreme Court: 
The bottom line of the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision was that the net profits from 
Mountain Fuel's oil properties beyond all 
costs associated with their production, 
including the cost of capital, should be 
applied to the benefit of Utah ratepayers 
through a reduction in their future 
rates. • • • 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in light of these 
past practices, adopted a "no-profits-to-affi-
liates" rule which prohibited such 
intra-company profits from being included in 
consumer rates, and applied that rule to the 
Mountain Fuel-Wexpro option so as to prevent 
any prof it realized by Wexpro under that 
option from being passed on to Mountain Fuel's 
ratepayers. The Utah Supreme Court also held 
that Wexpro, by reason of its relationship as 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mountain Fuel and 
the unique relationship between Mountain Fuel 
and Wexpro created under the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement and the Joint Exploration Agreement, 
was, under Utah law, a public utility. Brief 
in Opposition at 14-16. 
I. The Settling Parties Admitted The Stipulation 
And Agreement Are Not Consistent With This Court's Decision. 
Counsel for Mountain Fuel stated: 
[I]t also frees this [exploration and 
development] program that in the past has been 
highly successful. It's a program that I 
don't bBlieve and the consultants that have 
advised me don't believe and the company 
doesn't believe that could be conducted under 
the ground rules which the Supreme Court said 
must apply for the future. R. 980. 
* * * 
Participation by the customer under the ground 
rules of the Supreme Court opinion is in my 
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opinion and in the opinion of management 
impossible. R. 984. 
* * * 
There is an enormous capital requirement [for 
drilling] that we foresaw then and foresee now 
being difficult to meet. We think we can do 
it under the settlement agreement ••• and we 
think we would have had some difficulty doing 
so under the ground rules set forth by the 
Utah Supreme Court. R. 1032. 
* * * 
The [Utah Supreme Court] decision from the 
standpoint of management was a disaster. If 
all of the fruits of the program had to be 
rolled in, ••• the disaster was of such 
dimensions to the shareholders of the company 
that it felt it had to go forward with massive 
litigation, and it did so. R. 2002-03. 
J. The Division Settled The Cases Because Of The 
Expense And Time The Litigation Would Take And The "Threat" 
FERC Would Deprive Ratepayers Of Cost-Of-Service Gas. 
The Division expressed as the primary motivation 
for settlement, not the settlement's compliance with this 
Court's mandate or the public interest, but the expense and 
time the litigation would take. R. 974, 967. To the 
Division, the expense of the litigation was the "most 
significant element" that motivated a negotiated settlement. 
R. 1025-27. See also, R. 1028-29. Moreover, the Division 
was extremely concerned with the "threat" posed by the FERC 
applications which could cause the ratepayers to lose all 
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cost-of-service gas R. 2055.6 
K. The Commission, Rather Than Carry Out The Court's 
Mandate, Found Itself "In A Box" And Approved The Settlement. 
The Report and Order approving the Stipulation and 
Agreement is replete with express statements that the 
Commission was concerned with the utility's refusal to 
explore, its threat to have all gas priced at market through 
its FERC applications, and the expense and time of the 
litigation. 
The Commission noted several critical regards in 
which it found Mountain Fuel's conduct lacking. The 
Commission noted that "the decision by [Mountain Fuel] to 
abandon exploration as a utility undertaking has been 
implemented unilaterally and without Commission sanction." 
Report and Order at 9. 
The Commission expressly noted that the decision to 
create Celsius was not brought before it, and that any such 
proposal whereby Mountain Fuel would be allowed to earn an 
6The Division's position that its concerns with the 
loss of cost-of-service gas is the basis for the settlement 
is puzzling in light of the Division's concession that in the 
Agreement gas from all the wildcat acreage transferred to 
Celsius will be purchased at market prices. 
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unregulated rate of return on its "non-utility" investments 
should be presented in advance. Report and Order at 9. 
With respect to Mountain Fuel's FERC applications, 
the Conunission stated: 
[The] Commission is extremely con-
cerned that the Utah customers of MFS are 
not well-served by the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Conunission's (FERC) taking jurisdiction 
over any of MFS's operations and by MFS's 
attempt to supplant State regulation with 
Federal regulation and pricing policies which 
could make natural gas significantly more 
costly to Utah customers. The thrust of the 
FERC applications has been to avoid Utah 
policies favoring cost-of-service gas pricing 
{rather than sharply rising "market" pricing 
favored by the Federal Congress as an incen-
tive for producers to search for new gas 
supplies) on old as well as new gas. The 
applications have evoked a classic, and 
ironic, confrontation between company 
interests seeking higher profits through an 
expansion of federal regulation, and 
regulators seeking to preserve State 
prerogatives to regulate utility affairs in 
the interest of keeping costs to customers as 
low as practicable while allowing a reasonable 
rate of return to investors. While the 
Commission will not condition this order on 
the withdrawal of MFS and its subsidiaries of 
pending FERC applications, the Commission 
feels a more appropriate procedure and a 
showing of good faith by MFS and its 
subsidiaries would be to voluntarily continue 
said applications until the Commission has 
been fully apprised of the effect of such 
applications. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
In addition, the Commission expressly noted 
that "the testimony of management and members of the board of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
directors is that MFS investors will not support a regulated 
exploration program on these properties." Id. at 13. 
Yet, despite its express reservations, the 
Commission approved the Report and Order. In doing so, the 
Commission stated: 
Litigation has already cost the parties 
substantial amounts in direct costs and has 
involved proceedings in multiple agencies and 
courts. If the litigation, which to date has 
cost a total of approximately $4,000,000, is 
not resolved by settlement, it is possible 
that it will proceed for several years in 
several forums with costs to the parties of 
additional millions of dollars. Id. at 13. 
One of the Commissioners noted during argument 
that estimates of litigation costs in the future were in the 
neighborhood of $7 million. R. 1423. 
That the Commission was concerned with expense 
and threats rather than with a thorough examination of the 
issues is in part attested to by Finding 6 wherein the 
Commission stated that: 
The Commission is not entirely 
persuaded that under attractive circumstances 
investors will not support a regulated 
exploration and development program, or that 
such a program will cause problems with 
partners in the field or with the ability of 
MFS to keep employees. However, the 
Conunission finds that it is unnecessary to 
make a final determination on this matter for 
the purpose of this proceeding. Id. at 18. 
The Commission had great concern about and ex-
pressed great frustration with Mountain Fuel's adamant 
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refusal to agree to conduct any future utility exploration 
and development, as evidenced by the following comments made 
during closing argument on the Stipulation and Agreement: 
COM. CAMERON: So if we start over and 
we divide it up 80/20, or whatever figure you 
want to say, and the ratepayer puts up its 
fair share under an order up to a certain 
amount of money, the company goes out and 
apportions whatever it does, I don't 
understand for the life of me why the company 
is going to do a worse job than they would if 
all the money came from stockholders, number 
one. Number two, I can't understand if this 
Commission is willing after hearing about it 
to go ahead and authorize such a program why 
it would be in the company's interest not to 
pursue that. R. 2010-11. 
After an interplay with counsel, Commissioner Cameron 
went on to indicate the impact that the fait accompli and 
threats by the shareholder interests had: 
COM. CAMERON: I frankly am not 
worried too much about these properties or the 
stipulation insofar as it treats these 
properties. I think that's been covered. I 
think I can make a decision based on that. 
I'm worried about and have concern about an 
attitude by the management of Mountain Fuel 
• • • but I am very concerned about that 
management absolutely throwing down the 
gauntlet to this Commission saying we are not 
doing that, we won't, this is the only way 
we'll look at this, you know, and it seems to 
be nonsense. They're going to have to go out 
and raise the money somewhere in the future 
and it just seems nonsense. R. 2011-12 
(emphasis added). 
Commissioner Cameron later in the same hearing stated: 
COM. CAMERON: That's my basic 
question, is that what we're addressing, just 
these properties? You know, I seem to think 
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and it seems to me every statement that 1 s been 
made here is the Corrunission accept this, 
you've made your bed and it isn't going to get 
changed, and I agree you don't expect--you 
know, the law is the law and jurisdiction is 
jurisdiction and all that gobbledygook, but 
we're trying to be, or, we're being put into a 
box which we can't get out of either. R. 2018 
(emphasis added). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DIVESTING ITSELF 
OF JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC UTILITIES 
AND PUBLIC UTILITY PROPERTIES. 
Fundamentally, the Stipulation and Agreement 
divests the Commission of jurisdiction. It sanctions the 
deregulation of at least three classes of assets which are as 
a matter of law utility properties: (1) the properties 
transferred by the P&S Agreement to Wexpro, virtually all of 
which originally were in the utility capital account; (2) 
leaseholds in the utility 101 account containing productive 
gas reservoirs; and (3) the assets transferred to Celsius 
from the utility 105 account. Notwithstanding this Court's 
holding that these types of properties are utility 
properties, all of these properties are, under the Report and 
Order, immune from regulation. Moreover, the Stipulation 
seeks to assure this divestiture of jurisdiction over the 
properties by stating that: 
None of the parties will claim that the 
Properties owned by Wexpro are subject to the 
public utility regulation of any state, and 
all parties will cooperate to obtain legal 
rulings and, if necessary, statutes so 
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providing. It is acknowledged that the 
Company's rights with respect to the 
Properties or benefits from them may be 
subject to appropriate regulation for 
ratemaking purposes. However, that fact will 
in no way be claimed by any party as a basis 
for state public utility regulation of Wexpro 
in any of its activities with respect to the 
Properties. If Wexpro's activities with 
respect to the Properties are claimed by the 
parties to be or are successfuly subjected to 
state public utility regulation, Wexpro will 
be released from its obligations under the 
Agreement with respect to the Properties which 
subject it to regulation. Stipulation, t 11.2 
Not only does the Report and Order divest the 
Commission of jurisdiction over utility properties, but it 
approves the Stipulation that Wexpro and Celsius will be 
outside the Conunission's jurisdiction and not subject to 
public utility regulation. This is absolutely at variance 
with the statutes of this state and with this Court's 
decision that by the activities performed by Wexpro it 
becomes a public utility subject to the jurisdiction and 
regulation of the Commission. 595 P.2d at 878. Wexpro has 
never ceased owning and operating the gas plant it obtained 
by the unlawful P&S Agreement. The activities which this 
Court found made Wexpro a public utility do not change under 
the Agreement. Yet by approval of the Stipulation, the 
Commission has in effect reversed this Court's determination 
that Wexpro, as a matter of law, is a public utility. 
Celsius, by engaging in the same types of activities which 
r-, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
caused this Court to proclaim Wexpro a public utility, is 
likewise as a matter of law a public utility under the terms 
of the Agreement. Yet the Commission acquiesces in the 
plainly unlawful terms of the Stipulation and disclaims 
jurisdiction over Celsius. 
The Stipulation and Agreement go so far as to strip 
the Conunission of jurisdiction over sales of natural gas by 
Celsius to Mountain Fuel. Plainly, the Commission has power 
to regulate all of the business of every public utility. This 
Court declared in the Wexpro case that oil and gas explora-
tion is a utility business. It also prohibited sales of gas 
between affiliates at market prices because such sales were 
violative of the no-prof its-to-affiliates rule. Moreover, 
the Commission has jurisdiction over any contract with 
respect to any expenditure diverting directly or indirectly 
the funds of any utility to any of its shareholders or to any 
corporation in which they are interested, § 54-5-26, Utah 
Code Ann. Yet under the Stipulation approved by the Commis-
sion, the Corrunission will be unable to regulate purchases of 
gas by Mountain Fuel from Celsius or the price at which such 
gas is purchased--a price which could be of severe detriment 
to ratepayers whether or not the full price paid is allowed 
to be passed on in rates. 
The Stipulation in effect divests the Commission of 
the power to determine "the serious issue of whether it is in 
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the public interest for Mountain Fuel to divide its utility 
function between itself and a subsidiary." 595 P.2d at 878, 
n.8. Since the Stipulation will prevent any party from ever 
challenging Wexpro's and Celsius' independence from 
regulation, the Commission will be permanently barred from 
determining that question, a question which, in light of 
Mountain Fuel's decision to continue Wexpro's ownership of 
the properties, should have been determined on remand. 
The Commission divested itself of its ratemaking 
jurisdiction by allowing the parties to fix in the Agreement 
the rate of return in the operator service fee and cost of 
service paid Wexpro for its operations on 101 properties. 
Finally, the Stipulation does away with virtually 
all of the hearing provisions under the Commission's grant of 
statutory authority by providing that parties claiming 
default under the Stipulation are limited solely to the 
remedy of arbitration. 
The statutes of this state, and not the Stipulation 
and Agreement, must define the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion. See, §§ 54-1-2; 54-2-1(30); 54-4-1 to 54-4-7; 
54-4-26, u.c.A. 1953. Notwithstanding the several dis-
claimers in the Commission's Report and Order that the 
Commission is not giving up any jurisdiction, there is no way 
to square the Commission's wholesale divestiture of 
jurisdiction with those disclaimers. 
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II. THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES DIVESTS 
ITSELF OF THE STATUTORY POWERS TO ACT AS A 
PARTY IN LITIGATION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SER-
VICE COMMISSION. 
During the pre-Supreme Court decision stage 
of Case No. 76-057-14, this Court decided that the Division 
was empowered to act as a party and represent the public 
interest before the Corrunission. The Report and Order divests 
the Division of this power in several important respects. 
The Division gives up its power to act before the 
Commission, to litigate before the Commission, and agrees not 
to challenge any action taken by Mountain Fuel, Wexpro or 
Celsius in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, other 
than through arbitration. Stipulation ,r 5.2. The 
arbitration provision further hogties the Division in 
monitoring performance under the Agreement by prohibiting the 
Division from using professionals retained by the Division or 
Committee within twelve months preceding the Agreement. This 
eliminates any expertise the Division's experts have obtained 
over the last twelve months in these complex matters. 
The Division agrees not to make any claims that the 
utility or its customers have any right or interest in any 
property owned by Wexpro or hereafter acquired by Wexpro 
except as provided in the Stipulation and Agreement. The 
Division agrees not to claim that the properties owned by 
Wexpro are subject to state public utility regulation. 
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Stipulation ~ 11.2. The Division gives up its right to 
claim certain Wexpro properties are subject to any company 
interest. Stipulation, ~ 12. The Division agrees not to 
file with any regulatory body for the modification or 
abrogation of any terms of the Stipulation and Agreement 
except in exigent circumstances. Stipulation, ~ 15.4. 
The legislature of this state is the only entity 
with authority to limit the Department of Business Regula-
tion's and the Division's powers. Neither the Commission, 
Mountain Fuel, Wexpro, Celsius, nor the Division itself has 
any statutory authority to modify the Division's powers. Yet 
the Division did so in the Stipulation and Agreement. 
III. THE APPROVAL OF THE STIPULATION AND AGREE-
MENT WAS IN WHOLESALE VIOLATION OF THIS 
COURT'S MANDATE IN CASE NO. 76-057-14. 
The Order in Case No. 76-057-14 was reversed 
and the matter was "remanded for a hearing in accordance with 
the principles set forth in [this Court's] opinion." 595 
P.2d at 873. See, Part E. at pp. 29-34, supra. This Court 
expressly ordered that the Commission must reassess the 
transfer and determine whether the properties were utility 
assets in accordance with the tests set forth by this Court. 
Any transfer was to be for fair market value, not detrimental 
to ratepayers, and in the public interest. Proceeds from oil 
operations on utility properties were to offset rates. If 
Wexpro were to continue its operations, it was to be subject 
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to regulation and the Commission was to decide if Mountain 
Fuel could divide its utility operations with a subsidiary. 
Nothing was done in accordance with the mandate. 
There was never a hearing on classification. There was neve1 
a hearing on valuation of the assets or on whether the trans-
fers were in the public interest. There was never a valua-
tion of any of the assets. There was merely a wholesale 
release of utility assets from Commission jurisdiction, and 
the only hearing was on the Stipulation and Agreement. 
The Commission ignored and violated this Court's 
express mandate that the ratepayers were entitled to have 
rates reduced by all the oil profits from properties explored 
and developed at the ratepayers' risk. 595 P.2d at 876. 
Instead, the Commission approved a stipulation that the 
Division and the Committee would not assert any claim to any 
part of the revenues previously received or retained as a 
result of the exploration and development program or the 
ownership or classification of properties, except as provided 
in the Stipulation and Agreement. Stipulation, ~ 13. There 
was never any hearing for the purpose of reducing rates to 
the extent of the oil profits from utility properties. 
In perhaps the most glaring and critical violation 
of the mandate, the Report and Order allows Mountain Fuel's 
shareholders to operate two unregulated oil companies as 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. Footnote 8 of this Court's 
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decision forecloses such acquiescence by the Commission in 
the shareholders' successful attempt to avoid regulation of 
utility functions. The failure to determine pursuant to this 
Court's order the "serious issue" of whether Mountain Fuel 
could, consistent with the public interest, divide its 
utility oil and gas exploration and development function 
between itself and a subsidiary, is unthinkable. 
By their statements to the United States Supreme 
Court, the stipulating parties are estopped to argue that the 
Report and Order follow the mandate. 
A lower tribunal or administrative agency is bound 
to follow an order or mandate of this Court, Powerine Co. v. 
Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 148 P.2d 807 (Utah 1944); ~' 
Ithaca College v. National Labor Relations Board, 623 F.2d 
224 (2d Cir. 1980); City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Federal Power 
Commission, 561 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Vetter v. Wagner, 
576 P.2d 979 (Ak. 1978); Tovrea v. Superior Court, 419 P.2d 
79 (Ariz. 1966); and has no power or authority to deviate 
from the mandate issued by this Court. Briggs v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U.S. 304 (1948). Once a higher 
court issues its decree or mandate, an administrative agency 
has no authority, by stipulation or otherwise, to circum-
scribe the power of that court to see that its mandate is 
carried out. No entity other than an appellate court which 
issues the mandate has authority to alter or modify its man-
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date. United States v. E.I. duPont deNernours and Co., 366 
U.S. 316 (1961); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Co., 386 u.s. 129 (1967). An administrative agency may 
not knuckle under to utility interests and settle litigation 
in a manner inconsistent with an appellate court's mandate. 
Id. at 141. 
In Cascade Natural Gas, supra, the Supreme Court of 
the United States set aside a consent decree which did not 
comport with a Supreme Court mandate. After the district 
court issued a new decree on remand, the Supreme Court in 
Utah Public Service Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 
395 u.s. 464 (1969) vacated the lower court's decree a second 
time as not in compliance with the mandate. In Utah Public 
Service Commission, the Court held that a decree of a lower 
court must conform with the purpose of the mandate as well as 
its letter. Id. at 469. The lower court may not simply do 
"the best that might be" done without quite complying with 
the mandate. Id. at 471. 
And perhaps most pertinent to the issue before this 
Court where the public interest is at stake, "the pinch on 
private interests is not relevant" to fashioning a decree. 
Id. at 472. 
The Commission did not comply with the mandate of 
this Court. Nor did the Commission comply with this Court's 
purpose in issuing the mandate. This Court's purpose was to 
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put a stop to a fundamental abdication by the Commission of 
its statutory responsiblity to protect the public interest, 
595 P.2d at 873, and prevent a "regulatory outrage" which 
allowed the transfer to an unregulated company of well over 
$150 million worth of assets discovered and developed with 
funds provided by Utah ratepayers. Id. This Court's purpose 
was to ensure that ratepayers obtain their rightful benefits 
from the huge oil profits Mountain Fuel was expropriating for 
its shareholders. This Court's purpose was to prevent the 
use of intracompany transactions to create an inf lated price 
to be charged consumers. Id. at 874-75. 
The Stipulation and Agreement disserve those 
purposes. Assets discovered and developed with ratepayer 
funds are transferred to unregulated companies. The 
shareholders have received Commission sanction for their 
unregulated return from oil properties. Ratepayers will pay 
market prices to Celsius for gas from utility acreage. 
Except for a one-time, temporary reduction in cost-of-service 
gas, the ratepayers will not share in the benefits by having 
the net proceeds from all oil reduce the cost of gas. The 
purpose of the mandate, as well as the letter, is dashed by 
the Report and Order. 
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IV. THE REPORT AND ORDER APPROVING THE 
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT VIOLATES THE 
LAW OF UTAH AS EXPRESSED BY THIS COURT. 
This Court in the Wexpro case put flesh on the 
public interest standard administered by the Commission. 
In several important respects, even aside from the violation 
of the mandate, that standard is violated by the Report and 
Order. The sale of gas obtained from utility properties fron 
Celsius to Mountain Fuel at market prices, and Wexpro's 
entitlement to 46% of net profits on "new oil" from gas 
reservoirs, violate the no-profits-to-affiliates ~ule. 
The Report and Order, as a matter of law, violates 
the trust relationship whereby Mountain Fuel has a duty to 
provide the most favorable rates reasonably possible. 595 
P.2d at 874. There was substantial testimony that the market 
price of gas over the coming years will increase sharply. 
See, e.g., R. 1145-46. The record is uncontro~erted that, 
when the 101 account gas fields are depleted, cost-of-service 
gas will no longer exist. See,~., R. 1060. The 
Stipulation and Agreement means there will be no more 
exploration and development of hydrocarbons by the utility. 
These uncontroverted facts combine to mean--not cheap 
gas--but very expensive gas in the future for Mountain Fuel's 
ratepayers. 
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The parties paid lip-service throughout the hearing 
to the ratepayers' concern for maintaining cost-of-service 
gas supplies. For example, Mountain Fuel's counsel stated: 
I think [the settlement agreement] will 
give the customer the thing the customer ought 
to be interested in and is, and that's the 
maximum amount of gas at cost-of-service 
prices and the best reserves that these 
properties are able to provide. R. 982-83. 
Counsel for the Division and Committee echoed that "We 
wanted above all to preserve cost-of-service gas to the 
ratepayers of the State of Utah." R. 1038. See also, R. 
1901, 1965, 2009, 2054-55 and 2080-83. 
Despite this lip-service to cost-of-service gas, 
the fact is that when the supplies of cost-of-service gas 
available from the 101 account properties are exhausted, 
Mountain Fuel will have no more cost-of-service gas. The 
uncontroverted evidence from the stipulating parties' own 
witness establishes that the market price of gas will 
increase dramatically during the 1980's. R. 1145-46. The 
adverse impact on ratepayers may well be devastating. 
For example, Mountain Fuel is producing currently 
about 50 million Mcf of gas a year at an average cost of 
service of about $1.00 an Mcf. R. 1105. In a very few 
years, the same gas, if unregulated, might have a market 
price of $5.00 an Mcf. R. 1105. Depleting and not replacing 
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this amount of cost-of-service gas will ultimately cost 
ratepayers a minimum of several hundred million dollars a 
year in increased gas costs. Testimony of Roseman, R. 1105. 
If the 105 account properties will ultimately produce gas in 
amounts equal to that now being produced by Mountain Fuel 
(i.e., 50 million Mcf a year) and Mountain Fuel buys that 
gas, that gas will be charged to consumers at the then 
prevailing market price (e.g., $5.00 an Mcf) rather than at 
the then prevailing cost-of-service (e.g., $2.00 an Mcf). 
This means an additional charge of $150 million dollars a 
year to the ratepayers. Testimony of Roseman at R. 1145. 
A California gas utility estimated the difference 
to ratepayers between cost-of-service-gas and market-price 
gas over the life of the production of reserves from similar 
properties in the Rocky Mountain region; the utility 
estimated that providing the gas at cost of service would 
result in a "net savings of $543,000,000 from the market 
price of the gas ••• " R. 1814. 
In other words, the Commission's approval of the 
settlement agreement may well be a half billion dollar 
mistake. In any event, the failure to require 
cost-of-service gas f rorn the 105 account properties clearly 
is contrary to the public interest, is extremely detrimental 
to rate payers, and is violative of the trust duty 
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considerations enumerated by this Court in the Wexpro 
opinion. 595 P.2d 874. 
Finally, despite some conclusory evidence in the 
record that the transfers were for fair market value, and 
despite a stipulation by less than all the parties that the 
transfers were for fair market value, there is no substantial 
evidence in the record to support any such finding. In fact, 
a motion by the Coalition of Senior Citizens for valuation of 
the assets was denied by the Commission. Counsel for the 
Committee stipulated that the 54% Mountain Fuel receives from 
net proceeds from oil on productive gas reservoirs is not 
fair market value. R. 1377. While there was testimony that 
a 7% overriding royalty is fair market value in arm's length 
transactions, there was no evidence that it was fair market 
value for Celsius to give Mountain Fuel a 7% overriding 
royalty interest but to charge market prices for gas from 
those properties. There is no reasoned explanation in the 
record why 54% of net oil revenues beyond Wexpro's return on 
investment constitutes fair market value with respect to 
productive oil reservoirs, whereas a 7% overriding royalty 
constitutes fair market value for extremely valuable wildcat 
acreage. Nor is there any evidence to support the difference 
between requiring cost-of-service gas from explored 
properties but allowing market-price gas from wildcat 
properties. 
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The record as a whole is devoid of substantial 
evidence to make a finding that the properties were trans-
ferred for fair market value. On the contrary, the record i: 
clear, based on statements of witnesses and counsel for the 
stipulating parties, that the Stipulation and Agreement was 
the result not of reasoned determinations on issues, but of 
compromise--pure and simple. 
V. THE REPORT AND ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS AND HOSTILE TO ITS FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS. 
A. The Report and Order is hostile to its own 
findings and conclusions because while it states that 
customers will benefit from cost-of-service gas, it sanction~ 
the end of cost-of-service gas and the purchase by Mountain 
Fuel from Celsius of market-price gas. Four times in the 
Report and Order the Commission emphasizes the importance of 
cost-of-service gas. Report and Order, at 10, 11, 15, 17. 
Yet the Report and Order will lead to the end of cost-of-ser-
vice gas because, when the 101 account gas fields are 
depleted, all gas purchased by Mountain Fuel will be at mar-
ket prices. Even before those fields are depleted, all the 
gas to be purchased by the utility from Celsius from wildcat 
acreage and from unexplored formations under explored acreage 
is to be purchased at market prices. 
80 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. The Report and Order is hostile to its own 
findings and conclusions because it leaves Wexpro and 
Celsius unregulated. The Commission states that the 
no-profit-to-affiliates rule and potential conflicts of 
interest or sweetheart relationships between Mountain Fuel 
and its subsidiaries require continued and ongoing scrutiny 
by the Commission of Mountain Fuel and its subsidiaries, 
whether or not they are subject to a regulated rate of 
return. Id. at 8. Yet the Report and Order allows Wexpro 
and Celsius to be unregulated and in fact prevents the 
Division from ever challenging that lack of regulation. 
C. The Report and Order is hostile to its findings 
and conclusions because the Commission states that Mountain 
Fuel should continue utility exploration and development. 
The Report and Order states that exploration and deve1opment 
of energy resources are an appropriate activity for Mountain 
Fuel, both as part of its regulated activities and those 
which are not regulated. The Commission states it believes 
that Mountain Fuel should continue utility exploration and 
development in the future, and that the decision by Mountain 
Fuel to abandon exploration as a utility "has been 
implemented unilaterally and without Commission sanction." 
Despite this express statement of the importance of Mountain 
Fuel's utility exploration and development for hydrocarbons, 
the Commission allows Wexpro and Celsius to go 
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unregulated and "for the purpose of this settlement [The 
Conunission] finds it unnecessary to determine if Mountain 
Fuel's activities should include an exploration and 
development program." Id. at 9. 
D. The Report and Order is internally inconsistent 
because the Conunission on the one hand states that Mountain 
Fuel's non-utility activities must enhance and not jeopardize 
utility operations, Id. at 8, but, on the other hand, allows 
Celsius to be an unregulated oil company and to sell gas from 
utility property to Mountain Fuel at market prices. 
E. The Report and Order is arbitrary and capri-
cious in allowing Celsius to be an unregulated oil company 
based not on an application by Celsius or Mountain Fuel, but 
on the Conunission's "trust" that Mountain Fuel will make such 
an application. Id. at 9. 
F. The Report and Order is arbitrary and capri-
cious in that the Commission notes its "extreme concern with 
the FERC applications," but fails to condition the approval 
of the Stipulation and Agreement on withdrawal by Mountain 
Fuel and its subsidiaries of those FERC applications, and 
rather awaits a showing of "good faith" by Mountain Fuel and 
its subsidiaries concerning those applications. Id. at 10. 
G. The Report and Order is arbitrary and capri-
cious because the Commission accepts Mountain Fuel's fait 
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accompli, but the Commission "is not entirely persuaded that 
under attractive circumstances investors will not support a 
regulated exploration and development program or that such a 
program will cause problems with partners in the field or 
with the ability of Mountain Fuel to keep employees." Id., 
Finding 18. 
In short, the Commission's Order is not supported 
by its findings and is in fact hostile to them. The 
irreconcilability of findings and the Order is fatal. See, 
~., Parowan Pumpers Association v. Public Service 
Commission, 586 P.2d 407 at 409 (Utah 1978). Moreover, the 
Commission's action is so unreasonable that it must be deemed 
arbitrary and capricious and it must not be sustained. See, 
~., Williams v. Public Service Commission, 504 P.2d 34 
(Utah 1972). 
CONCLUSION 
Much more is at stake here than the Commission's 
failure to comply with this Court's mandate in this case, 
however important this case is. What is at stake here is the 
very integrity of the judicial process and the maintenance in 
the community of respect for this Court's decisions. If 
well-heeled interests perceive they can successfully avoid 
this Court's decisions by waging all-out war on them, respect 
for the law cannot be sustained. If this Court allows lower 
tribunals and administrative agencies to honor settlements 
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which fly in the face of not just the law, but of an express 
mandate, then this Court will encourage endless litigation 
rather than the resolution of disputes. The shareholders 
interests' thus-far successful refusal to comply with this 
Court's mandate is an affront to the integrity of the 
Corrunission, of this Court and the law. Reversal of the 
Commission's Report and Order has import far beyond the 
protection of the public interest in fair and equitable 
utility regulation. It has fundamental import to the 
promotion of a fair and equitable legal system, and most 
important to promoting respect for the law. 
The Report and Order should be reversed and the 
cases remanded with instructions to comply with the mandate 
in the Wexpro case and the law. 
DATED this b_*"aay of June, 1982. 
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500 Kearns Building 
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_UTAH COMMITTEE OF CONSLJ.MER SERVICES anJ 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, 
DIVISION or PLJUUC UTILITJES, 
ReJ pund cJJIJ. 
PETITION FOR J\ WHIT OF U'.llTIORARJ TO TIJE 
SlJPRE!vtE COURT OF Tl IE STATE OF LJTAH 
. The pctitionc:rs, !\fountain Fuel Supply Companr, Wcx-
pro Compai1y, aud Alex Oblad, J Ltrold Hurtn11 anJ Carlyle 
Hannon, major n:prcsL'ntalive f\lou11tai11 Fud ':.hard1olJers, 
respectfully pray that a writ of t:crtior:tri issue ti> the Suprt'lllt 
Court of the: State of l lt:d1 to rcvit"w tliL' judgment and op111-
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OPINION BELOW 
The opinmn of the Utah Supreme Court, Appeal No. 
I 583j, has been reported at 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) an<l 
a copy of the ~otme is attached as Appendix A. 1 
JURISDICTION 
From the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court on May to, 
1979, timely petitions for rehearing were filed by petitioners 
and denied without comment on July 18, 1979. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stayed its remittitur of the case pending 
disposition of this petition for certiorari. This Court's juris-
diction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Whether Utah regulation and taxation of interstate pro-
duction and sale of crude oil and natural gas, so severe 
that the interstate commerce may be terminated, constitute 
an impermissible interference with and burden upon inter-
state commerce. 
II. Whether Utah regulation of the price of interstate natural 
gas sales, whid1 sales are subject to comprehensive pric-
ing regulations by Congress and the J~edcral Energy Regu-
latory Cumnussion, is preempted by federal regulation. 
Ill. Whether Utah regulation of the ernnomic return to the 
producer upon sales of oil in interstate commerce is pre-
empted by rnmpreheusive price regulations of the United 
States Department of Energy which produce, in accord-
I Tlie advance sheets of the Pacific Reporter erro1u:ousl)' set forth 
counsd appcaranrcs for the parties. Tlac Utah Puhlic Scn·i<c Com-
mission was wi1ho111 .my legal w11111t·I 111 ,my lime before the Utah 
Supreme Court to urge the validity and publk policy of its onler of 
A\nil H, 1~:>7H. That assignment rnme<1ucntly fell on the petitioners. 
A m, Calvin L. Rampton, Esq. was, at all times bc:low, counsel for 
Wexpro Company. 
j 
am.:e with Congress' intention, a far higher cc.:o11unul 
return. 
IV. Whether Utah's rt:truactivc reclassification of oil and gas 
properties as utility assets. which depresses their value by 
tens of milJions of dollars, rnnstifutcs an uncompensated 
taking of the property of shareholders and bu1H..Jholdcrs 
contrary to their invc:stmcnt-b1tcked reliance upon a Utah 
statute, its practical construction for over forty years, an<l 
previous final adjudications that these same properties 
were not utility assets. 
CONSTJTUTJONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVJSIONS INVOLVED! 
Article I. Section 8 of the Constitution. 
Article VI of the Constitution. 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section I to the Constitution. 
Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 J 7(b) ( 1976). 
Emergency Petroleum Allo(abon Act, l) U.S.C. § § 75 l &:. 75.) 
(1976). 
l!nergy Policy and Comnvation Alt, I 5 U.S.C. §§ 757 &:. 760~ 
and 42 lJ.S.C. § 6201 ( 1976 & Supp. 1979). 
Naturnl Gas Polity Act, I 'i ll.S.C. § 3301 ( 21) (Supp. 1979). 
Utah Publi( Utilities Ad, Utah Code A1111. § '>·1-2-1 ( 30) 
'(1974). 
STATEMENT OF THI'. CASE 
I. The N11lme of the JJiJf'11le. This controversy nmcerns the 
State of Utah's constitutional power to rc~ulatc interstate com-
2 Copies of the relevant portions of the constitutional and statutory 
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merce in oil an<l gas, a commerce alrea<ly regulated by the 
UniteJ States, and to do so by a retroactive reclassification 
of non-utility oil and gas properties as utility assets. Issues 
argued below included preemption by f ecleral regulation, un· 
due burden on interstate commerce, and the taking of property 
without just compensation. 
For almost 40 years, petitioner Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company ("Mountain Fuel"), which operates a natural gas 
distribution utility, has also conducted one of the most success-
ful oil and gas exploration and development programs in the 
lntermountain West. It has done so with the full knowledge 
and express support of the Utah Public Service Commission 
("Utilities Commission"). Gas found was placed in a utility 
account and dedicated to the distribution utility at a cost-of. 
service price far below the interstate and intrastate market 
price. Oil found was placed iu a non-utility account and sold 
at market price. 
The Utilities Commission rc,1uired this segregation into 
utility and non-utility accounts and, in a series of contested, 
final, an<l unappcaled orders, has repeatedly held that the 
oil properties, most of which arc in Wyoming and states other 
than Utah, were non-utility and not subject to Utah regulation. 
Every piece of property at issue here was "involved in one or 
more hearings and was classified as a non-utility asset by a 
final order. 
The capital rnsts of joint exploration and development 
for both oil and gas were financed by ~fountain Fuel's share-
holders and by the sale of <lebt scrnritics. Portions of some 
expenses (primarily for drilling that resulted in dry holes) 
,./ere allocated to the utilit}' accounts in a mauner approved 
by the Utilities Commission. From 1960 to 1972, the non-
j 
utility oil accounts pai<l a share of <lry hole expenses an pw-
portion to· their share of revenues an<l thereafter have paid 
more than that proportion. 
This case arose in late 1976 when Mountain Fuel trans-
ferred its non-utility oil properties and operations to a wholly-
owned subsidiary, petitioner We~pro Company ( "Wexpro"). 
The Utilities Commission, af tcr exhaustive hearings, approved 
the arrangements between Mountain Fuel and Wexpro after 
modification, adhering to the position, relied upon by Moun-
tain fuel's stockholders and bondholders, that the propertit:s 
transferred were non-utility. That position was based upan the 
Commission's long-standing construction of the pertinent Utah 
statutes and specific fin<lings of fact in contested hearings 
with respect to the properties. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed. It fashioned a test 
under which virtually all of the non-utility properties must be 
reclassified as utility properties and the profits on Wexpro's 
sales of oil and gas from Wyoming and other states must be 
subjected to Utah rcRuJation to subsidize yet lower rates to 
Utah natural gas ratepayers who already pay the lowest metro-
politan area rates in the nation. 
Certain conscc1uc1Kes stemming from the new intcrpreL1-
tion of the Ut•1h statutes by the Utah court are undeniable an<l 
were not controverted below. 
First, shardwl<lcrs and bondholJcrs, who rdit:J upon prec 
vious final orders of the Utilities Commission applring the 
Utah statutes that the oil properties were not subject to regu· 
lation, have rctroadivdr lost tens of millions of dollars of 
their properly and of the sc.:rnrity for their dc:benlur<.:s. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Mus um and Library Services 
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Second, the conversion of a high-risk, free market busi-
ness into a high-risk, low-return utility operation means that 
petitioners will almost certainly be forced to dose down. as 
now unprofitable and impossible to finance, one of the na-
tion·s most successful energy exploration and development 
programs. The energy program which will be shut down is in 
the lntermountain West, one of the most prolific on-shore 
areas in the country for new discoveries of oil and gas. 
Third, Utah, a consuming state, has undertaken to regu-
late oil and gas production and sales in the producing states 
of Wyoming. Colorado and other states, with the effect of 
impeding interstate commerce. 
Fourth, the price of interstate sales of gas, regulated na-
tionally by Congress an<l the Federal Energy Regulatory Com· 
mission, will now be fixed at lower levels by Utah in orJcr 
to benefit local, Utah consumers. 
Fifth, the return to the prnJUl:cr on interstate sales of 
oil, controlled by price regulations of the United States De· 
partment of Energy to encourage new production, will now be 
greatly depressed by Utah in order to subsidi:le local natural 
gas consumers. 
The dispute between the parties concerns the constitu· 
tional power of Utah to accomplish these results in the way 
it did. 
2. Origin 1111d 1'11111:1iom of i\lo11111,1i11 1'111:/. Mountain Fuel 
was neatcd by a 1935 merger of five companies, one of whkh 
produced oil. (R. 4394, 4945, 5512-13) For <lt.-ca<les, Moun-
tain Fuel has operated separate utility gas anJ non-utility oil 
businesses. (R. 4393-94) Its distribution of natural gas sub-
-
7 
jects it to publit: utility regulation in Utah and Wyoming, 
while its production and transmission fum:tions are under fed-
eral and oth$!r state regulation. Mountain Fuel's independent, 
non-utHity businesses indude the produt:tion an<l sale of oil 
and the production of gas as well as the manufadure and sale 
of brick, ceramics, and other building materials, none of which 
has ever been subject to state utility regulation. Re: Mountain 
fuel S11pply Co., 33 P.U.R. (N.S.) 3 (Utah 19·10); U1,1h P.S.C. 
Ca1e No. 6369 ( 1972) (R. 5728, 5734-36); (R. 226, 3800 
(17]) 
3. 1'he b.:plor"1io11 ,md Der<,:lo/1mmt Prugr,mt. For many 
years, the Company's utility and non-utility divisions rnrric<l 
on a vigorous joint exploration and development program. 
Mountain fuel investors have always borne the capital rnsts 
of land acquisition for both utility and non-utility exploration. 
(R. 4392) If the pro~ram produced a successful wdl, it wa~ 
classified as either oil or ~as, depending upon whirh l1:ad 
the wcatcr "value of produrtion" at the wellhead. ( R. :j72 !-
H) If a gas fonnatiun was disrnvcred, all assodate<l rnsts 
were rnpitaliled in the utility acrnunts and reflected in the 
rates. In the event of an oil well discovery, the entire rnst 
was rnpitali:tcd 111 the Company's non-utility oil al'rnunts a11d 
was, therefore, not taken into account in establishing natural 
gas rates. (R. 56L·1, 5706) 
Dry holes, whid1 prw.lurc neither gas nor oil, arc rn:ccs-
sarily treatc<l differently. In the early years, when most wells 
were gas, dry hole expenses were prim:ipall)' reflected i11 the 
utility accounts. Even then, the non-utilit)' oil division paid 
a lar~cr proportion of drilling expense than its proportion ut 
total Company oil :rnd ~as revenues. ( R. ; N2 [ 8), .1800 [ 2.j]. 
")72'.\) A~ oil hc:cum.· a sihnificrnt co11t1iLH1tor to Mou11ta111 
Fuel revenues, its share of joint cxplor.1tio11 expense rose •uiJ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
smcc 1975, has stouJ at half. U1,1h P.S.C. CuJc No. 7l l3 
( 1975) ( R. 5817-18) The share allornteJ to the utility gas 
acrnunts affects natural gas rates. The share paid by non-' 
utility oil acrnunts docs not. 
The Utilities Commission h.1s always rc:q11in:d Mountain 
Fuel to scgrcg•1te non-utility oil properties from utility gas 
properties an<l operations. The Commission furb,zde Moun-
tain Fuel to inclu<le oil properties in the utility rate base upan 
which an authoriied rate of return on plant was allowed. This 
was done in seven separate rate orders from 1940 to 1978.1 
These seven proc.:ecdings were all contested and all went to 
final orders from which no appeals were taken. During these 
years the joint exploration and development program was car-
ried on with the express approval of the Commission as to the 
utility division's participation. 
Mountain Fuel also has historiutll}' t.:onJuctcJ joinl ex· 
ploration and development with other inJcpenJent producers 
who, upon discovering gas, sold the gas at nurket price to 
.Mountain Fuel in interstate rnmmen:c for delivery and cou-
sum ption in Utah. 
4. U,11t:/'"Y",. Bem:fiu /mm /he l'ro,i:r,1111 . . Mountain Fuel has 
always found substantially more gas (better than l. 5 trillion 
cubic feet between 19'>0· 1976) than oil. (R. )666, 'H>33, 56.16) 
Its cost-of-servkc £aS ( aLtuaf pro<ludion (()St plus a utility 
rate of return) has always been priced well below market. 
In 1977, for example, Mountain Fuel customers paid $.40 
per Mcf for Company cost-of-service gas as compared with a 
) Ile: Mountain Fuel Supply Com11any, 33 P.U.fl. (N.S.) 3 (1940); 
Utah P.S.C. Case No. 3972 (1953) (H. 5502-03); Utah P.S.C. Case No. 
4392 (1957) (R. 5621); Utah P.S.C. Case No. ·i797 (1960) (R. 5636); 
Utah P.S.C. Case No. 5901 0968) (H. 5706-07); Utub P.S.C. Case No. 
6369 0972) m. 5728); lltah P.S.C. Case No. Ci668 ( 197·1) (R. 5803). 
9 
fidd price of .$1.17 and a pipeline pncc of $l.-i8. (R. 50)1) 
Mountain htd's gas transmission system, built 011ly bemuse 
of its exploration and dcvdupmcnt program, <.:nablc:J the Com-
pany to purdmsc an aJJitional ouc trillion rnbic feet betweeu 
1960-1976 (R. 3666), giving Mountaiu Fuel a reserve lift: 
index of bctwceu J.1 anJ I) years, tompareJ with the 11•1tional 
average of 11i11e years. (It 2030) In 1979, over jU percent of 
Mountain ha<:l's utility gas rct.)ltjrcmcnts arc bejng supplieJ 
from its own wells, a result unmatched by any other com-
parable gas Jistribution utility 
In the period 1960-1976, rates were reduced .$ 123 million 
by lower gas prices Jue to the exploration and Jcvelopme11t 
program. (R. 2391) Rates wc:rc reJuced an aJJitional $93.8 
million due tu tax deductions generated by the program ( R. 
.1638), for a total bcndit to the ratepayers of .$216.8 million. 
As a conS(.'(.)Ueau:c, f\lmmtaiu Fuel has the lowest metropolitan 
area natural gas rates in the: nation. ( R. 389) 
5. 1'be U,1fr/'".>'''I' JU1k 1.iwe The l ltah SuprenH.: Court latld 
that Mountain Fuel's non-utility oil prnpc:rtics must be taken 
to subsidize its utility ratepayers This holding was baseJ ou 
the assumption that the ratepayers took the risks of the pro-
gram by payinA l'Crtain exploration expenses i11 their rates. 
(App. A8-9) The court dtJirntc:J tltc oil prop<:rtics to the 
ratep•1yers on this mo1H:y·at-risk 11ot1011. Although a mis-
nomer, "ratepayer contribution" to the program was much 
smaller than shareholder contributiou. In the pcrioJ 1960-
1976, a rernver}' of $4·1-9 million was authorizc:d in the rates. 
(R. 3638) In that same period, invc:stors contributeJ $87.7 
million to capital rnsts associated with utility gas exploratinll 
(R. 3639) anJ $·12.9 million for costs associated with oil 
(R. ">439), makinJ~ a total nmtribution of Sno.6 111illio11. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Investors thus rnutributeJ nearly three times as much as rate· 
payers "contributed." 
Moreover, whatever the comparative contributions of in-
vestor and ratepayer, the magnitude of the contributions had 
nothing to Jo with risk. All of the investor contribution was 
at risk while none of the so-called "ratepayer contribution" 
was. (R. 2452, 2514-15, 2523, 2746) That is manifest from 
the fact that the Utilities Commission ruled in three cases-
in 1960, 1968 and 1978 1-that it would allow a reasonable 
exploration expense in the gas utility rates only so Jong as 
the cost-of-service of developing new supplies of Company 
production was lower than the average cost of purchased g••S. 
The ratepayers could not lose; the shareholders anJ bond-
holders could. 
6. lnlenlule Co111111t'fd'. Virtually all of the 11on-utility oil 
properties transferred to Wexpro on January I, 1977, were 
outside Utah, the principal producing properties being in 
Wyoming, Colorado, and Nevada. (Sec Appendix C) All 
of Wexpro's oil opcrntions and substantially all of Moun-
tain Fuel's gas operations involve interstate rnmmcrcc. Crude 
oil is sold in interstate commerce to refineries or other pro-
ducers in mall)' states at prices subject to federal regulation. 
(R. 970-71) Natural gas sales at the wellhead, in intrastate 
as well as interstate transactions, arc also subject to compre-
hensive federal regulation. 
Mountain Fuel has constructed an interstate transmission 
.system from Colorado through Wyoming to Utah along with 
.C Utah P.S.C. Case No. 4191 (1960) m. 5639); Utah P.S.C. Case No. 
5907 (1968) (R. 5663); Utala P.S.C. Case No. 16-051-H (1978) CR. 3393, 
3395). In the 1968 case, the Utilities Commission said: 
(Al vigorous exploration and development prog1·am should 
be continued so long as the costs incurred in developing new 
supplies of gas are lower lhan lhe average cost of purchased 
gas. (R. 5663) 
·~--
1l 
a major gathering network, compressor stations, a11d alJicJ 
capital facilities. These facilities are under federal regulatiou. 
(R. 4HO) They are shown on Appendix D. Because of its 
exploration and development program, Mountain Fuel was 
able to supply. natural gas to northwestern, southwestt:rn and 
midwestern consuming states <luring the harsh winter of 1976-
1977. (R. 5504 [ 3]) 
7. Jm·eslor Reliullft.'. Capital contributions by investors for 
both oil and gas were made in reliance upon the segregation 
of the non-utility oil from the utility gas. ( R. 5149- 51) Share-
holders pun:hascd Mountain Fuel stock, whid1 is traded 011 
the New York Stock Exdrnngc, in reliance upon· the Utilit}' 
Commission's rcpeatcJ final and unappcaled but contested de-
cisions that the Company's uil properties arc unrc~lalated, 11011-
utility assets. Bondholders, as well, purchased in reliance upon 
the non-utility rharndcr of the oil propcrtit:s. As a result, the 
Company has raised debt c1pital at low costs to utilit}' rate-
payers. U1,1h P.S.C. Cm: N<>. 711.3 (1975) (R. 5822) 
8. for111,1lio11 ,md 'J'r,11JJ/n lo fr/ cx/1ru. The non-utility oil 
properties were transferred by Mountain Fu~I in return for 
all outstanding Wexpro sttKk. (R. 346-47, 53·10) Wexpro 
w&ts created to encourage anJ expand oil an<l gas cxploratil>11 
;md development activities. The market value of the 11011-
utHity oil properties transf cm:J was estimated to be 111 exec~~ 
of $J 50 million, the entire cost of which had been paid b}' 
shareholders from earnings or the sale of securities. No part 
of these costs was ever rccovcreJ in utility rates. (R. ·1393, 
4406) 
Wexpm anJ Mountain Fuc:I 1tlso t:11tcrcJ jnto a 1977 
Joint Exploration Agreement ("Jl'.A"), approv(.'d hy the Co111-
1nission upon hc•11·in~. in \vJiid1 each a_gi-ccd to •1dva1u.c uuc-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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h&tlf of annual exploration expenses, with Mountain Fuel cap-
italizing and receiving any gas discoveries and Wexpro capital-
izing and receiving any oil discoveries. It was anticipated that 
Wexpro would also explore and develop independently of 
Mountain Fuel, raising its own capital to do so. (R. 250, 277) 
9. PuJition of lfrJjwwlmJJ. Respondents did not contend be-
fore the Utilities Commission that the non-utility assets should 
be rolled into or merged with the utility gas accounts foe cate-
making purposes. They expressly disclaimed that argument 
and instead asked the Commission to attach certain conditions 
to the Wexpro transfer. (R. 674, 3785-91) On appeal, re-
spondents for the first time argued that the ratepayer should 
receive, along with low-priced cost-of -service gas and high 
reserves, all of the oil assets and prof its above a regulated 
utility rate of return. 
10. Utilitit·.r CommiHiou Holding. On April 11, 1978, the 
Utilities Commission approved the JEA and found that non-
utility oil properties transferred to \X'expro were not subject 
to regulation. It cited the precedent of 38 years of final ad-
judications and orders of the Utilities Commission as to the 
non-utility character of the oil assets and that an exploration 
expense would be allowed in the rates only so long as the 
costs of that program reflected in the rates were lower than 
the average price of purchased gas., (App. Illl-15, 17-18, 
28-30, 32, 35, 44) 
Jt further found that Mountain Fuel shareholders and 
bondholders had rclieJ upon the final orders of the Utilities 
Commission and its regulatory policy on the oil and gas ex-
pl,?ration and development program in investing in the Com-
s The Report and Order or the Utilities Commission of April 11, 1978 
is attached as Appendix B. 
·~'.:f. . _,!ii·· : :l\o 
pany (App. Bl7-18, 22, 39-·10) an<l that the program had been 
in the public interest an<l should be continued in the future 
under the JEA with Wt:xpro. (App. li.39-40, 85-86) 
11. U1,1h S11prt:11ll: Cu11r1 110/di11g. Upon Jirut appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court, in a <livi<leJ opinion, held that the non-
utility oil properties haJ always been a11J arc utility assets,'' 
and that these properties anJ the oil rcvenucs generated from 
them should be "applied, to reduce the rnst of gas" to the 
Utah utility customer. (App. AB-9) The court majorit)' JiJ 
not mention the separation of utilitr gas and non-utility oil 
rcc1uired by the Commission for •tlmost ·iO y<:ars, or the seven 
previous, scparntc f iual orders of the Commission <tdjuJicating 
the oil properties of .Mountain Fuel to be non-utility, unregu-
lated assets. 
The Utah Supreme Court majorjty Jid 11ot cite nor <liscuss 
that portion of the Utah statute providing that regulation of 
a utility by the Commission shaJI not extend to anr non-utility 
business conduded by th(: utility. Utah CoJe Ann. § 54-2- l 
(30) (1974). The rnurt helJ that the Commission's conclu-
sions were "pren1ised on the erroneous assumption there was 
no correlation or rnnnedion between the contributions by the 
ratepayers. through an annual exploration and development 
expense included in the rate base, and the ensuing benefits 
from the program." (App. A2) 
ti The Utah court wrote out a three-pronged economic test to deter-
mine whether the non-utility oil properties were utility assets, viz., 
(1) was the property, while undeveloped wildcat acreage, ever re-
flected, even momentarily, in a utility account earning a rate o( 
return, (2) were any utility exploration expense funds applied to 
develop that acreage or (3 I have natural gas or gas liquids ever been 
produced from the acreage, regardless of amount. <App Al3-14) 
Petitioners acknowledge that undt·r this new lest, :mLst;.rntially all of 
lhc non-utility oil properties would fall within the sweeping contours 
of what the Utah court has now a111101111t·t·d to ht· "11tili1· '""''"' ,,. " 
I...:,~·•: 
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Jgnoring the fact that the Commjssion had precisely recog· 
nized that connectjoo and explained its relevance, the court 
majority, on the basis of a new theory that Mountain 1:uel 
stood in a "trust relationship" when it sold natural gas to its 
utility customers (App. A4, 8), held that (i) sales of inter-
state gas by Wexpro to 1'.fountain Fuel must be at the cost-of-
service prke rather than the federal reiling price, even when 
the gas rnmes from acreage independently developed by Wex-
pro (App. AS·6), and (ii) Wexpro. along with any other 
company in interstate commerce that selJs jointly developed 
gas to Mountain Fuel, is itself a public utility subject to Utah 
regulation. The Utah court stated: 
A review of the provisions of the two agreements 
as moJifitd by the Commission dearly indicates that, 
by the activities performed by Wexpro, it becomes a 
public utility subject to the jurisdiction and regulation 
of the Commission under Sec. 54-2-1 ( 30). )Y/ ex pro, by 
i11 joint ,,aivitieJ 11•ilh Alo1111lai11 1"11e/, particularly up-
on the transferred properties iJ both performing '' ser· 
11ice, z1iz., f,1cilitaJi11g the prod111:1io11 of 1111/ul'al ga.r, 
1111d delivering 1U1tural gas lo ill f>111"C1JI, both of 11•hich 
com1i1111e lf/expro a public u1i/i1y. (App. A13) (Em· 
phasis added) 
These concepts, taken together, leave no room for Moun· 
tain Fuel or Wexpro to conduct a non-utility business in oil 
or gas, subjett Wexpro to Utah regulation as a public utility, 
and require Wcxpro to sell gas to Mountain Fuel at cheap 
prices (App. A5-6). far below the federal ceiling level for 
comparable vintage supply. Further, under the statutory in-
terpretation of the Utah court, any other indepenJent producer 
which explores "jointly" with and delivers gas to Mountain 
Fuel, whether in interstate commerce or not, "facilitat [es) 
the production of natural gas" and is, as well, ~ubject to Utah 
~egulation. 
15 
Justice Wilkins, in dissent, concluded that the majorit}'°s 
ruling was contrary to the Utah statutc:s and to the many final 
Jec.:isions of the UtiHtics Commission, that the Utah wurt 
had ignored Jcdsions of this Court unJer the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that the detision constituteJ a "massive 
appropriation of the property dghts of Mountain Fuel's share-
holders." (A pp. A 52- 56) The dissent noted that the re-
mand to the Utilities Commission woulJ be a mere methanical 
accounting protedurc because the Commission had found fads 
&llld the court majority haJ stated rnnclusions that re9uired 
the redassification of the prnpcrties in ciucstion from 11011-
utility to utility. (App. A4 I-42, 53) 
12. 'l't:r111i11,1lio11 of 1\1011111,iin f11C'I l:'x/1/ur,1ti1J11 und 01:1·clo/1-
111ml. The cvidcntc shows, and it has never been denied, that 
if the non-utility oil pn:ipertics were folded into the gas utility 
accounts for ratemaldng, the 43-year-old exploration and de-
velopment program of Mountain Fuel would end. ( R. 2006, 
5028, 5033) Mountain Fuel competes for rnpital funds against 
oil and gas companies who receive the highest interstate price 
for both crude oil an<l natural gas, even though smh com· 
panics also recover an exploration expense in their rates and 
prices. (R. 4175, 4'110-11) The subsidiiation of Utah gas 
consumers with oil profits, and the requirement that Wcxprn 
sell gas independent!}' <liscovercJ in other states to .Mountain 
Fuc:l at low, cost-of-service prices, will make it impossible to 
raise risk capital for the prowam. (R. 155-56, 3'>0, 385-89) 
REASONS FOR GRANTING Tl-IE WRIT 
Utah will now re~ulatc both the price of natural ~as 
moving in interstate commerce and the rate of return on inter-
st;1te sales of oil. The State has ;JJso taken tc11s of millions of 
dollars of oil pn>pcr·tics hdo11,i~i11.~ to pc:titi1H1c:1·s in o.-de,- to Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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give a one-time windfall to Utah gas utility customers through 
temporarily lowered rates. These actions by Utah raise seri-
ous constitutional issues of interference with interstate com-
merce, state regulation of subjects preempted by federal law, 
and the uncompensated taking of private property. 
This case is one of great public.: importance and wide-
spread significance, particularly at a time when energy short-
ages prese!lt an urgent problem for solution at national and 
international levels. Utah has attempted to appropriate energy 
resources in interstate commerce, much of which does not even 
touch Utah's borders, for purely local benefit. This is not the 
first time in our history, nor will it be the last, that this Court 
has been asked to preserve the federal plan against local in-
cursion. In times of economic difficulty, states are under strong 
temptation to pref er local and short-term interests to national 
and long-term goals. Utah has succumbeJ to that temptation. 
If its attempt succeeds and the decision below stands, other 
states and localities will be encouraged to similar attempts, if 
only in self -defense. Further litigation of this kind is a cer-
tainty. 
The issues here Jo not turn upon Utah's utility laws but 
on principles of federal constitutional law. It could not be 
more clear that petitioners Jo not invite this Court to deter-
mine the wisdom or propriety of the "no-profit-to-affiliate" 
rnncept or the three-pronged utility test under the Utah court 
opinion. Nor Jo petitioners request in any sense that this 
Court enter upon or become enmeshed !n an accounting or 
dassif i(ation proceeding as to the non-utility or utility char-
ack~ of the oil properties. There is no issue prcseutcd involv-
ing ~the classification of oil or gas assets. Rather, petitic~ners 
romplain only of the resulti11g impact of the Utah opiuion upon 
17 
the production an<l sale of oil and gas in interstate rnmmcrt:c, 
upon preemptive ft:<leral law and policy, and upon constitu-
tionally protettcJ property rights. This petition is so confined. 
That Utah has acted in the guise of regulating a Jistri-
bution utility rn::ithcr justif ics its action nor narrows the scope 
of the prcrcdent. Hence, Utah's announced rationale for inter-
fering with interstate commerce an<l fcJeral re~ulation - that 
its utility rntcpaycrs bore the risk of out-of-state exploration 
and development - docs not, even if it were true, e1npowcr 
Utah to fix oil profits and £<1S prkcs it is rnn~titutionally bar-
red from regulating. 
The controlling constitutional rules should be authorita-
tively stated now.7 With Utah's action as precedent, other 
1 The federal constitutional questions asserted by this petition were 
raised below and decided against petitioners. The decision is sub-
ject to no further review in Utah. Nothing remains to be done 
except the implementation of the judgment by the Utah Utilities 
Commission. Justice Wilkins, in his dissent below, characterized 
the remand to the Commission as "demonstrably needless" because 
the criteria framed by the Utah court had appropriated all Wexpro's 
assets under the Commission's undisputed findings. (App. A41-42, 
53) 
In response to the petitions for rehearing below, respondents adopt-
ed the opinion of Justice Wilkins on the nature of the remand, argu-
ing that all of Wexpro's oil profits and properties were to be utHized 
to lower Mountain Fuel natural gas rates. Petitioners. however, 
urged on rehearing that the Utah court judgment could be inter-
preted as resulting in a roll-in of less than all of the oil profits and 
properties. The Utah court did not respond. 
Under any interpretation, there is no c1uestion that on remand Utah 
will regulate interstate commerce contrary to the Constitution and 
Congressional preemption and that petitioners will suffer an immense 
loss in property values and profits of al least lens of millions of 
dollars and perhaps as much ilS $150 million. The sole reason these 
results have not already occurred is that the Utah Supreme Court 
stayed its remittitur of the 111allcr to the Commission so that peti-
tioners could seek review in this Court of the substantial federal 
questions presented. 
'fhis case is mature for review by this Court bcc<.iusc the fl'dcral 
1Nllfl' 1·1·111i1H11•rl ·" 
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states and local units of government will attempt to seize non-
utilit y assets of other sharehoiJers and bondholders to sub-
siJiie local consumers at the expense of national interests in 
energy dcvdopmc:nt, thus obstructing vital and comprehensive 
federal energy policies. 
I. 
UTAH'S EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION IS 
AN IMPERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE WITH 
AND BURDEN UPON INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
Utah has obstructed interstate commerce in three ways: 
1. By appropriating Wexpro's .profits ou sales of Wyom-
111g, Colorado, anJ Nevada oil in order to subsidiie natural 
gas puces diargc<l Utah ratepayers by the parent, Mountain 
Fuel;11 
2. By rcyuiring Wcxpro to lower the priLe of interstate 
natural gas s•tlcs to Mountain Fuel by approximately 68 per-
1 Continued 
questions have been resolved wilh finality, the regulation and taking 
are certain and all that remains is an accounting proceeding. 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); ltadlo Station 
WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945). 
Review at this time is essential to preserve petitioners' rights. 
Continuation of the gas and oil exploration and development pro-
gram depends upon the coutinuing commitment of risk carital and 
the retention of highly skilled management and technica person-
nel. Neither of these is possible if Utah's action is likely to stay 
in effect. Complex and high risk undertakings of this sort cannot 
be stopped and started at will. Hence, later review, after extended 
proceedings before the Commission, would in all probability come 
too late, no matter what the outcome, to save petitioners' explora-
tion and development program and operations. 
11 If the non-utility oil properties are folded into the utility gos accounts 
for ralcmaking purposes, Mountain Fuel's cost-of-se1·vice produc-
tion would come to Utah customers at $.16/Mcf rather than the 
already low 1977 average price of $.40/Mcf. 
,.. ,.. ,.,, ....... •••••I""••,.,,"' ""' • 11 I•<-- •~• 1 11.,.,. ,. ~.. ,.,. • 11 ,.,.,. --• •• 1 .. -
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cent from the federal ceiling price of .S l.l 7 /Md to the state 
resulated price of $..10/Mcf ;!>and 
3. lly subjc.:ding tu Utah utility re~ulation the wellhead 
price and sales of other producers who jointly pro<lu<.:e natural 
gas with Mountain Fuel outside of Utah and sell that gas to 
Mountain i:ucl for interstate transmission to Utah. 
There is no doubt ou this record, or indeed, in common 
sense, what the results of Utah regulation will be. Wexpro 
;and Mountain Fuel wiJJ in all probability have no other optiu11 
than to cease efforts to find new discoveries of and to develop 
oil anJ gas. Neither Wexpro nor Mountain Fuel can attract 
risk capital for oil and gas exploration when the best that can 
be expected is a low distribution utility rate of return. 
Three lines of authority condemn Utah's extraterritorial 
regulation of natural gas .and oil sales. 
First, Utah's regulation of oil anJ gas is invalidated by 
the Commerce Clause under PmJJ.1)'/1 1,mi,1 1·. IVe.11 Virgini,1, 
262 U.S. 581 (1923)~ Northem N,111md G',lf Co. '" Stafr 
<:orp<m1lio11 CommiHion, 572 U.S. ~M (J<J6)); 11. P. /food & 
Sons, Inc 1·. 011 l\Joml, 336 lI.S. '>25 (19,19); and Pikt' r. 
Br11t:c Ch11rdJ, ''""·· 397 U.S. U 7 ( l 970). 
Pt•11myfrt111it1 1·. IV t:JI Vir,i:i11i,1, .111/>r,1, held unro11sti1u-
tional a West Virginia statute m.1uirin~ pro<lurers an<l dis· 
tributors to s~1tisfy lond <.onsumcrs before shippin~ to Ohio 
1md Pc11nsylva11ia. This Court stated: 
Natur&al ~its is a lawful article of wmmcrce, and its 
transmission from 011e state to another for sale anJ 
•>Based on a comparison of Mountain f.'ucJ's average cost-of-service 
prJcc for ils own gas with· its average field prnduccr price for the year 1977. (R. 5031) 
•••~o;. a••••• Ol :ca ... a ............ ......._ .... ..__ .... ,,. ...... .._ .. ._ .._,. .... ,..,._ ---~" ~----- -•------
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consumption in the latter js interstate rnmmerce. A 
state law, whether of the state where the gas is pro-
duced or that where it is to be sold, which by its neces-
sary operation prevents, obstructs, or burdens such 
transmission, is a regulation of interstate commen:e, 
-a prohibited interference. 262 U.S. at 596-97. 
This Court has frcquentl)' reaffirmed the fundamental 
principle of Pe1JJ1J)'l1·u11iu '" W eJI V irgiui,1 which prevents a 
state from impeding the channels of interstate commerce or 
erecting anti-competitive barriers to the free flow of goods 
for the benefit of local consumers. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inf. 
i·. D11 lvlond, JJJ/>ra; Toomer v. Wi1u/I, 334 U.S. 38) ( 1948); 
Duldu·in ''· Seelig, Inc, 294 U.S. 511 ( 1935); Pw1er-P01m1uiu 
P,1,;king Co. "· Huydel, 278 U.S. 1 ( 1928). Baldu·i11 held un-
constitutional a New York law prohibiting the importation of 
milk unless it had been purchased in the producing state at 
prices no lower than New York required its producers be paid. 
Utah's statutes, as now interpreted, rc(1uirc that natural 
gas, produced and sold in Wyoming in interstate commerce, 
but Jestii1ed for Utah, be sold at a regulated Utah price well 
below applicable federal prices for the benefit of Utah con-
sumers. As a consuming state, Utah has interfered with inter-
state commerce to protcd local rnnsumcrs, as in l'e1m1y/1°d11i" 
''· If/' e.r/ V irgi11i11. Utah has also extended its regulatory arm 
into the producing state of Wyoniing, as in Dt1/du•i11, when its 
only basis for utility jurisdiction is the retail distribution of 
natural gas in Utah. 
Moreover, the Utah scheme reaches even further bcyon<l 
constitutional limits when its subsidizes its Utah customers by 
ex-porting its state regulation to millions of dollars. of _Wex-
pro profits for the sale of oil i11 interstate rnmmcrce in Wyom-
21 
ing an<l Colorado when that oil is nut even JcstincJ for use 
in the rnnsuming state. 
The State of Wpm1iug was so wnn.:rne<l wjth the appli-
cation of the Utah regulation tu Wyoming proJun:rs that it 
filed a brief t1111ion mri,w in conncttion with the pttitions for 
rehearjng below. Wyoming notc<l that the Utah statute was 
interpreted to apply to id I intcrstJtc pro<lu(crs selling gas to 
Mountain Fuel and asked: 
[ D] oes the Court's application of the Utah statute 
mean that a produ(cr of natural gas in W)101ning mar 
be held subjed to the jurisdiction of the Utah Public 
Service Commission as a public utjlity if it sells gas 
to Mountain Fuel ? 
The Utah rnurt ha<l already given a dear affirmative 
answer to the Wyoming c1u<:stion in its opinion and <lid not 
trouble to rcanswer the {1uestion on rehearing. 
Scrnn<l, decisions of this Court beginning with Ali.uouri 
,1, KtWJaJ N11l1md .G',1.r Co., 265 U.S. 298 ( 1924) an<l cul-
minating in l'hillip.1· Pt:Jro/rnm Co. 1·. IViuomin, 3 l7 U.S. 
672 ( 19511), establish the pri1Kiplc that the wdlheaJ pri(c 
of natural g•ts sol<l for transportation or ct:sale across state 
lines is itself a trans•tdion in interstate rnmmcrn: and so 11ut 
subject to state rc:gulation. Wcxpro in this <.asc sta11ds i11 
precisely that position. Phlllip.r invalidates Utah's regulation 
of interstate gas s.des to Mountain Fuel by W ex pro and othu 
producers. 
Third, whatcvn label is used, Utah's appropriation for 
lontl ratepayers of Wexpro's profits on oil sales in Wyoming, 
Colorado, and Nevada is analogous to. and inJecd indistin-
guishable from, a tax upon those interstate sales. Any prnf 1t 
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\Vexpro makes above a fixed utility rate of return on a sale 
of regulated oil, is to be taken and redistributed to Mountain 
Fuel's consumers in the form of cheap gas rates. The fact 
that the local rnnsumer-beneficiaries are less than all of the 
citizens of Utah does not make the exaction any less a tax, 
for numerous taxes are levie<l for the bencf it of particular 
classes. 
The controlling law oo state taxation of interstate com-
merce is stated in Gmeral 1\loJol'J Corp. ''· If/ a1hi11g10111 3 77 
U.S.436,441 (1964): 
[T] he decisive issue turns on the operating incidence 
of the tax. In other words, the question is whether the 
State has exerted its power in proper proportion to ap-
pellant's activiti.es within the State and to appellant's 
consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and pro-
tections which the State has af fordc<l. 
All of the cases hold that there must be JOI/le nexus be· 
tween the rnmmercc and the state taxing it and some fair 
proportionality between the tax and the company's activities 
within the state. See, e.g., Complele A1110 y,.,11ui1, Inc. v. 
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 ( 1977). Here there is neither. Utah is 
taxing interstate commerce in oH which docs not even touch 
its borders. Petitioners have found no case with a tax like 
this one because no other state has attempted such a bold 
and rapacious charge on interstate commerce. 
·Moreover, there exists the prospect of multiple taxation. 
Mountain Fuel operates as a gas distribution utility under local 
regulation in Wyoming as well as in Utah. If Utah may tax 
Wexpro's Wyoming, Colorado and Nevada oil sales because 
Mountain Fuel is a distribution utility in Utah, certainly 
Wyoming may also tax Wyoming oil sales and Wexpro's oil 
sales in Utah, Colorado and Nevada as well. 
23 
What has really happened here is this: Utah, without all}' 
nexus to the interstate rommercc anJ having no taxable inci-
dence of Wexpro's oil business or profits, has nont:theless 
undertaken to tax that oil commerce so severely that it will 
end - and it has done so under a rationale that will permit 
other states to levy similar taxes on the same commerce. 
Under all relevant authority, -Utah has interfered with 
interstate sales anJ movements of oil and natural gas in a 
manner rendered impermissible by the Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution. 
II. 
UTAH'S REGULATION IS PREEMPTED BY 
HDERAL REGULATION OF OIL AND NATURAL 
GAS SALES. 
Utah has rcgulatc:<l both oil anJ gas in conflict with feJ-
eral statutes and policy. au 
A. G'em•r11/ fr,111u:11·ork. of Prt:emptil'e Fedn,d Oil ,md N11l-
1m1/ G'a1 Regu/11/ion. 
Production and sale of natural gas ••nd crude oil has bctu 
a field of intense fcdernl rn11ccrn and <.:omprehcnsivc, detailed 
fcdcrnl reRulation for dcrndcs. Commcnung with the passage 
of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, rnntinuing with the Emerg· 
ency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, and culminati11R in a 
111 The doctrine of federal preemption extends not only to state laws 
or actions that conflict with particular federal statutes, but also lo 
state actions which attempt to operate in a field already occupied 
by Congress or which frustrate the achicvmcnt of federal policy. 
Uurbunk v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 t 1973); •'Jorlda 
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series of energy enactments in 1978, 11 Congress has rnmpletely 
lKL'Upicd the ficJJ. State regulation of interstate production 
and sales of oil anJ sas has been ousted am.I national policies 
established in direct conflict with what Utah has done here. 
The national government has taken the more recent of these 
actions in response to the worst energy crisis in the history 
of this country. Its polic:y is to develop national markets for 
oil and gas with uniform prices, to stimulate new exploration 
and development through price incentives, and ultimately to 
phase out regulation in favor of competitive pricing. u 
So complete is the federal domination of this f ielJ that 
even the traditional area of state regulation, natural monopoly 
distribution, has been subjected to federal standards in control 
of wasteful practices, rate design, inncmcntal pricing and the 
11 Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. U 717-717w 0976 & Supp. 1979); Emerg-
ency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627; 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. 94-173, 89 Stat. 871; 
Natural Gas Policy of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §I 3301-3432 and 42 U.S.C. 
~ 7255 (Supp. 1979); Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117: Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-
618, 92 Stat. 3174; National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. 
L. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206; Power Plant and Industrial .. 'ucl Use Act 
of 1978, Pub. L. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289. 
1! The statutory declarations and legislative history leave no room for 
argument that a national policy for the uniform pricing of oil and 
gas in or affecting interstate commerce and for providing price in-
centives for new production is plainly intended by the Congress. 
See, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751 & 3201 (1976 & Supp. 1979), 16 U.S.C. I 2601 
( 1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 6201 ( 1976). Public Utility Hcgulatory Policy 
Act of 1978, 11.n. Rep. No. 95-543, p. 10, states: 
The natural gas pricing policy adopted by the I Conference I 
Committee establishes a single, uniform price for natural 
gas produced in the United States. 
See also, Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, ll.H. Hep. No. 95-1752 and 
Energy Tax Act of 1978, S.R. No. 95-436, p. 20, where the Senate 
Committee on Energy and Natural Hesourccs stated: 
The Administration is proposing a system under which price 
co.ntrols would be made more consistent with national pol-
icies. Producers would be given adequate price incentives 
for development or new fields. 
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proJuction and sale of intrastate oil anJ gas. In short, fc:J-
eral regulation has been extended to completely eclipse state 
regulation in this field. u 
ll 1'°fdtm1I Pn:emp1ion of N(1/1m1/ G'aI. 
Against the backgroun<l of the comprehensive federal 
framework just examined, the invalidity of Utah's regulation 
of both gas and oil is clear. 
With respect to gas, the Natural Gas Act preserves for 
exclusive federal jurisdiction "the sale in interstate rnmmercc 
of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption ... 
and (sales] to natural-gas companies engaged in such trans-
portation or sale .... " Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) 
( 1976). See ,drn, Natural Gas Policy Act, I 5 U .S.C. § 
3301 (21) (Supp. 1979). 
In Phillips P1.:1roh11111 Co. 1•. lr/iJmmi11, mpr,1, this Court 
held: 
(T] he legislative history (of the Natural Gas Act] 
indiratcs a rnngressional intent to give the Commission 
jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natura I 
gas in interstate commerce, whether by <l pipeline rnm-
pa11y or not and whether occurring before, during, or 
after tra11smissio11 by an interstate pipeline compa11r. 
347 U.S. at 682. 
Ut•th's rq.;ulation here is 11ot a regulation of tra11sal tio11s 
between a Utah utilitr and its Utah customers. It is, rather, 
a regulation of interstate s;dcs of natural µ,.1s for resale as 
defined by the Natural Gas Act. The regulated salt:s arc also 
11 A slate may not regulate any price of oil even though produced 
and consumed intrastate. 15 U.S.C. § 757 ( 1976). It may still regu-
late the sales price of gas produced and consumed wholly intra-
state, provided however that the price i11 all t~vcuts docs not 
exceed lhc federal maxi111u111 ceiling for <.:omparnblc vinl<1ged gas. 
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transactions by a "natural-gas company" within the Act's rnv-
erngc as st:ttJcJ by Philli/1J. Under that decision, regulation of 
sales by •tn independent natural-gas producer is the same as 
regulation of sales "by an affjliate of an interstate pipeline 
company." 347 U.S. at 68~. Thus, sales from Wexpro and 
others to Mountam Fuel are "first sales" in interstate com-
merce and immune f com state regulation. 
C. F nl er"/ Prum p1io11 of Oil. 
With respect to oil (as well as natural gas), one of the 
central objectives of the comprehensive energy legislation, as 
set out in the Energy Po liq and Conservation Act, is "Ju 
i11ae,1Jt: the J11f'ply of foHil f ue/J in the United States through 
pria ina111i11e.r 111uJ production req11iremenli." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6201(3) (1976) (Emphasis added.) See ,,/w, Emergcnq 
Petroleum Allocation Act, 1 5 U .S.C. § 75 I (a) ( l) ( 1976). 
The Utah regulation rnmplctely and effectively frustrates 
this federal polity. The uncontrovcrted fact is that as a re· 
suit of the Utah scheme, one of the nation's most successful 
exploration and development programs will be compelled to 
phase out and end. The precise reason is that Utah has taken 
away the "price i11n:11tives" that Congress intended. ny re· 
yuiring that profits f com oil sales be uscJ to subsiJizc natural 
gas rates, the consuming State of Utah has eliminated all in-
centive and economic capacity for Mountain Fuel shareholders 
to continue to bear the risk and expense of further explora· 
tion ;rnd development. This form of oil regulation is an open 
invitation to other consuming states to rei~ulatc by sei~ing the 
profits from oil pro<lurtion and rnllapsin,g those profits into 
local gas distribution utility rates. 
--The fad that Utah's regulation is by way of sciiing profits 
on Wexpro's oil sales. and not regulation of the sales price, 
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<loes not lessen the frustwtion of kJeral preemptive puliq·. 
Requiring Wcxpro to <lc:Jiratc its oil prof its to lower Ut;ih 
utility gas rates is destructive of the federal objectives of price 
incentive an<l new proJuction and thus has exactly the same 
impact as state regulation of the price itself. That regulation 
is in conflict with aml condemned under the seminal authority 
of NorJhem N11J11ral G,11 Co. 1•. S1t1le Co,.poratiun Cu111111iJ-
siou, 3 72 U.S. 84 ( 1963). AJthough Nori hem N"J11r11/ dealt 
with the Natural Gas Act, the analogy here is direct: 
The federal regulator}' scheme leaves no room eithc:r 
for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate 
wholesales of natural gas, [citation omitted] or for 
state rcgul;itions which would inJirt:ctly achieve the 
same result. These state orders 11en:ssarily deal with 
matters which directly affect the abilit}' of the Federal 
Power Commission [now FERC] to regulate compre-
hensively and ef frrtively the transportation aud sale of 
naturaJ gas, and to achieve the uniformity of regulation 
which was an objective of the Natural Gas Act. They 
therefore invalidly inva<le the federal agency's exclu-
sive domain. 372 U.S. at 91-92. (Emphasis added) 
In Feder,1/ Powrr Co111miJJio11 11• Ok./,d><111Jt1 C'or/111ri1/1(1JJ 
Co111111iuio11, 362 F. Supp. 522 (1973), 111111111. tiff. ·ii'> U.S. 
961 (I 97•i), Oklahoma attempted, in the name of lorn I rnn-
servation, to "shut-in" wells dedicated to interstate commerrc 
havin~ a cheap rnsinghc11J price for the bc11cfit of Oklahoma 
producers and consumers. A three judge federal court invali-
dated the state re,gulation as inconsistent with the preemptive 
authority of the Federal Power Commission and also as a11 
intolerable burden upon UHnmcrtc. This Court summitrily 
11ffirmed.1• 
11 The dissents of Justices Hchnquist, Stewart und Powell were not 
"from any disugrccnwnt with the substantive holding of the District 
Court," but run to the standing of the FPC to prosecute the action. 
415 U.S. at 963. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Federal preemption of the regulation here follows, ,, 
fortiori, from the Ok/,1homt1 Corporation CommiJJion holding. 
There, the announced purpose of the regulation was energy 
conservation which is also a federal policy. The Utah regula-
tion results in lower production of oil (because of decreased 
profits) and higher consumption of gas (because of artificially 
lower rates), each of which runs squarely counter to federal 
energy palicy: 
Government policy ... shoulJ provide for prices that 
encourage development of new wells through a more 
effedive distribution of production incentives [and] 
should also promote conservation by confronting [con-
sumers] with the real cost of oil and gas in the energy 
marketplace. Energy Tax Act of 1978, S.R. No. 95-
436, p. 20. 
If allowed to spread to other states, Ut•1h's rnnflicting 
regulation will not only balkanize the national oil and gas 
markets, it will destroy the development of a comprehensive 
and uniform federal energy policy during an era of critical 
energy shortage. The burden on commen:e of the attempteJ 
Utah regulation is patent; its conflict with comprehensive fed-
eral policy is startling; and the invitation to other state regu-
latory bodies to do likewise is undeniable. 
III. 
UTAI I HAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CONFISCATED 
PETITIONERS' OIL PROPERTIES WITHOUT 
COMPENSATION. 
From the beginning of its corporate existence in 1935 
until 1977 when it transfeue<l them to Wexpro, Mountain 
Fuel owned non-utility oil properties. It <lid so pursuant to 
the Utah Utility Co<le, Utah Code Ann. § 5·1-2-1 ( 30) ( 1974), 
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that permits a company to own anJ operate both utility auJ 
non-utility businesses an<l provides that the latter shall not be 
regulated. The capital rnsts of an1uiring, <lrilli11g an<l develop-
ing non-utility oil properties were pai<l by Mountain Fuel 
shareholders from capital contributions, retaine<l earnings, anJ 
the sale of debt securities. ShareholJers purchased stock anJ 
bondholders lent their credit in express reliance upon the non-
utility oil functions of the Company. Mountain Fuel sold oil 
at the market price an<l realized rnmpetitive profits. So op-
erated, the oil properties had a market value in excess of S l 50 
mil Hon. 
Mountain Fud's shardioldcrs owned these non-utility oil 
properties for 43 years, to May 9,. 197~. They own them no 
more. On M<ty IO, 1979, tl1c Utah Supreme Court gave most 
of the value of the oil properties to 1-fou11tain Fuel's natural 
gas utility ratepayers. The court did so by dedaring the oil 
assets to be "utility properties." (App. A 12) Thus, Wexpao 
and its owner, Mountain Fuel, ••re now entitled only to a l1rn 
utility gas rate of return, the oil profits being Riven to tht: 
gas customers to lower their rates further. 
By subjl'cti11h virtually ,di of the oil properties to its reg-
ulation, Utah has taken from J\fountain Fuel and its sh•uc-
hol<lers substantial oil profits anJ cilpital values of the oil 
properties. The bondholders have lost substantial scrnrity for 
the debentures they purchase<l. 
The Utah decision is an unrnmpcnsate<l confisLatio11 of 
petitioners' property in violatiun of the Fifth Ame11Jme11t. 
made applicable to the states hy the Fourteenth Amendmc11t, 
under the principles cnu1Kiate<l by this Court in Penn Cmtr.1/ 
Tr1111J/1or/11tion Co. 1·. City of Nm• York, '138 lJ.S. I0-1 ( 1'J7H) 
and Penm)'/11,mi,1 Cu,,/ Co. 1·. 1\Jaho11, 260 U.S. )')) ( 1922). Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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as well as, by dose analogy, Allied Srruou,."I SJeeJ Cu. v. 
Spam1au1, 438 U.S. 234 ( 1978) anll United SWeI Tru11 Co. 
v. New /eHey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).u The central inquiry of 
those cases is whether state action has interfered with or de-
moralized the distinct investment-backed expectation of prop-
erty owners resulting in substantial loss or the devaluation of 
property interests. 
Additional factors stressed by those cases as showing an 
unconstitutional taking are present here. The property values 
taken are substantial and the taking is retroactive. There arc 
no alternative valuable uses for the property. Petitioners have 
received no compensating benefit There is no public emerg-
ency in Utah and no strong public interest relating to these 
properties - other than the desire to appropriate most of 
their value. Legitimate, investment-backed expectations of 
petitioners, the shareholders, and the bondholders have been 
destroyed. 
It is um1uestio11c<l that the shareholders and bondholders 
acted in justifiable reliance upon Utah law. Pursuant to the 
Utah Utility Code, Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 (30) (1974), 
petitioners' oil business, carried on in other states, was no 
more a gas utility business than was Mountain Fuel's ceramic 
and britk bus mes~. In fact, petitioners, if auythin~. were more 
justified in their dependence upon the nou-utility status of 
the oil business than any other, for they had not only the 
l Jtah utility statute 1111d tj 3 years of practirnl construction upon 
which to rely, but also a series of final orders of the Utilities 
1 ~ Allied Structural Steel and United States Trust Co. involve the im-
pairment of the obligation of contracts, but both decisions arc 
directly relevant because the two concepts, impairment of con-
tractual obligation and the taking of properly without just compen-
sation, arc closely parallel and in some rcs11ects conceptually 
identical. 
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Commission. The Commission Jecisions not only announn:<l 
the principles of the segregated, non-utility character of the 
oil properties, but adjudicated the non-utility status of these 
specific properties now retroactively dedared to be utility 
assets. 
The seizure of Mountain fuel oil properties floats, under 
the Utah opinion, on two theories ... each patently fallacious. 
The first premise is that "the ratepayers [were] the primary 
source of risk capital throughout the years" (App. AS), be-
cause a share of the <lry hole expenses proportionate to 
revenues was allocated to utility an.mrnts and refkcte<l in the 
rates. The defect of the argument has already been demon-
strated - by a policy announced in advance, no dry hole ex-
pense would be reflected in the rates unl.ess the exploration 
program resulted in gas for ratepayers at less than the cost 
of purchasing the same gas in the market. There was no pros-
pect that a gas customer in paying his bill would contribute 
to an unsuccessful exploration and development program and, 
therefore, there was no risk to the ratepayer, only to Moun-
tain Fuel and its shareholders. 
Mountain Fuel was not fC{fUircJ to explore anJ develop 
gas fields; it could have simply purchased pipeline or f icld 
produced gas. The share of dry hole expense rcflccte<l in the 
utility rates was a q11/d pro quo for cost-of-service gas an<l 
would continue 0111)' so Ion~ as exploration resulted in lower 
rates. All of this was k11own in aJvante and constituted the 
announced rules under which the .Mountain Fuel program went 
forward. The ratepayer risk thcorr is, beyonJ ']uibblc. a sham. 
The second premise of the Utah rnurt is that a utilit)' 
stands in a "trust relationship to its customers" (App. A·i, 8) 
and must undertake •di steps to sell gas at the cheapest r4ltc Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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to consumers, induding the dedication of profits from a non-
util ity business. This trust-relationship notion is in square 
conflict with this Court's constitutional holding in Board of 
Public Utility CommiHionen v. New Yol"k 1'elepho11e Co., 
271 U.S. 23 ( 1926). The New York Commission attempted 
to employ in a rate case •rn excess depreciation reserve created 
by the telephone company in prior years to off-set future year 
deficiencies in telephone revenues. The Court held that the 
New York Commission could not reach back and retroactively 
utilize assets 'of prior years to offset prospective revenue de-
ficiencies. To do so would be a confiscation of investor assets 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
With respect to the trust-relationship notion, the Court 
in Nett· Ymk Telephone said: 
The customers are entitled to <lemand service and the 
company must comply. The rnmpany is entitled to just 
compensation and, to have the service, the customers 
must pay for it. 1'he re/,1tio11 heJ u•em the comp•m)' 
a11d ilJ rnJtomen is 1101 that of /''"·tneu, •1ge111 and 
/>l'infi/>al, or trmlee a11d benefid",.Y· 271 U.S. at 3 l. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Court also rejected the novel theory adopted by the 
Utah court here that a (UStomer an1uires an interest in the 
assets of a seller when he pays a purchase price that covers 
some or all of the seller's expenses: 
Customers pay for service, not for the property used 
to render it. ... By paying bills fol' urvice they do 
not acquire any intert:JI, legt1/ or eq11i1t1ble, in the prop-· 
erty med /or their wm•enieure or in the f 1mdJ of the 
(0111/''"'.l'· Propert)' paid for out of money received for 
service belongs to the company just as does that pur-
chased out of proceeds of its bonds and stol:k. 27 l 
U.S. at 32. (Emphasis added) 
.~·~.·. ··,-~ \ 
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In the American cumomy, there is nothing remarkable 
about any business. utility or otherwise, recovering all of its 
expenses plus a profit in the price it charges for the pro<lul:t 
or service it sells - all without the customer participating in 
the business profits or the assets that produced those profits. 
The facts in this case arc much more extreme than those 
which were indicted as a "taking"' in Ne"' York Telephone. 
In the latter, the assets and acco~mts which were sought to be 
taken by the New York Commission u;ere and alu-ayJ h,1d 
been utility· properties. The oil properties of Mountain Fuel 
never have been. 
Had Utah made a prospective decision that utilities rnulJ 
not own non-utility assets, this case would be very different. 
But Utah did not do that. The judgment below holds that 
the State may consistently - by express statute, by rnn-
sistent practice, and by spelif ic adjudication for over four 
decades - assure the invc!:itor that its policy is not to regu-
late oil properties, invite investment on that basis, and then, 
only after siRnificant oil Jisrnveries had been made and the 
world price of oil haJ sharply risen, Jclibcratt:I)' break its 
promise and appropriate the value of the investments maJc. 
Not only will the Utah decision blunt and dcmoral izc the 
investment-backed expectations of bondholders and shardwlJ-
crs in the capital markets of the nation in similar instances, it 
will, if permitted to stand, serve as an incentive for other 
states to seize corporate properties to ease the cwnomic con-
dition of voting consumers. 16 
16 As Mr. Justice Holmes wrote for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, supra: 
We arc in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire 
to improve the public condition I in this case by lowering 
local natural gas rules I is not enough to warrant achieving 
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
n:1vi111• f11r tlw d1;1111•f· '1htl t JS at -t lfi 
>~.·:~-
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CONCLUSION 
The non-utility oil properties of Mountajn Fuel have been 
:;eiled and expropriated by Utah without rnmpensation in 
contravention of the l~if th and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution. Jn so doing, Utah has burdened interstate com-
merce by attempting to regulate the sale and production of 
gas and oil, fields whkh are federally preempted under the 
Supremacy Clause. 
This petition for certiorari should be granted. 
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filiated petitioners ("Mountain Fuel"). 1 l\Iountain Fuel 
~'ks federal review of a l T tah Supreme Court decision 
·minating a gross consumer fraud on lTtah's citizens 
a fraud the Utah court aptly characterized as a "reg-
ttory outrage", in a manner wholly consonant with 
L.lh's regulatory mandate and public policy without 
e remotest interference, let alone violation of any fed-
Lll constitutional prescription. 
(~lJES'l'lONS PHESENTED 
1. Does the fourteenth amendment, the commerce 
rnse or federal preemption prohibit Utah from treat-
ing l\lountain Fuel's oil and gas properties located in 
I Ttah, Colorado and \\Tyoming as utility properties for 
rate-making purposes when those properties were ex-
plored and developed as utility properties pursuant to a 
utility exploration program at the risk of Utah's rate-
payers? 
~. Under the property guarantees of the fourteenth 
amendment does Mountain Fuel have the constitutional 
right to conduct an oil and gas exploration program as 
a utility activity, charge all of the risk of exploration to 
l Ttah ratepayers, and keep all the profits from oil dis-
coveries for the sole benefit of Mountain Fner s stock-
holders'{ 
3. Docs the fourteenth amendment require ITtah 
to grant l\Iountain Fuel the hest of both possible wor1ds, 
1 '1'he amicus Mountain States Legal Foundation, which purports 
to present to the Court a "studied reflection" on this case, is 
financially supported by Mountain Fuel and has on its Board of 
Directors Wexpro's counsel. 
3 
that is, to treat the risk of oil and gas e~ploration as a 
utility activity to be borne solely by Utah's ratepayers, 
hut the profits of successful oil discovery as the fruits of 
free enterprise to be enjoyed exclusively hy Mountain 
Fuel's stockholders { 
4. \Vas Utah constitutionally compelled to accept 
l\fountain Fuel's totally unique "oil and gas method of 
classification" as the controlling principle for allocating 
the benefits from l\lountain Fuel's oil and gas properties 
between ratepayer an<l stockholder interesU 
5. Does federal preemption or the commerce clause 
deprive Utah of regulatory authority over a utility's oil 
and gas exploration program conducted in Utah and 
other states as a ( 1 tah utility activity at the sole risk of 
l Ttah's ratepayers upon the discovery of oiH 
G. Is l Ttah's decision to apply the well-established 
principle of utility law-gain follows risk-in the al-
location of benefits arising from utility activity between 
ratepayer and stockholder interest to Mountain Fuel's 
oil and gas properties barred by federal preemption or 
the commerce clause when those properties whether 
located in Utah or adjacent states were explored and 
developed as a Utah utility activity at the sole risk of 
l Ttah' s ratepayers? 
STATEl\IENT OF THE CASE 
The sweeping questions l\lountain Fuel attempts 
to present are contrary to the uncontroverted facts. 
Mountain Fllel's argument is fomLunentally pre111iscd 
on three false factual assertions. 
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(I) l\lountain Fuel claims Mountain Fuel 
conducted its oil and gas exploration program as 
a free enterprise, non-regulated activity. On the 
contrary, Mountain Fuel at all times conducted 
its exploration program as a utility activity. 
( ~) l\lountain Fuel claims Mountain }i'uel's 
shareholders hore the risk of its exploration for 
oil and gas. On the contrary, the ratepayers bore 
alJ the risk of .Mountain Fuel's exploration for 
oil and gas. 
( 3) l\Iountain Fuel claims the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court amounts to retroactive re-
classification, whatever that is. On the contrary, 
the Utah decision does not recaphire one dime 
of oil profits taken by l\I ountain }'uel' s share-
holders before the initiation of these proceedings, 
and only classifies as utility properties for future 
rate-making purposes, properties that always were 
and should have been so classified. 
I. Mountain Fuel alt cays conducted its oil and gas 
oration proyram as a utility activity. 
From the iIJception, .Mountaiu Fuel conducted its 
ind gas exploration program as a Utah utility ac-
f'· Unlike rnajor oil companies, independent pro-
"'c ~rs, or indeed other utilities, Mountain Fuel did not 
In up its shareholders' money and take its chances. 
Htain Fuel Jct Utah ratepayers put up their money 
~ ····~ take the chance of finding oil or gas. A JI of tl1e 
wildcat acreage 1\1 mmtain Fuel explored was acquired 
5 
by l\fountain Fuel iu its utility accounts ~and included 
in Mountain Fuel's rate base on which l\lountain Fuel's 
ratepayers paid a regulated rate of return. (H. 700.) 2 
If leases proved unsuccessful and were cancelled, the 
loss on such cancellation was charged to Mountain 
Fuel's ratepayers. ( ll. G87-88.) J_ \JI preliminary explor-
atory work was charged as an expense in l\1 ountain 
Fuel's rates. Most important of all, every single dry 
hole was charged to l\Iountain Fuel's Utah rate-
payers. (Utah J>.S.C. Case Nos. :WOO (rn47), -t7H7 
(WHO) and Gann (Jn72); DIV-1; MFS-8; R.. 312-
U, ()87-8U, G91, 701, :WD".k) From IH47 until 107-J. 
Mountain Fuel recovered all of its expense for the ex-
ploration and development of oil and gas through charges 
in its rates to l Ttah ratepayers and in fact the amount 
recovered actually exceeded the amount of expense in-
curred by l\Iountain Fuel in its exploration activities. 
(Utah P.S.C. Case Nos. OHG8 and H7!H (In74); H. 
mH.) 3 l\Iountain Fuel did conduct its exploration pro-
gram in states other than Utah, hut the uncontrovertej 
facts were that that exploration program, \vherever con 
ducted-in Utah, \ V vomine:, or Colorado-was con 
_, ... , 
2 The following abbreviations are used for the purpose of cita 
tion in this brief: ( 1) "R." refers to the transcript page num 
bers from evidentiary hearings before the Public Service Com 
mission; (2) "Ord." by date and without case number refers ti 
the orders of the Public Service Commission in this case; (3 
orders by case number and date only refer to Commissioi 
orders in the cited case, and (4) citations to exhibits are ti 
the exhibit number used in this proceeding; Mountain Fue 
exhibits are referred to as MFS-; Division of Public Utilitie 
exhibits are referred to as DIV-; and Salt Lake Count· 
exhibits are referred to as SLC-. · 
\ For accounting purposes, the costs of unsuccessful exploratio1 
are expensed and the costs of successful exploration are cap 
italized. Mountain Fuel's shareholders only put their money UL 
after exploration proved to be successful. 
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<lucted as a lJ tah utility activity, and l\:Iountain Fuel 
mly attempted to trausfonn its exploration program 
~rom a utility to a no11-utility classification after oil and 
~as were discovered. 
:2. lt was only after the successful discovery of oil 
that Mountain Fuel attempted to reclassify its oil prop-
erties as uou-utility prnperties under lllountain l 1·ttel's 
wlwlly-rmique oil and gas method of classification. 
\ Vhile l\fountain Fuel explored for oil and gas as 
a utility activity, it attempted to transform successful 
oil discoveries into non-utility properties beyond regu-
latory L'ontrol nnder its wholly-unique oil and gas method 
of classification. ( H. 1030-31.) Under Mountain l~uel' s 
oil and gas method of classification, a successful explor-
ation was classified as an oil or gas well based on the 
type of hydrocarbon discovered. ( lHFS-.5; R 71-7:!, 
~:!:!, -Vis, 55D, lOB0-31.) If a commercial discoverey 
produced pipeline quality gas, the well and related 
properties were capitalized in :Mountain Fuel's utility 
accounts and the gas distributed to l\Iountain Fuel's 
ratepayers as cost-of-service gas, which included, of 
course, a profit or rate of return on Mountain Fuel's 
capita] investment. (lHFS-5; R. u l.) All other hydro-
carbons, whether crude oil, condensate, or natural gas 
liquids were classified by Mountain F'uel as oil prop-
erties and capitalized hy l\f ountain Fuel in its non-
utility accounts. ( Il. 1030-31; 10-t.5.) Mountain Fuel 
kept aJl of the profits from these oil properties exclu-
sively for ~fountain Fuel's shareholders. ( S LC-1 at 8; 
H. l O:lO-H 1 . ) 
7 
l\1 ountaiu Fuel's oil and gas methQd of classifica-
tion was Llius use<l by :\lou11tain Fuel for two purpose~ 
First, it was used hy l\lounlai11 Fuel as a test of Utah' 
regulatory jurisdiction. That is, under Mountain Fuer 
oil-and-gas method of classification, l\lountain Fut 
claimed {T tah lost regulatory jurisdiction upon l\1 oun 
tain Fuel's discovery of hydrocarbons other than pipt; 
line gas. (Ord. -t/ 11 /78 at ml 11, 6:!, 108.) l\Iountai1u 
Fuel also used its oil and gas rnctho<l of dassificatio1: 
as a principle of a Boca ting the benefits of its explora 
lion program between ratepayer and stockholder interrr 
csts. (SLC-1 at 8; H. lOHO-Hl.) ,[\lthough all of Moun 
tain Fuel's exploration program for oil and gas was con-
ducted as a unitary utility activity, l\Iountain F'ud's 
ratepayers only hent"fitecl upon the discovery of gas.·1 
The ratepayers benefited upon gas discoveries by ha v-
ing such gas included in their rates at a cost-of-service 
price rather than field or market prices. The cost-of-
service price, of course, included a profit for Mountain 
Fuel's stockholders. .A I though 1\1 oun ta in Fuel con-
ducted its exploration as a utility activity under its oil 
and gas method of classification, it kept all oil discoveries 
i Utah did not argue that Mountain Fuel's exploration program 
had failed to benefit Utah ratepayers. Utah's argument was 
that Mountain Fuel's shareholders, under Mountain Fuel's oil 
and gas method of classification, realized huge oil profits to 
which they were not entitled. Mountain Fuel, moreover, in its 
petition, grossly overstates the benefits received by Utah's rate-
payers. Mountain Fuel, in its petition, for instance, claims that 
Utah ratepayers received some $93.8 million in tax deductions 
from Mountain Fuel's exploration program. (Petition at 9.) 
But the $93.8 million includes all of Mountain Fuel's costs of 
unsuccessful exploration that were, in turn, charged to Utah's 
ratepayers to the tune of $57 million. Simply, Mountain Fuel 
claims that it was to the ratepayers' benefit to pay for the cost 
of drilling dry holes. 
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for the sole benefit of .Mountain Fuel's stockholders. 
ln short, Mountain Fuel used its oil and gas method 
of c1assification to achieve the best of both possible 
worlds. When it was involved in the high-risk busi-
11ess of exploring for oil and gas, it conducted that 
business as a utility activity and charged those risks to 
l T tah' s ratepayers. '\rhen the risk of exploration was 
eliminated and it had discovered oil, l\fountain Fuel 
attempted to convert its oil wells to non-utility proper-
ties and to keep the benefits or profits from those prop-
e1ties as the fruits of free ente1prise exclusively for its 
stockholders. To look at the consequences of l\Iountain 
Fuel's oil and gas method of classification in the harsh 
light of economic reality, it was Mountain Fuel's posi-
tion that l\fountain Fuel was able to develop over $250 
million in oil reserves for the sple benefit of Mountain 
Fuel's stockholders without drilling a single dry hole. 
l\Iountain Fuel's claim that its oil and gas method 
of classification was required by utility regulation and 
that its rejection wi11 have economic and litigation reper-
ssions beyond this one proceeding are wholly false. 
l\f mmtain Fuel's oil and gas method of classification 
s not required hy any rule or regulation. ( H. ~ao, 
2 I, 10~0.) Indeed it was only after the initiation of 
t se proceedings in ]!)77 that Mountain Fuel's oil and 
g~ s method of classification was ever reduced to writ-
i , '· (Ord. 4/11/78at11 ~:l; MFS-·t, .5; R. 28fl.) Moun-
t'. n Fuel's own chief executive officer acknowledged 
at while Mountain Fuel was required under standard 
uti1ity regulation to keep separate utility and non-utility 
accounts, there was no rule or regulation that required 
9 
the division of ~I ountai11 Fuel's oil and _gas properties 
between such accounts on the basis of l\lountain Fuel's 
oil and gas method of dassification. ( IU~a 1.) The reason 
there was no such accepted rule or regulation is because 
Mountain Fuel's oil and gas method of classification was 
wholly unicp1e not only to the gas utility industry hut 
to the entire oil and gas industry. No other company in 
the l Tnitcd States has ever used Mountain Fuel's oil 
and gas method of classification as a test of regulatory 
jurisdiction or as a principle for alloeating benefits be-
tween ratepayer and sharehoJder interests. ( H. ~H5-fW; 
-J.5H-(>1 ; 870-71 ; ~707.) The uniqueness of l\lountain 
Fuel's oil and gas method of classification now belies 
Mountain Fuers claim that l Ttah's rejection of that 
method of classification raises constitutional questions 
of substance for this Court's consideration or to put the 
issue in different perspective, helies .Mountain Fuel's 
necessary position that the consequences of its oil and 
gas method of classification were compelled under the 
United States Constitution 
a. Uta h's mtepayers bore all of the risk of JI 01111 -
fain Fuel's exploration for oil and gas. 
The risk of exploration for oil and gas is the risk of 
not finding oil or gas. A 11 of the risk of oil and gas ex- t 
ploration is reflected in the cost of tmsm.:cessful explor-
ation and aJJ of the cost of unsuccessful exploration by ,, 
1\( ountain Fuel was charged by l\Iountain Fuel in its .. 
rates to Utah ratepayers. From rnn until Hl7:.? l T tah 
ratepayers did not merely pay 1\Immtain Fuel for the 
gas they used but also paid all of Mountain F11el's cost 
for unsuccessful exploration--every single dry hole. 
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WD (1D72); DIV-1; l\IFS-8; u. Bl~-14, ti87-8H, mn, 
n, :wu.t.) 
.Moun lain Fuel's shareholders or non-utility ac-
>tm ts were not required to pay one single dime toward 
lountain Fuel's cost of unsuccessful exploration until 
)7:!. In 197:!, the lJ tah Public Service Commission 
1r the first time required l\lountain Fuel's non-utility 
~counts, representing the interest of lVIountain Fuel's 
rnrehol<lers, to pay $BOO,OOO a year toward Moun-
Lin Fuel's cost of unsuccessful exploration. (Utah 
•.s.c. Case No. mwn l IU72); n. G88.) In 1974 .Moun-
tain Fuel's non-utility accounts were required to pay 
l/a of such cost (Utah P.S.C. Case No. flG68 (1974) 
and finally in rnrn, only one year before the 'Vexpro 
transactions, 1\Iountain J'uel' s stockholders were re-
quired to bear 50% of l\Iountain Fuel's risk of explora-
tion. (Utah P.S.C. Case No. 7113 (IU75); R. 688-89.) 
From 1 n~.t.7 through 197 4 the amount charged in 
.Mountain Fuel's rates to Utah's ratepayers for the cost 
of unsuccessful exploration exceeded by over $B million 
the amount l\Ionntain Fuel actually spent or incurred 
for unsuccessful exploration. (Utah P.S.C. Case Nos. 
G668, u701 ( Hl74) ; H. 694.) In short, tluough 1974, 
Utah ratepayers bore all of Mountain Fuel's risk of 
exploration for oil and gas. Hy 197 4 Mountain Fuel 
had already completed its major oil and gas discoveries. 
t Ord. -i/11/78 at 'il'il 27-29.) Of the $2.50 million in oil 
and gas reserves that ::\fountain Fuel attempted to trans-
fer from its non-utility accounts to 'V expro in December 
of 1 H7<>, over !)() '/;. of those reserves hacJ been discov-
ered by I H7·k (<>rd. 4/ 11 /78 at m! ~7-:W; DI V-t; ll. 
1012, 10~5.) 
It is true that in 1 U72 l\Iountain Fuel's non-utility 
accounts were required to conunence making token con-
trihutions to l\J mm lain Fuel's exploration risk and that 
from 1 H7~ through 1 D7H 1\J ountain Fuel's shareholders, 
through its non-utility accounts, finally paid over $8 
million toward 1\1 oun taiu Fuel's risk of exploratiou. 
( D IV-1.) In the same 1H7~- rnrn period, however, 
Mountain Fuel's ra tepa ye rs paid ~i 17 million toward 
Mountain Fuel's cost of unsuccessful exploration (Id.) 
and from 10-1·7 through 1 H7H the ratepayers paid over 
$.57 million. ( lTtah J>.S.C. Case Nos. ~!)()() ( 1U47), 
H27 5 ( 1 !H8)' B5 l 1 ( 1 !).)())' ;]();)() ( 1 !);) I ) ' a!)7:! ( 1 n.>a)' 
~ian2 (1957), 47n7 (IHOO) and 5D07 (1%8); J)IV-I; 
l\l FS-8.) 1\1 ore importantly, the shareholders' contri-
bution that was finally required was only paid out of 
the enormous profits from oil properties that had been 
discovered at ratepayer risk In 1 !>7:! Mountain Fuel 
had net profits from its non-utility oil properties of ~q .n 
miJlion; in 1 H7:1, $2.a million; in 1 D7 -t, $7.:! million; i11 
HJ7 5, $14.ct million; and in rnrn, the year before \ V c.x-
pro, $:!-t million. (SI .C-1 at 8.) In the period, 1 H7:!-
1 H7G, when l\Iountain Fuel was finally required to pay 
$8 milJion toward 1\1 ou11 ta in Fuel's cost of unsuccessful 
exploration it realized over $47 rnilJion in net profits 
from the oil properties that had lwen developed at the 
sole risk of Mountain Fuel's ratepayers. l\1ountai11 
Fuel's costs of unsuccessful exploration were, thus, either 
directly paid hy Ptah ratepayers or pai<l from the prof-
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its of oil properties that ha<l been developed at the sole 
risk of Utah ratepayers. The total risk, therefore, of 
Mountain Fuel's exploration and development of oil 
and gas was in economic reality borne by the Utah rate-
payers of l\Iountain Fuel. It was this consumer fraud 
that was terminated hy the Utah decision that Mountain 
Fuel now claims warrants review of this Court. 
Mountain Fuel's daim, a claim made for the first 
time in this Court, that the risk of exploration charged 
to ratepayers was conditioned on the requirement that 
l\Iountain Fuel discover and produce cheap gas, is 
wholly false. The ratepayers' obligation to pay all of 
Mountain Fuel's cost of unsuccessful exploration was 
not conditioned in any way. If l\Iountain Fuel had not 
discovered a single cubic foot of gas, l\fountain Fuel 
and its stockholders would not have had to reimburse 
or defray any of the burden placed on Utah's ratepayers. 
The record is wholly devoid of any such administrative 
requirement. There was simply no money-back guaran-
tee. 
4. The IVexpro transactions. 
Effective .January I, 1 !)77, Mountain Fuel attempt-
e~.· to once and for all remove the oil and gas properties 
h ' d in its non-utility accounts from what it perceived 
as· the jeopardy of Utah regulation. Mountain Fuel 
er ated a wholly-owned subsidiary, \Vexpro, and at-
, npted to transfer all of the oil and gas reserves held in 
its non-utility oil accounts with a market value in excess 
of $t.50 million to \ Vexpro. Mountain Fuel also at-
I •,•I• 
.... , ' 
, ,,. ~ ·,1111 I />1 
u 
tempted to have \ \' expro enter into a juiI!t expluralicm 
arrangement with .l\lountain Fuel to explore over :!.U 
million acres of oil and gas leases held in Mountain 
Fuel's utility acc:onn ts. The transfer of :Mountain Fuel's 
oil and gas propertiP-s to \ Vexpro at book value in ex-
change for all of \\' expro's outstanding .stock was re-
flected in a J >urchase and Sale ~ \ grecment. ( l\I FS-1.) 
The Purchase and Sale i\greement, as amended, re-
quired \ r expro to resell all of the gas produced from 
the transferred properties to .l\lountain Fuel at cost-
of-service prices. ( l\J FS--!.) The Purchase and Sale 
..c\ greement also gave l\J ountain Fuel an option to pur-
chase gas produced hy \\' expro on new acreage at mar-
ket prices. The joint exploration arrangement was rc-
~ected in a .Joint Exp]ora ti on .:\ greemen t he tween 
Mountain Fuel and \ \' expro. ( 1\1 FS-:!, 5.) 
The respondents initiated the proceedings be]ow 
to attack the \\' expro transactions. l Ttah claimed that 
the Commission had jurisdiction ovor the oil and gas 
properties held in :\lountain Fuel's non-utility accounts , 
that such properties were utility properties, and tha t 
they should he rolled in or induded in .Mountain Fuel's 
utility accounts for rate-making purposes. The Puhlie 
Service ('om mission, in a ~-1 decision,' ruled agaiust 
rcspo11dents, and they appen1ed to the l Ttah Supreme 
Court. 
' The Commission Report & Order set forth at pages 1 to 95 of 
Appendix B to Mountain Fuel's petition does not represent t he 
independent product of the Public Service Commission but w as 
adopted verbatim from the order proposed by Mountain Fuel , 
an adjudicatory practice previously critized by this Court. U.S . 
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U .S. 651 (1964). 
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5. The decisio1t of tlte Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Utah Pub-
Servicc Commission. The holdings of the Utah Su-
~me Court below can be divided for the purpose of 
~petition for certiorari between holdings addressed to 
,1cs re1ating to the oil and gas properties held in 
mntain Fuel's non-utility accounts and holdings ad-
;sscd to the option of 1\Iountain Fuel to purchase 
) produced by \ V expro from newly-acquired acreage 
market prices and \ \r expro' s regulatory status. The 
ldings of the l Ttah Supreme Court addressed to the 
and gas properties were by far the most important 
and were the focus of the court's decision. These hold-
ings were clear and final. 
The Utah Supreme Court held with regard to the 
oil and gas properties held in .Mountain Fuel's non-
utility accounts (I) such properties were utility prop-
erties ( . .:\pp. A 12 ),6 and ( :! ) such properties should be 
included in .l\Iountain Fuel's utility accounts for rate-
making purposes (A pp .. r\8, !) ) . The Supreme Court of 
Utah categorically rejected Mountain Fuel's oil and gas 
method of classification as a proper test of Utah regula-
tory jurisdiction or as a proper principle for the alloca-
tion of henefits arising from Mountain Fuel's oil and gas 
exploration program between ratepayer and shareholder 
interest. The bottom line of the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision was that the net profits from l\fountain Fuel's 
oi1 properties beyond all costs associated with their pro-
6 The citation '"App. A" refers to the Utah Supreme Court's de-
cision set forth in Appendix A to Mountain Fuel's Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari. 
lJ 
ductiou, including the cost of capital, shoul~l be applil:d 
to the benefit of l J tah ratepayers through a reduction 
in their future rates (.App . .i\8, H). The court held 
the ratepayers were to receive those net profits because 
the ratepayers and not 1\1 oun tain Fuel's shareholders had 
assumed the risk of exploration for oil and gas ( 1\ pp. 
.A 8). The £T tah court reached the same result as .l\Iichi-
gan and California, He M icltigan Consolidated Oas Co., 
78 P.lT.1U3d H~l (Mich. Puh. Serv. Comm'n HW8); 
Ile Pacific Oas & 11_,'/ectric Co., !)7 P. U .U.ad H:.!l (Cal. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n I B7:.!), and implicitly followed the 
thoughtfo] decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Colnmhia in Democratic Central l"'om-
mittce v. 11,.ashinutun Tm1v.-it Commission, 485 F.~d 
78H (D.C. Cir. mm), cert. denied, -t 15 U.S. 935 
( H>7 4). 
The ( r tah Supreme Court's holding with regard to 
l\fountain ]j\1el' s option to purchase gas from \V expro 
at market prices was occasioned by the past practices 
of l\'fountain Fuel. \\'hen gas reserves wound up in 
Mountain Fuel's non-utility accounts as a result of 
l\'f ountain Fuel's oi1 and gas method of classification, 
l\T mm ta in Fuel added insult to injury hy reselling that 
gas to Mountain Fuel's utility accounts at market prices, 
and then passing on those market prices as an expense 
in its rates to l Ttah ratepayers. The Supreme Court of 
Ptah, in light of these past practices, adopted a "no-
profit-to-affiliates" rule which prohibited such inh·a-
company profits from lwing indudecl in consumer rates, 
and applied that rule to the 1\Immtain Fucl-\\rexpro 
option so as to prevent any profit rea1ized hy \ Vexpro 
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under that option from being passed on to l\lountain 
Fuel's ratepayers. The Utah Supreme Court also held 
that \\' expro, by reason of its relationship as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of l\lountain Fuel and the unique re-
lationship betwee11 l\I ountain 11 ... uel and 'V expro created 
under the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Joint 
Exploration L\greement, was, under Utah law, a public 
utility. 
\ Vhile the Supreme Court's holding with regard 
to the Mountain Fuel-' Vexpro option and 'Vexpro' s 
status as a public utility are dear, their finality for the 
purpose of certionui is less certain. The Supreme Court 
not only set aside the Purchase and Sale Agreement and 
the .Joint Exploration Agreement, the Supreme Court 
of Utah left open the question of whether 'Vexpro is to 
exist at all. Specifically, in footnote 8, the Utah court 
said: 
There is further posed the serious issue of whether 
it is in the public interest for l\fountain Puel to 
divi<le its utility function between itself and a 
subsidiary. Helevant factors to be considered in 
this inquiry include any potential administrative 
inconvenience caused by the necessity of regu-
lating two corporate entities performing, in 
essence, a singular utility function; and additional 
costs and expenses affecting the rate base. 
1 1ply put, tl1e question of whether there is going to 
L \ \' expro rernaills a Utah regulatory issue. 
(). The decision of the Utah SiqHeme {'ourt docs 
.;v con/ iscate any pro7Jerty of Mountain l''ttel or its 
,llL., clwlders, interfere with interstate commerce or con-
flict with federal energy policy. 
17 
l\lountain Fuel's attempt to concoc:_t "substantial 
Federal quc:stions" out of the decision below is premised 
on fundamental mischaracterization of the court's de-
cision. The lJ tah Supreme Court's decision did not 
confiscate anything. The Utah Supreme Court merely 
held that oil, and gas properties that had been developed 
under a utiJity program at the risk of l Ttah ratepayers 
were utility properties on which Mountain Fuel was 
only entitled to a regulated rate of return, and that net 
profits beyond that regulated rate of return should be 
credited to l\f ountain FueJ' s ratepayers to reduce rates. 
"'hat Mountain Fuel's shareholders are entitled to have 
constitutionally protected and what will be protected 
under the decision of the Utah Supreme Court is their 
capital investment in l\fountain Fuel's utility oil prop-
erties. 
The decision below does not "retroactively reclass-
ify" anything. Mountain Fuel's attempt to inject the 
slogan "retroactive reclassification" to support its "con-
fiscation" argument is sophistry. Nothing in the Utah 
court's holding will affect anything prior to the institu-
tion of the 11 'c.rpro proceeding. There is no impact on 
rates received or revenues realized under any prior Com-
mission order. 1\1 ountain Fue1 wil1 keep every dime of 
the $57 million it received for the cost of unsuccessful 
exploration. It will keep every dime of oil profits it re-
ceived through the end of 1976-profits amounting to 
over $47 million. The court's decision will only affect 
rates and. revenues after the initiation of the IV expro 
case. 
The l Ttah decision did not regulate the price, pro-
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duction or profits of oil an<l gas sold in interstate com-
ierce. The l J tah decision did not remotely attempt to 
~gulate the price at which oil or gas is sold by l\Ioun-
tiu Fuel or \ V expro to others, nor does it even regu-
tte the price at which \ Vexpro sells gas to Mmmtain 
'uel under the l\I ountain Fuel-\ V expro option. .All 
l1at the Utah Supreme Court held \vith regard to the 
\' cxpro-l\Iountain Fuel sales is that any profits realized 
'Y \ V expro could not he included as charges in l\Ioun-
tin Fuel's rates to Mountain Fuel's customers under 
lie "no-profit-to-affiliates" rule. 
By holding that the tmic1ue relationship between 
~Iountain Fuel and \ V expro resulted in \Vexpro being 
classified as a public utility, the Utah Supreme Court 
did not liold an<l did not even state that independent 
parties other than \Vexpro would he classified as public 
utilities hy reason of their normal business relationships 
with l\fountain Fuel. The Utah Supreme Court did 
not attempt to regulate the price of nah1ral gas sold to 
Mountain Fuel for resale by independent parties or to 
('lassify such independent suppliers as public utilities. 
Indeed, T Ttah has a statute that expressly exempts such 
independent suppliers from classification as a public 
utility. Thus, section 5".t-2-l ( :30) provides in material 
part: 
Such person, company, corporation or association 
se1ling or exchanging such surplus product under 
such authorized contract shall not thereby be-
come a public utility within the meaning of this 
act, nor sliaJI it he snhject to the jurisdiction of 
the 'cornrnission. . . . § 5-t-2- l (BO), lT.C.A. 
1!)5:3. 
l'l 
.An<l finally, the l Ttah Supreme Court's clecision does 
not prevent any independent party from engaging in 
joint exploration with l\fountain Fuel under the pen-
alty of being classified as a public utility. \ Vexpro was 
not an independent party. 'Vex pro was created as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of l\Iountain Fuel for the sole 
business purpose of receiving all of the oil and gas prop-
erties held in lVIountain Fuel's non-utility accounts and 
to explore with 1\1 ountain Fuel the valuable wildcat 
acreage held in l\Jouutain Fuel's utility accounts. It 
was intimately involved in an attempt to secure with 
finality hundreds of millions of dollars of oil and gas 
reserves that had been developed at ratepayer risk for 
the benefit of l\Iountain Fuel's shareholders, and to 
grab enormously valuable exploration rights on over 2.9 
million acres of oil and gas leases held in Mountain 
1~--uel's utility accounts. There was nothing independent 
about \Vexpro, and there is nothing in the fVexpro de-
cision by the Utah Supreme Court that regulates, 
threatens or interferes with independent producers or 
sellers. 
REASONS FOH DENYING THE \\'Hl'l' 
1. The Utalz Supreme Court's decision does not 
raise any issue of constil utional confiscation. 
Mountain Fuel's claim of constitutional confiscation 
amounts to a claim that i\Iountain Fuel is constitution-
ally entitled in its exploration program to the best of 
hath possible worlds-the worlds of utility regulation 
and private enterprise. l\lonntain Fuel under its "oil" 
and "gas" method of classification asked lo he treated 
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as a utility wheu it was engaged in the risk of explora-
tion. It wanted to be treated as a utility by having its 
wildcat acreage capitalized iu its utility accounts as 
property held for future use, when it incurred losses 011 
wildcat acreage by including as a charge in its rates 
the expenses of cancelled leases, when it did geophysical 
and seismic work preparatory to exploration, and when 
exploration was unsuccessful and resulted in dry holes. 
But Mountain Fuel wanted its exploration to be trans-
formed into a private enterprise as soon as oil was dis-
covered. It wanted to he treated as a private enterprise 
under its "oil" and "gas" method of classification where 
the benefits of profits of its oil properties were con-
cerned. 
The simple answer to l\Iountain Fuel's claim of 
constitutional confiscation is that the constitution does 
not guarantee a utility the hest of both possible worlds. 
The constih1tion does not guarantee a utility can charge 
its ratepayers the cost of service for the gas they receive, 
· 1 addition ca11 charge its ratepayers for all the cost of 
nsuccessfnl exploration, ,m<l then keep the unregulated 
~turn from oil properties discovered through such ex-
loration solely for the benefit of stockholders. 
Under tlie Ptah Suprelllc Court's decision l\loun-
in Fuel a1Jd JU oun ta in Fuel's stockholders receive the 
mstih1tional protection to which they are entitled. 
'hat J\1 ouutain Fuel's .stockholders are entitled to have 
oteete<l, aud what wiJJ he protected under the lT tali 
1prenw Court's decision, is their capital investment. 
Pederal l'ower Commission v. II ope Natural Oas Co., 
21 
B:!O U.S. ;JH I ( rn H) ; Li11dheimer v. 1 Llinois Jfr/L Tele-
phone Co., :!Hi U.S. 151 ( rna.:t); see al~·u, Nehbia v. 
People of the State of New Y'ork, iOl l T.S. 50i ( rna-1). 
The roll-in of 1\1 ountain Fuel's utility oil properties and 
associated revenues and expenses under the Utah Su-
preme Court's decision will result in the full protection 
of l\lountain Fuel's stockholders' capital investment in 
utility oil properties. All the costs associated with the 
operation and production of 1\1 ountain Fuel's utility oil 
properties, including a rate of return or profit on the 
stockholders' capital inveshnent, will inure to the benefit 
of Mountain Fuel's stockholders. That is the protection 
required by the constitution and that is the protection 
that Mounb1in Fuel's stockholders will receive under 
the court's decision. \ Vhat the stockholders will not 
receive are the net profits of l\Jountain Fuel's utility 
oil properties beyond all costs assodated with their pro-
duction. Ueyond such costs those profits will be allo-
cated to its ratepayers under the l Ttah Supreme Court's 
decision, for those profits are profits attrilmtahle to tlw 
risks of exploration, the risks that were exclusively borrn 
by l\Jountain Fuel's ratepayers. 
This ( 'ourt has squarely held that there is no con 
stitutional right to nou-regulation and certainly there i: 
no constitutional right to the continued acceptance o 
Mountain Fuel's oil and gas method of classificati01 
that arbitrarily and improperly removed utility prop 
erties from the jurisdiction of the Commission. J11cdcra 
Power Commission v. Natural Uas Pipeline, ill 5 lT .S 
575 (UH~); .iVebhia v. J>copfc of the State of Ne1 
York, s111n·a; Cotto11wood 11/all Slw7>pi11u Center v. Uta' 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Power & Light Co., -1--W F.:!<l :w ( 1 Oth Cir. I !l7l). The 
argumeut that ~lountain Fuel makes was precisely the 
constitutional attack made agaiust the Natural Gas Act 
of I H:38 which for the first time placed natural gas pipe-
liues under federal regulation and made such pipelines 
subject to a regulated rate of reh1rn. The Court made 
short shrift of that argument and stated, "[T] he busi-
ness ... is not any the less subject to regulation now 
because the governrnent has not seen fit to regulate it 
iu the past." Federal J>orccr Co1111nission v. Xatural 
Gas Pipeline, su1>ra, at .588. 
The roll-in of oil properties, revenues and expenses 
is not confiscation at all, but is an application by the 
l Ttah Supreme Court of the controlling principle uni-
fonnly foJJowed hy <.:ourts and commissions in a11ocating 
benefits arising from utility activities between ratepayer 
and stockholder-gain foJlows risk. Democratic Central 
{'onm1ittcc v. Jrashington Transit Commission, 485 
F.2d 78H ( D.C. Cir. mm), cert. denied, -t.n l r.s. 935 
(Hl7-t); Uchchick c. IJ~ashington Transit Commission, 
-(·85 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1H7H); Xew York Jtratcr 
Service Corp. v. Public Service Commission, I:.! App. 
Div.:.!d 12:!, :W8 X.Y.S.:.!d 857 (lntiO); El Paso .Xat-
uml Oas Co., Docket No. CP7i>-H<>2 (FEHC 1977); Ue 
JI icliiga11 Cu11so/id{~f ed Oas Co., 78 P. U. H.ad :l:.! 1 
( l\Iich. Puh. Serv. Cornm'n l !Hi8) ; He 1Vyo111ing Uas 
Co., -W P. U.H.ad 50!> nvyo. Puh. Serv. Comm'n 
1%1 ) . The principle that he who hears the financial 
burden of particular utility activity should also reap the 
benefit resulting therefrom I )emocratic Central Com.· L ) 
111ittee, supra, at 80fi, does not raise an issue of con· 
fiscation, but is valid regulation of public ~1tility activity 
in the public interest. This principle of allocation has 
been adopted without exception by every single judicial 
an<l administrative decision in every jurisdiction which 
has ever addressed the question. Bebchick v. JVashing-
ton Transit Commission, supra; New York JVater Serv-
ice Corp. v. Public Service Commission, supra~· Hl Paso 
.. Vatural Gas Co., supra; Re .Michigan Consolidated Oas 
Co., su71ra; Ile JVyorning Gas Co., supra. The claim of 
"confiscation" is a red herring. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court's decision does not 
raise any issue of undue burden or obstruction of inter-
state com11ierce. 
l\.fountain Fuel's claim the l Ttah Supreme Court 
decision burdens or obstructs interstate commerce is 
wholly without merit. 
(a) l\lountain Fuel attempts to argue that the 
Utah Supreme Court's holding addressed to the Moun-
tain Fuel-\ Vexpro option obstructs commerce by regu-
lating the price of interstate sales of gas from \ V expro to 
:Mountain Fuel.7 The decision below does nothing of 
the sort. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court requires the 
Public Service Commission to allow in retail rates onlv 
the cost of service on gas sold by \V cxpro to Mountain 
Fuel. The court does so under the "no-profit-to-affili-
ates" rule, applying the wel1-estahlished principle that 
1 While the question whether Wexpro is to exist at all is still 
open, see § 5, supra, there is no commerce clause issue raised 
. by this case whether Wexpro exists or not. For the pur-
pose of respondents' argument respondents assume that Wexpro 
will be in business. 
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shareholders should not be able to make a profit at the 
expense of ratepayers 011 transactions between affiliated 
companies where there is no arm's-length bargaining. 
H cgardless of whether or not \\' expro' s gas comes from 
inside or outside l r tah, this holding is fully in line with 
constitutional doctrine established by this ( 'onrt. This 
Court has consistently held ~l state, in retail ratemaking, 
may determine a reasonable charge on interstate sales 
of nah1ral gas between affiliates without violating the 
commerce clause. ln Lone /')"tar Gas Co. v. 11exas, 304 
IT.S. ~~4 ( rnaH), this Court expressly rejected the argu-
ment that a determination by the Texas commission of 
a reasonable rate for gas sold interstate to a utility by 
au affiliated pipeline company was invalid under the 
commerce clause. Lone Star Gas was consistent with 
and followed the rule laid down in Dayton Power "'~ 
Light Co. v. Public l 7tilities Commission of Ohio, 
:w~ U.S. ~oo ( rna-:t) aud IV est em Distributing Co. v. 
Public Service Co11w1ission of Kansas, :.!8:5 CT.S. 1 rn 
(I Ha~). In IV estern /)istributin{f, the Court explained 
hy a state inquiry into the reasonableness of a charge 
f an affiliate for gas sold interstate does not circum-
mt paramount federal authority over interstate com-
erce: 
Those in control of tl1e situation have combined 
the interstate carriage of the commodity with its 
local distribution in wliat is in practical effect one 
organization. There is an absence of arm's length 
bargaining hctweeu the two coq)()rate entities in-
volved, and of aH the elements which ordinarily 
go to fix market value. The opportunity exists 
for one member of the combination to charge 
the other an unreasonable rate for the gas fur-
25 
nished and thus to make such unfair charge in 
part the basis of the retail rate. The~ state author-
ity whose powers are invoked to fix a reason-
able rate is certainly entitled to be informed 
whether advantage has been taken of the situ-
ation to put an unreasonable burden upon the 
distributing company, and the mere fact that the 
charge is made for an interstate service does not 
constrain the Commission to desist from all in-
quiry as to its fairness. Any other rule would 
make possible the gravest injustice, and would 
tie the hands of the state authority in such fashion 
that it could not effectively regulate the intra-
state service which unquestionably lies within its 
jurisdiction. 1Vestern Distribution Co., supra, 
at 124-25. 
The Utah Supreme Court's holding on this point was 
especially sound in this case in light of the fact that in 
the past l\Iountain Fuel has achrnlly heen selling gas 
from its non-utility accounts to its utility accounts at 
market prices, and then passing on those market prices 
as an expense in rates to l Ttah ratepayers. The com-
merce clause under this Court's doctrine does not pro-
scribe a state from putting a stop to that kind of practice. 
( b) Mountain Fuel's argument that the rolJ-in of 
oil properties and profits obstructs commerce is based 
on a fundamental misstatement of the Otah Supreme 
Court's decision. l\f onntain Fnel misrepresents the 
court's holding by arguing that it regulates production, 
prices and profits on interstate sales of crude oil de-
veloped in states other than l T tah. That is false. On 
the contrary, aJI the l T tah Supreme Court held with re-
gard to l\1ountain Fuel's oil profits is that net profits 
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beyond all costs assodated with production, including 
the cost of capital, from oil developed as a utility activity 
at the sole risk of ratepayers, should benefit Utah's 
ratepayers. This is rate-making, not regulation of pro-
duction, price or profit. 
l\I ountain Fuel's contention that the roll-in of oil 
properties and profits violates the commerce clause be-
cause oil is developed and so] cl outside Utah is again 
contrary to the doctrine of this l 'uurt. This Court has 
squarely held that the commerce clause does not pro-
hibit a state, in eslablishing utility rates, from classifying 
as utility properties for rate-making purposes properties 
located in other states. In Lone Star Oas Co. v. Texas, 
supra, this Court upheld, without re<1uiring segregation 
of out-of-state properties from the rate base or segre-
gation of revenues and expenses associated with those 
properties, an order of the Texas Hailroad Commission 
reducing natural gas rates charged by a Texas utility. 
This was not a case where the segregation of 
properties and business was essential in order to 
confine the exercise of state power to its own 
proper province [citation omitted]. Here, as we 
have seen, the Commission in its method of deal-
ing with the property and business of appellant 
as an integrated operating system did not trans-
cend the limits of the state's jurisdiction or apply 
an improper criterion in its determinations. I~one 
Star Oas Co., supra, at :241. 
Cf. Capital Trnnsit Co. 1;. J>uhlic l 'tilities eommissio11 
of n.('., :.n a F.:!d l rn, 17n-81. ( D.C. Cir. rn.53). 
Not only is l\I ountain Fuel's argument wrong as a 
matter of this Court's doctrine, hut it flies in the face of 
£..I 
regulatory reality. l t is both necessary au<l c:onunon for 
public utilities throughout this country to utilize out-of-
.state properties tu provide services to consumers in their 
state of service. For example, Pacific Gas & Electric 
Company, in serving energy to CaJifornia consumers, ex-
plores and develops oil and gas properties in Alaska. 8 
Mountaiu Fuel itself explores for and develops hydro-
carbons in \\r yenning and Colorado for the purpose of 
providing natural gas to ratepayers in Utah. llecause 
out-of-state properties are necessary to provide utility 
services, state public utility commissions have to include 
these properties in rate base and calculate rates on the 
basis of revenues and expenses from them. Mountain 
-Fuel's commerce clause argument would have the 
effect of handicapping utilities in developing adequate 
sources of power to serve their consumers, and would 
handicap utility commissions in exercising the regula-
tory powers they need to set rates. Therefore, not only 
is 1Vlountain -F'uel' s argument contrary to this Court's 
doctrine, hut it wouJd have the effect of stripping pub-
lic commissions of power they use as a matter of course 
on a day-to-day basis. Mountain Fuel's position that 
this common practice violates the commerce clause is 
constitutional nonsense. 
( c) l\fountain Fuel's final daim the decision be-
low burdens interstate commerce is based on the totally 
false premise that the holding of the l Ttah Supreme 
Court will regulate as public utilities independent 
R See, e.g., Re Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 97 P.U.R.3d 321 (Cal. 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 1972), where the California Commission 
gave ratepayers the benefits in rates of profits on oil discovered 
by the utility in Alaska. 
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parties jointly exploring with Mountain Fuel and will 
regulate interstate gas sales between independent parties 
and l\Iountaiu Fuel. These premises are categorically 
false and are a misstatement of the Utah Supreme 
Court's holding. The issues in this case solely concern 
:Mountain Fuel and its wholly-owned subsidiary, 'Vex-
pro, and the court's cledsion makes no holding and has 
absolutely no ramifications with respect to independent 
parties. 
a. The Utah Supreme Court's decision does not 
raise any issue of preemption. 
l\Iountain Fuel's claim that the Utah Supreme 
Court decision regulates both oil and gas in conflict 
with federal statutes and policy is also nonsense. l\Ioun-
tain Fuel attacks both the court's decision prohibiting 
\ \T expro to make a profit on its sales of gas to l\fountain 
Fuel at ratepayer expense, and the holding benefiting 
ratepayers by rolling in oil profits on utility properties 
explored and developed at ratepayer risk. Neither of 
hese holdings is remotely preempted by any federal 
-tatute, rcg1dation or policy. 
l\fountain Fuel claims the Natural Uas Act pre-
mpts the ITtah Supreme Court's holding preventing 
fountain Fuel from passing on in rates any more than 
l1e cost of service 011 natural gas it obtains from \Vex-
ro. In making this argument, Mountain Fuel mis-
1ialyzes the r Jtah Supreme Court's decision. The de-
. sion does not regulate wholesale prices, but prohibits 
· ~of its on wholesale sales between l\I ountain Fuel and 
ts wholly-owned subsidiary, \Vexpro, from being 
29 
charge<l to ratepayers iu the retail price af gas. This 
action is fully consistent with this Court's holdings on 
this very point. Contrary to .Mountain Fuel's position, 
the Natural Gas Act left it to the states to do exactly 
what the court below mandated. Prior to the passage 
of the N ah1ral Gas Act, this Court held consistently 
and squarely the states had constitutional power to 
regulate charges in retail rates for natural gas purchased 
from affiliates, regardless of whether or not the gas was 
purchased from the affiliate in an interstate transaction. 
1Vestern Distributing Co., supra; Dayton Power q; Light 
Co., supra; Lone Star Oas Co., supra. The Natural Gas 
Act had no effect on that authority. Panhandle East-
ern Pipeline Co. v. .Michigan Public Service Com-
mission, 341 U.S. B:lH ( 19.51); Panhandle Eastern 
Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, 
3H2 U.S. 507 {In-17). The Natural Gas Act "had no 
purpose or effect to cut down state powe!r." Panhandle 
v. Indiana, supra, at ;)17. The Natural Gas 1\ct was 
not intended and could not have been intended by Con-
gress to render states helpless to protect consumers 
against affiliated companies' price manipulations, when 
the Court prior to the Act had held the states had clear 
power to provide consumers such protection. This Court 
stated in Panlumdle v. Indiana, supra, with respect to 
the Act: 
[P]erhaps its primary purpose was to aid in 
making stale regulation effective, by adding the 
weight of fcdt>ral regulation to supplement and 
reinforce it in the gap created by the prior de-
dsions. 'l'he Act was drawn with meticulous re-
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gard for the continued exercise of state power, 
not to handicap or dilute it in any way. 
* * * * 
It would be an exceedingly incongruous result 
if a statute so motivated, designed and shaped to 
bring about more effective regulation, and par-
ticularly more effective state regulation, were 
construed in the teeth of those objects, and the 
import of its wording as well, to cut clown regu-
latory power and to do so in a manner making 
the states less capable of regulation than before 
the statute's adoption. Id. at .517-19. 
Therefore, ~Iountain Fuel's argument that Utah is con-
stitutionally required to allow its natural gas public 
utility's stockholders to make a profit at ratepayer ex-
pense on gas "purchased" from its wholly-owned subsid-
iary is simply wrong. 
Mountain Fuel argues that the entire decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court is preempted by "federal regu-
lation [which] has been extended to completely eclipse 
state regulation in this field." (Petition at 25.) 1Vfoun-
tain Fuel cites a string of federal statutes, including the 
Natural Gas Act, in support of this fatuous proposition 
(Petition at :!-~, n. 11). But federal stah1tes have not 
eclipsed the field and "ousted" state regulation. The 
very statutes cited by :Mountain Fuel belie that prop-
osition. Congress has expressly recognized in these 
statutes the traditional powers of the states over oil and 
gas matters. The absurdity of Mountain Fuel's position 
is seen, for example, in the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policy 1\ct of 1H78, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201, et seq. (1978). 
That stah1te expressly provides: 
Nothing in this chapter prohibits any State 
regulatory authority or nonregulated gas utility 
from adopting, pursuant to State law, any stand 
ard or rule affecting gas utilities which is differ 
ent from any standard established by this chap 
ter. 15 U.S.C. §3~08.9 
There is no pattern of ( ~ongressional hw "eclipsing th 
field." In fact, Cougress has demonstrated its inten 
not to do so. Nor is there any conflict between an: 
federal policy, statute or regulation and the holding 
of the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Com 
does not in any way regulate production, price or profi 
of oil or gas. It rather articulated and implementej 
uniformly accepted principles of ratemaking. Allocation 
of profits according to the principle gain follows risk is 
not regulation of production, price or profit. l\Iountain 
Fuel necessarily misstates the holdings because it re-
alizes an accurate reading of the decision raises no fed-
eral issue of any sort. 
Once again, 1\Iountain Fuel's position flies in the 
face of regulatory reality. l\I ountain I~~uel would have 
this Court eliminate all classes of state regulation over 
any aspect of the oil and gas business. It would elim-
inate state regulation preventing waste of oil and gas. 
1 t would eliminate state regulation promoting conser-
vation. It would eliminate state boards with the juris-
'> See also the Federal Energy Petroleum Allocation Act, cited 
by Mountain Fuel, which again demonstrates Congress' recog-
nition that federal regulation has not "completely eclipsed" the 
field. This Act, by its express terms, preempts only state reg-
ulation over allocation of refined petroleum products which are 
in actual conflict with regulations promulgated pursuant to it. 
15 u.s.c. §755(b). 
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diction and authority necessary to promote conservation. 
It would eliminate state laws requiring well permits 
and the spaciug of wells. 10 The argument is simply 
uu tenable. 
Mountain Fuel states that the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision frush·ates federal policy by "siezing 
profits" on "T expro's oil sales because Mountain Fuel's 
"exploration and development program will be compel-
led to phase out and cnd.n (Petition at :W.) This is 
nothing more than a thinly-veiled temper tantrum by 
Mountain Fuel's stockholders who threaten to end their 
exploration program if they do not get their own way. 
nut a temper tantrum does not produce a federal con-
stitutional issue. Mountain Fuel's contention the de-
cision eliminates price incentives in violation of federal 
policy is wholly inaccurate. Price incentives are not 
eliminated by the decision. l\Iountain Fuel has always 
been free, and still is free, to engage in a free-enterprise 
I and gas exploration program of its own. Mountain 
l 3} has the same price incentives as any other corn-
y. A II it needs to do is put its stockholders' money 
1·isk, rather than use the profits generated by its 
ity program to foster the enterprise. Nor i.s the 
at to end the program credible, because this temper 
1 rum caunot limit Mountain Fuel's obligations under 
h Jaw to serve as a puhlic utility under l Ttah's reg-
'.)ry authority. 
10 See, e.g.,§§ 40-6-1, et seq., U.C.A. (1953). 
JJ 
Finally, the claim that this decision will !nvite other 
states to "sieze profits" from utilities rings hollow. The 
Utah Supreme Court was faced with a wholly-unique 
problem. No other utility in this country ever developed 
this unique system of classification to give its share-
holders the best of both worlds in its exploration and 
development of oil and gas at the expense of ratepayers. 
Mountain I~.,uel' s conduct was unique and the decision 
will not have the ramifications claimed by Mountain 
Fuel. JVIountain Fuel's claim that this abuse of lJ tah 
consumers rises to the level of constitutional principle 
warrants no consideration by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for "rrit of Certiorali should be 
denied. 
DA TED this :?8th day of November, 1 H7!l. 
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